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Situating Emotion: A Critical Realist View of 
Emotion and Nonconscious Cognitive Processes for 
Law and Legal Theory 
David J. Arkush 
This Article attempts to clarify legal thinking about emotion in 
decision making. It surveys evidence from psychology and neuroscience 
on the extensive role that emotion and related nonconscious cognitive 
processes play in human behavior, then evaluates the treatment of 
emotion in three legal views of decision making: rational choice theory, 
behavioral economics, and cultural cognition theory. The Article 
concludes that each theory is mistaken to treat emotion mostly as a 
decision objective rather than a part of the decision-making process and, 
indeed, to treat it as a force that mostly compromises that process. The 
Article introduces the view that emotion is a critical behavioral process 
that plays a role in most if not all decisions and is not readily amenable 
to accumulation or maximization. The Article discusses broad 
implications of this view for welfarist legal theory and policy generally 
and for an ongoing debate on risk regulation between behavioral 
economists and cultural cognition theorists. It also sketches potential 
applications in the law of employment discrimination, consumer 
protection, and criminal law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, a revolution has begun in legal thinking on 
emotion in decision making. Rational choice theory, which holds 
that decision making is emotionless, has been swept by “behavioral 
economics,” which recognizes that many decisions are biased or 
flawed, often for emotional reasons. More recently, “cultural 
cognition theory” holds that emotion is rational and critical to 
decisions, positing that behavioral economics is mistaken to treat 
emotion as a distorting influence. This Article argues that each 
theory is unsatisfactory in light of empirical evidence on the role of 
emotion in decision making. The Article argues that the evidence 
supports a fundamental theoretical shift on emotion: treating 
emotion primarily as a behavioral process rather than an object of 
decisions. This shift has broad implications for law, legal theory, and 
policy in areas ranging from contract, tort, and criminal law to 
administrative regulation and the laws governing democratic process. 
This Article is situationist in that it treats emotion not as an 
object of controlled thought and choices, but rather as one of many 
underappreciated factors that cause behavior.1 This stance is dictated 
 
 1. See Jon D. Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: A Critical Realist Perspective on 
the Human Animal, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003) [hereinafter Hanson & Yosifon, 
Situation]. Hanson and Yosifon adopted the term “situationism” from social psychology. In 
that field, “situationism” refers to the view that behavior is produced more by contextual 
factors and people’s attempts to respond to them (“the situation”) than by stable 
characteristics within people (“dispositions”). See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. 
Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination and Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate 
Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1039–40 (2006). I read Hanson and Yosifon as treating 
stable personality characteristics, to the extent they exist, as part of the situation as well, 
deeming them part of people’s “interior situations,” in contrast to situational factors outside 
people’s bodies, which are “exterior situations.” See generally Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, 
The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 
1 (2004) [hereinafter Hanson & Yosifon, Situational Character]. 
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by a methodological commitment to using the best available 
evidence on how humans think, feel, and behave, with the caveat 
that we must not overestimate our ability to attain knowledge 
untainted by politics and our own limitations—an approach Jon 
Hanson and David Yosifon have named critical realism.2 The project 
of “situating emotion” is the critical-realist attempt to identify 
emotion’s role among the many factors that produce behavior. 
Part I of this Article briefly introduces the dominant view of 
emotion in law, as reflected in rational choice theory and behavioral 
economics. Drawing heavily on evidence from social psychology and 
neuroscience, Part II discusses three major problems with this view, 
each of which derives from treating emotion as an object of decisions 
rather than a behavioral process. Part III introduces affirmative 
evidence for a different view of emotion that has received little 
attention in the legal literature: affect as the dominant biological 
process that drives behavior. Part IV evaluates rational choice theory, 
behavioral economics, and cultural cognition theory in light of the 
empirical evidence, concluding that each is incomplete, inaccurate, 
or incoherent. Part V outlines the view of emotion emerging from 
empirical evidence, argues that it compares favorably with other 
approaches, and sketches some implications of the view for law and 
legal theory. 
I. A CONTRADICTION ON EMOTION 
Rational choice theory has always contained an odd 
contradiction on emotion and reason.3 On the one hand, it treats 
emotion as undesirable and exceptional in decision making. On the 
 
 2. See Hanson & Yosifon, Situation, supra note 1, at 179–92. Jerry Kang and 
Mahzarin R. Banaji have similarly called for “behavioral realism.” Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of 
Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1497 (2004). I take behavioral realism to share critical 
realism’s commitment to basing law and legal theory on the most realistic understanding of 
human behavior available. Hanson and Yosifon, however, have rightly emphasized that we 
should maintain “reservations about how ‘knowable’ our world is, about the existence of truly 
neutral, apolitical social sciences and legal doctrines, and about the independence of judges, 
scholars, and other reputedly neutral actors and institutions.” Hanson & Yosifon, Situation, 
supra note 1, at 182. 
 3. Despite its multi-decade prominence, “rational choice theory” lacks a settled 
definition. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1060–
64 (2000). I use the phrase to refer to expected utility theory, the most common form of 
rational choice theory, id. at 1062, as employed to make normative claims. Exemplars are 
Richard Posner, Louis Kaplow, and Steven Shavell. 
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other, it sets emotion as the principal (if not exclusive) goal of 
decisions. This tension is worth exploring because it illustrates the 
major flaw in mainstream views of emotion: treating emotion 
primarily as an object of decisions and failing to understand its role in 
the decision-making process. 
A. Undesirable Emotion 
Rational choice theory follows a long Western tradition of 
treating emotion primarily as negative influence. In this view, 
emotion is the opposite of reason, an untrustworthy force that 
cripples judgment.4 Thankfully, given its destructiveness, emotion is 
also rare, lasting only for brief states such as fear, rage, bliss, or a 
visceral craving.5 Aside from these occasional episodes, we are mostly 
emotionless decision makers. 
More recently, authors in a school termed “behavioral 
economics” have discussed numerous “flaws” or “biases” in human 
rationality, many of which are emotional in nature.6 This represents 
less change from rational choice theory than appears at first glance. 
Like rational choice theorists, behavioral economists see emotion as a 
flaw that impairs proper—meaning “rational”—thought.7 Rational 
choice theory already accepted that emotions occasionally influence 
decisions; behavioral economics only expands the account of the 
frequency and means by which this happens. 
 
 4. See, e.g., George Loewenstein & Jennifer S. Lerner, The Role of Affect in Decision 
Making, in HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES 619, 620–21 (Davidson et al. eds., 2003); 
Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting, 80 IND. 
L.J. 155, 159–60 & n.28 (2005) [hereinafter Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting]; Terry A. 
Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 30 L. & HUM. 
BEHAV. 119 (2006). 
 5. See, e.g., George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Human 
Behavior, 65 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272, 273 (1996) [hereinafter 
Loewenstein, Out of Control]. 
 6. See supra text accompanying notes 1–3. 
 7. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE LAWS OF FEAR (2005) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, 
FEAR]. This accords with their oft-professed aim of developing and enhancing rational choice 
theory rather than undermining it. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 3, at 1074–75; Tanina 
Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New Behavioral Law and 
Economics Movement, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 973, 974–75 (2000). 
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B. Crucial Emotion 
Despite this apparent distaste for emotion in decision making, 
rational choice theorists and behavioral economists are committed to 
emotion when it goes by another name. They call this emotion 
“preferences,” “utility,” and “welfare.” Scholars have expended little 
effort defining these terms, but it is clear that they signify emotional 
well-being. For example, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, who 
have written extensively on welfare, use “utility” and “welfare” to 
“refer to the well-being of an individual”8 and further define “well-
being” as whatever pleases us minus whatever displeases us.9 The 
term “preferences” also signifies emotion because it is identical to 
“welfare”: welfare is the sum of satisfied preferences, and preferences 
are predictions of expected welfare.10 Thus, the terms refer to the 
same emotional objects of decisions at different phases of the 
decision-making process. Preferences are input-stage emotions that, 
once obtained, become output-stage utility or welfare.11 
C. Synthesis: The Emotionless Pursuit of Emotion 
Thus, we see that the object of our mostly emotionless choices is, 
oddly, emotion: Rational choice theory holds that people choose, 
without emotion, outcomes that will generate positive emotion. 
Behavioral economists employ the same structure, varying only their 
recognition that many decisions are irrational for various reasons, 
one of which is the interference of emotion. Economists also reverse 
this equation to infer preferences: because people rationally choose 
the best means of satisfying their preferences, we can say that they 
desire the results of their actions—that their choices reveal their 
 
 8. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 
979 (2001); see also STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 595 
(2004) (defining a person’s “utility” as an “indicator of his well-being, whatever might 
constitute that well-being”). 
 9. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 8, at 980 (“[W]ell-being . . . incorporates in a positive 
way everything that an individual might value . . . [and] in a negative way harms to his or her 
person and property, costs and inconveniences, and anything else the individual might find 
distasteful.”). 
 10. A set of preferences is usually viewed as a state of the world or a bundle of goods. 
See Preferences, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2006); Kaplow & Shavell, 
supra note 8, at 979 & n.33; see also SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 595 n.1. 
 11. Additionally, Kaplow and Shavell rely on work that expressly uses the term 
“emotion” to signify preferences and utility. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 8, at 983 n.39 
(citing JONATHAN BARON, MORALITY AND RATIONAL CHOICE 144 (1993)). 
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preferences.12 Thus, policymakers can determine the value of goods 
and services and define welfare simply by watching what people do in 
well-working markets. 
At a minimum, this approach suffers from internal tension. It 
assumes that emotion is mostly irrelevant or dangerous in decisions 
but that decisions reflect attempts to pursue emotion. Further, this 
approach assumes curiously that people perceive, evaluate, and 
pursue emotion without feeling it.13 The precise locus of tension is 
the hidden assumption that there are two types of emotion in 
decisions—emotion in the decision-making process and emotion as a 
decision object—and that the former is bad and the latter good. I 
argue below that this view is wholly mistaken, that emotion is critical 
to the decision-making process—sometimes helpful, sometimes 
harmful, but always necessary—and that welfare as commonly 
conceived is an illusory decision object. In short, the dominant view 
is backward. 
II. PROBLEMS WITH VIEWING EMOTIONS AS OBJECTS 
This Part discusses problems with viewing emotions as objects of 
decision making at each stage of the mainstream decision-making 
model: input (“preferences”), outcomes (“welfare”), and behavior 
(“choices”). First, however, let us make the discussion more concrete 
with a metaphor similar to one Shavell recommends. Imagine we 
each have a brain cavity that we can fill with utility chemicals—a 
well-being cup.14 At any given point in time, we have a certain 
quantity of chemicals in our cups, and we rank potential states of the 
 
 12. See, e.g., Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of 
Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 322–23 (1977) (“If you are observed to choose x 
rejecting y, you are declared to have ‘revealed’ a preference for x over y. . . . The rationale of 
this approach seems to be based on the idea that the only way of understanding a person’s real 
preference is to examine his actual choices . . . .”). 
 13. Also, its definition of “preferences” is circular. To ascertain preferences, we examine 
behavior and, to predict behavior, we look at preferences. See id. at 325. Another cause for 
concern is that many entities committed to influencing both our behavior and our perceptions 
of our behavior, primarily business interests, promote this theory even though they do not 
believe it. See generally Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: 
The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & 
Kysar, TBS I]; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some 
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & 
Kysar, TBS II]; Hanson & Yosifon, Situation, supra note 1, at 160–61. 
 14. See SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 596 n.2. 
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world based on the chemicals they will provide us. These rankings 
are preferences. We then choose among world-states to maximize 
the amount of good chemicals that flow into our cups, and 
policymakers can tell what we value simply by looking in them. 
Finally, take the metaphor one step further, and imagine you are in a 
restaurant. Your utility chemicals go into a cup on the table rather 
than a brain cavity, and your potential preferences are on the drink 
menu. Now let us look at your preferences, choices, and welfare. 
A. Problems with Preferences: Tap Water or Evian? Small or Tall? 
1. Miswanting 
The first problem with preferences is that many are mistaken—
deeply mistaken. Much of what we seek and aspire to yields far less 
happiness than we imagine. In terms of the cup metaphor, we often 
discover that our drinks do not taste as we expected. Or they taste 
right, but we learn that we want something different than we 
thought. Or, for no apparent reason, the drinks simply do not please 
us as expected. Psychologist Dan Gilbert calls this phenomenon 
“miswanting.”15 
Our relationship to money is probably the best-documented 
example of miswanting. Correlations between wealth and happiness 
vary somewhat from study-to-study,16 but one conclusion remains 
consistent: increased wealth or income provides little or no 
additional happiness to people who are not poor.17 Curves plotting 
well-being and annual income abruptly plateau above middle class 
levels.18 One recent study inferred that increasing happiness by one 
point on a ten-point scale would take at least an 800,000% increase 
 
 15. Daniel Gilbert & Timothy Wilson, Miswanting: Some Problems in the Forecasting of 
Future Affective States, in FEELING AND THINKING: THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN SOCIAL 
COGNITION 178 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000). Others have discussed evidence of miswanting 
and other so-called “affective forecasting” problems in the legal literature. See Blumenthal, 
Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 163 & n.44; Hanson & Yosifon, Situational Character, 
supra note 1, at 118–19. I discuss the evidence thoroughly because it is relatively new to legal 
scholarship and because I integrate it into a holistic view of emotion. 
 16. Michael Argyle, Causes & Correlates of Happiness, in WELL-BEING: THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 353, 356–58 (Kahneman et al. eds., 2003). 
 17. Id. at 358; David G. Myers, The Funds, Friends, & Faith of Happy People, 55 AM. 
PSYCHOL. 56, 59 (2000). 
 18. Argyle, supra note 16, at 356. 
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in income,19 and another found that although average national 
income in the United States grew from $9000 to $20,000 between 
1957 and 1998, happiness declined slightly, from 35% to 33%.20 
Studies of national wealth and well-being also have found that the 
correlation between increased wealth and well-being disappears once 
national wealth grows above a relatively low floor—$8000 gross 
national product per capita in one study21 and $12,000 gross 
domestic product per capita in another.22 
Additionally, several studies suggest that wealth can correlate 
negatively with happiness.23 Some researchers theorize that increased 
income or wealth may increase our focus on money at the expense of 
aspects of life that bring more happiness.24 This may lead us to 
“misallocate” time, for example, by “accepting lengthy commutes 
(which are among the worst moments of the day)” or “sacrificing 
time spent socializing (which are among the best moments of the 
day).”25 Some have even suggested that high income can focus 
attention on wealth in a pattern similar to drug addiction.26 
 
 19. Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Paul Frijters, How Important Is Methodology for the 
Estimates of the Determinants of Happiness?, 114 ECON. J. 641, 656 (2004). Another study 
suggests that the wealthiest people in the United States are at most only slightly happier than 
those with average incomes. Diener and his colleagues found that 49 people with incomes over 
$10 million reported being happy 77% of the time whereas people with average incomes 
reported being happy 62% of the time. Ed Diener, Jeff Horwitz & Robert A. Emmons, 
Happiness of the Very Wealthy, 16 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 263, 263–74 (1985). 
 20. Myers, supra note 17, at 61. Similarly, a 500% increase in income in Japan between 
1958 and 1987 did not increase reported happiness. Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein, 
Hedonic Adaptation, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 302, 
313 (Kahneman et al. eds., 2003); Daniel Kahneman et al., Would You Be Happier If You 
Were Richer?, 312 SCI. 1908, 1909 (2006). 
 21. Myers, supra note 17, at 59. (“Better so far as happiness and life satisfaction go to 
be Irish than Bulgarian. But whether one is Irish, Belgian, Norwegian, or American hardly 
matters.”). 
 22. Kahneman et al., supra note 20, at 1909. Although increased wealth correlates with 
greater happiness in poor countries, the correlation “is surprisingly weak (indeed, virtually 
negligible)” in the United States, Canada, and Europe. Myers, supra note 17, at 59; see also id. 
(“People who go to work in their overalls and on the bus are just as happy, on the average, as 
those in suits who drive to work in their own Mercedes.” (citing DAVID LYKKEN, HAPPINESS: 
THE NATURE AND NURTURE OF JOY AND CONTENTMENT 17 (Golden Books 1999))). 
 23. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, If We Are So Rich, Why Aren’t We Happy?, 54 AM. 
PSYCHOL. 821 (1999). 
 24. Argyle, supra note 16, at 358; Csikszentmihalyi, supra note 23, at 823; Kahneman 
et al., supra note 20, at 1910. In general, people who score highly on measures of materialism 
are less happy than others. Argyle, supra note 16, at 358. 
 25. Kahneman et al., supra note 20, at 1910. Other research has suggested that people 
who value money highly are less happy because they are motivated by “social comparison, 
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This knowledge, to the extent it has been disseminated, has not 
extinguished our “preference” for increased wealth. Moreover, 
money is far from the only example of miswanting, and many are 
much more surprising. For example, although close relationships—
particularly marriage and other close romantic relationships—are 
strongly correlated with happiness,27 having children, a widespread 
voluntary human activity, has mixed effects at best28 and may even 
diminish happiness.29 Also, children appear to decrease marital 
happiness, which declines once they are born and begins to rise again 
when they start leaving the home.30 
Perhaps even more surprising, merely having choices can 
diminish happiness, and having fewer choices can increase happiness. 
In exemplary studies of this phenomenon, Dan Gilbert and Jane 
Ebert measured satisfaction with revocable and irrevocable choices 
regarding material possessions and found that participants were 
happier with objects they chose when the decisions were 
irrevocable.31 Such outcomes are obviously surprising. A majority of 
people reading the procedure for the former studies expressed a 
preference to be among those whose decisions were changeable.32 
 
seeking power, showing off, and overcoming self-doubt.” Abhishek Srivastava, Edwin A. Locke 
& Kathryn M. Bartol, Money and Subjective Well-Being: It’s Not the Money, It’s the Motives, 80 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 959 (2001). 
 26. Csikszentmihalyi, supra note 23, at 823 (citing MICHAEL BENEDIKT, VALUES 
(Univ. of Texas Press 1999); STAFFAN LINDER, THE HARRIED LEISURE CLASS (Columbia 
Univ. Press 1970); TIBOR SCITOVSKY, THE JOYLESS ECONOMY (Random House 1975)). 
 27. Marriage likely increases happiness more than any other relationship. Argyle, supra 
note 16, at 359–62; Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Frijters, supra note 19, at 649; Myers, supra note 
17, at 63. Of course, people must be happy with their marriages. Myers, supra note 17, at 62–
63. Close relationships with other family, friends, coworkers, and fellow members of churches 
also are positively correlated with both happiness and better physical health. Id. 
 28. Argyle, supra note 16, at 360. 
 29. DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 220–21 (2006); Ferrer-i-Carbonell 
& Frijters, supra note 19, at 649. 
 30. GILBERT, supra note 29, at 220–21. 
 31. Daniel Gilbert & Jane E. J. Ebert, Decisions & Revisions: The Affective Forecasting of 
Changeable Outcomes, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 503 (2002). In one study, 
subjects chose one of two photographs they had taken. Half were allowed to change their 
minds within five days. Within two days, those whose decisions were irrevocable liked their 
photographs more than those permitted to change their minds, and this effect remained even 
after the opportunity to exchange photographs expired. A second study using art posters found 
similar results. Id. at 505–09. 
 32. Id. at 510–11; see also George Loewenstein, Costs and Benefits of Health and 
Retirement-Related Choice, in SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE: INDIVIDUAL VS. 
COLLECTIVE RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY (Sheila Burke, Eric Kingson & Uwe Reinhardt eds., 
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We miswant in a variety of other circumstances as well, from 
trifles such as the next meal to major life decisions such as our career 
paths.33 Psychologists have put forth compelling explanations for the 
phenomenon,34 and neuroscientists have begun ascertaining its 
neural basis.35 Those literatures are beyond the scope of this Article. 
Here, it suffices to say that many common conceptions of what 
makes us happy are surprisingly mistaken, and we regularly 
mispredict what will please us.36 In terms of the metaphor, it is as if 
our drinks do not taste as expected or, when we receive them, we 
realize we want something else. Or it is as if one of our favorite 
beverages does not increase our happiness and, in fact, may even 
harm us. Imagine that. 
 
2000) (arguing that choice is less desirable when it will not enhance competition, when it 
drains time, when people lack expertise and are prone to making poor decisions, and when 
people will face high levels of anxiety and regret about the choice); BARRY SCHWARTZ, 
PARADOX OF CHOICE (2005); Nicola J. Bown, Daniel Read & Barbara Summers, The Lure of 
Choice, 16 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 297 (2003). We may feel that some of these findings 
are obvious, but strong evidence suggests that they are not. Regarding wealth, for example, a 
1984 Roper poll found that when “[a]sked how satisfied they were with 13 aspects of their 
lives, including friends, house, and schooling, Americans expressed least satisfaction with ‘the 
amount of money you have to live on.’” Myers, supra note 17, at 58. When asked in another 
survey what would improve their lives most, Americans’ most common answer was “more 
money.” Id. Another found that people who earned under $30,000 per year reported needing 
$50,000 in order to be happy, and people who earned over $100,000 reported needing 
$250,000. Id. In another, half of women, two-thirds of men, and four-fifths of people earning 
over $75,000 said they would like to be rich. Id. We think we know that money does not buy 
happiness, but the evidence suggests otherwise. 
 33. Gilbert & Wilson, supra note 15, at 178–79; see also George Loewenstein & David 
Schkade, Wouldn’t It Be Nice? Predicting Future Feelings, in WELL-BEING: THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOL. 85, 88 (Kahneman et al. eds., 2003). 
 34. Gilbert and Wilson identify several reasons for miswanting, but they are beyond the 
scope of this Article. See Gilbert & Wilson, supra note 15, at 179–83. 
 35. Kent Berridge, Food Reward: Brain Substrates of Wanting and Liking, 20 
NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 1 (1996) (finding distinct brain structures in rats for 
“wanting” (being motivated to obtain something) and “liking” (pleasure)). 
 36. We should be careful not to overstate miswanting; we know what we want in many 
circumstances. Daniel Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective 
Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 617, 617 (1998) (“[M]ost people recognize 
that a weekend in Paris would be more enjoyable than gallbladder surgery, and few people fear 
chocolate or tingle in anticipation of next year’s telephone directory.”); Loewenstein & 
Schkade, supra note 33, at 99. The point remains, however, that we are often mistaken about 
what makes us happy in decisions large and small. 
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2. Inconsistency & manipulability 
A second problem with preferences is that we cannot nail them 
down. Countless studies, discussed in the legal literature as 
“behavioral economics,” show that what we call preferences are often 
irrational and context-specific. Because these problems have been 
discussed widely,37 I will not recount them in detail. The major 
points are simple: our preferences in a given situation can be altered 
in a variety of ways, for example by making certain options more 
salient than others,38 rewording or reframing a choice without 
changing its actual content,39 and so on.40 In terms of the metaphor, 
it is as if the restaurant can influence our orders by altering the 
menu’s layout or terms, induce us to drink more or less by altering 
the size of our cups,41 and increase our patronization of the 
establishment by making us feel that the owner, even when a 
corporation rather than a human being, is a good citizen. 
B. A Problem with Welfare: A Hole in the Bucket 
Preference problems suggest that decisions are difficult because 
we often do not know what is good for us. But what about when we 
get it right? Unfortunately, even when we obtain positive welfare, it 
leaves us surprisingly quickly. (The silver lining is that bad emotions 
also fade quickly.) In a famous 1978 study, Brickman, Coates, and 
Janoff-Bulman found that neither winning the lottery nor becoming 
 
 37. See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (2000) [hereinafter 
SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW]. 
 38. This is the “availability heuristic.” See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 
Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY 163, 164 (1982). 
 39. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Daniel Kahneman, Reference Points, Anchors, 
Norms, and Mixed Feelings, 51 ORGIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 296, 
305–07 (1992); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 271–73 (1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453 (1981). 
 40. See generally SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW, supra note 37; Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, 
supra note13; Hanson & Kysar, TBS II, supra note 13; Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral 
Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. 
L. REV. 1499, 1503–06 (1998). 
 41. This is absolutely correct. See Brian Wansink, James E. Painter & Jill North, 
Bottomless Bowls: Why Visual Cues of Portion Size May Influence Intake, 13 OBESITY RES. 93 
(2005). 
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permanently disabled affects happiness as much as we would expect 
after a short passage of time.42 The researchers compared self-ratings 
of happiness between people who had won $50,000 to $1,000,000 
in the state lottery within the past year, people who had become 
paraplegic or quadriplegic within the past year, and a control group. 
When asked to estimate their happiness on a five-point scale, lottery 
winners averaged 4.00, whereas members of the control group 
averaged 3.82.43 More surprisingly, people who became paraplegic or 
quadriplegic within the past year rated their happiness at 2.96, a level 
not terribly lower, and still solidly above the hypothetical neutral 
point of 2.50.44 This was true even though participants rated the 
experience of becoming disabled 1.28.45 The experience of being 
disabled was not nearly as bad as we might have expected. At a 
minimum, it was more happy than not. 
The phenomenon of emotions fading quickly has been 
confirmed in a host of other circumstances, such as watching one’s 
favorite team win or lose a game,46 breaking up with a girlfriend or 
boyfriend,47 watching one’s preferred candidate lose an election,48 
gaining or failing to gain tenure at a major university,49 being placed  
 
 42. Philip Brickman, Dan Coates & Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, Lottery Winners and 
Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917 (1978). 
 43. Id. at 920–21. The researchers later bolstered their findings by following up to 
ensure that the results were not distorted by factors such as preexisting differences in happiness 
between those who buy lottery tickets and those who do not. Id. at 921–23. 
 44. Id. at 920–21. 
 45. Id. at 920. Winning the lottery rated 3.78. Id. Later studies have reached similar 
conclusions. See generally Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 20, at 312; Camile B. 
Wortman & Roxane C. Silver, Coping with Irrevocable Loss, in CATACLYSMS, CRISES & 
CATASTROPHES: PSYCHOLOGY IN ACTION 189, 197–99 (Gary R. VandenBos & Brenda K. 
Bryant eds., 1987); Richard Schulz & Susan Decker, Long-Term Adjustment to Physical 
Disability: The Role of Social Support, Perceived Control, and Self-Blame, 48 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1162, 1166–68, 1170–72 (1985). This is not to say that people suffering from 
serious injuries are not very unhappy at times; it is only to say that they are far less unhappy 
than expected. Id. at 198. Frederick and Loewenstein note that people do not adapt as well to 
chronic or progressive diseases, but this is probably because the progressive nature of such 
diseases continually presents new problems, making emotional adaptation more difficult. 
Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 20, at 312. 
 46. Timothy D. Wilson et al., Focalism: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective 
Forecasting, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 821, 823–29 (2000). 
 47. Gilbert et al., supra note 36, at 620–22. 
 48. Id. at 624–26. 
 49. Gilbert and his colleagues surveyed all assistant professors and all former assistant 
professors in the College of Liberal Arts at the University of Texas at Austin between 1984 and 
1994 who either had achieved tenure, or had been formally considered but failed to achieve it 
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in solitary confinement in prison,50 losing a loved one51 (including a 
child),52 or learning that one has HIV53 or cancer.54 In each case, 
evidence suggests that people inaccurately predict the durability of 
changes in their happiness.55 
This evidence has led some to inquire whether we have 
something akin to a happiness or life-satisfaction set-point to which 
we eventually return after emotional events.56 At a minimum, it 
 
in any department other than psychology. Professors correctly predicted that the emotional 
impact of tenure decisions fades over time, but failed to predict how little tenure decisions 
affect short-term happiness and how quickly the effects fade. Id. at 622–24. 
 50. Prisoners seem to under-predict adaptation to solitary confinement. Loewenstein & 
Schkade, supra note 33, at 90. Studies on imprisonment generally suggest that although 
people have great initial emotional difficulty, they tend to adapt over time. However, well-
being deteriorates again when release dates draw near, “presumably because [prisoners] begin 
to compare incarceration with the freedom they are beginning to anticipate.” Frederick & 
Loewenstein, supra note 20, at 311–12. 
 51. Eunkook Suh, Ed Diener & Frank Fujita, Events and Subjective Well Being: Only 
Recent Events Matter, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1091, 1093–97 (1996) 
(conducting a study of recent college graduates). 
 52. Wortman and Silver interviewed approximately 125 parents who had lost an infant 
to sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) three weeks, three months, and eighteen months 
afterward. At three weeks, negative feelings were hardly more prevalent than positive feelings. 
Within three months, positive feelings predominated, and within eighteen months, the 
frequency of positive feelings was not significantly different from that for people who had not 
lost a child. Also, it is not the case that people felt unhappy less frequently but more intensely; 
positive feelings were consistently more intense than negative feelings. See Wortman & Silver, 
supra note 45, at 199–201. 
 53. Elaine M. Sieff, Robyn M. Dawes & George Loewenstein, Anticipated Versus 
Actual Reaction to HIV Test Results, 112 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 297, 297 (1999). 
 54. Gilbert et al., supra note 36, at 618. 
 55. Loewenstein and Frederick found related results in a broad study on a long list of 
changes that people expect to impact their happiness: environmental changes (“levels of local 
air pollution, rain forest destruction, restriction of sport-fishing due to pollution, and recovery 
of certain endangered species”), social changes (“increase in number of coffee shops and cafés, 
increase in number of television channels and selection of videotapes, reduced risk of nuclear 
war, and increased risk of AIDS”), and personal changes (“change in free time, development of 
pain-causing chronic health condition, change in household income, and increase in body 
weight”). Loewenstein & Schkade, supra note 33, at 90. Of course there were some 
methodological problems with the study, as not every person surveyed experienced each 
circumstance predicted. However, “a clear general pattern emerged from the data.” Id. People 
usually overestimate the impact of a change but sometimes underestimate it. For example, 
researchers found in a 1982 study that people living near a new highway apparently 
overestimated their ability to adapt to highway noise. Id. 
 56. See Ed Diener & Richard E. Lucas, Personality & Subjective Well-Being, in WELL-
BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 213, 221–22 (Kahneman et al. eds., 
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appears that sources of happiness should be classified into those that 
provide short-term, intermediate-term, and long-term benefits, with 
very few falling in the last category.57 This means that many of our 
choices have little impact on our long-term happiness, and much of 
our worrying over them is misguided. The upside, of course, is that 
we can fear poor decisions less.58 
As with miswanting, I do not wish to overstate this 
phenomenon. However, it clearly exists and contributes to poor 
decisions in important instances. For example, people overestimate 
the impact of receiving bad news about health,59 which can lead 
them to avoid medical testing when it would benefit them.60 
Similarly, people tend to over-predict the despair that terminal illness 
brings and to underestimate the quality of life of the disabled and 
 
2003); Suh, Diener & Fujita, supra note 51, at 1095 (“Our findings support the [dynamic 
equilibrium] model’s prediction that SWB [subjective well-being] reverts to a level 
predetermined by individuals’ personality as soon as the pattern of life events regains its 
equilibrium. According to our findings, this regression process probably takes several 
months.”). One study surveyed over 2000 middle-aged identical twins and found that 
education, income, socioeconomic class, marital status, and religious commitment each 
accounted for at most three percent of variance in reported well-being. David Lykken & Auke 
Tellegen, Happiness Is a Stochastic Phenomenon, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 186 (1996). The most 
reliable predictor of one twin’s happiness was the other twin’s happiness. Id. at 189; see also 
DANIEL GOLEMAN, SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE 181–82 (2006) [hereinafter GOLEMAN, SOCIAL 
INTELLIGENCE] (citing Richard J. Davidson & William Irwin, The Functional Neuroanatomy of 
Emotion and Affective Style, 3 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 11 (1999)); Ed Diener & Carol 
Diener, Most People Are Happy, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 181 (1996); Frank Fujita & Ed Diener, Life 
Satisfaction Set Point: Stability and Change, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 158 (2005); 
Richard E. Lucas et al., Reexamining Adaptation and the Set Point Model of Happiness: 
Reactions to Changes in Marital Status, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 527 (2003). 
 57. Fujita & Diener, supra note 56, at 162–163. 
 58. Many theories exist to explain why emotions fade quickly, but they are beyond the 
scope of this Article. See generally Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 20; see also Kahneman, 
Objective Happiness, in WELL-BEING 3, 13–15 (Kahneman et al. eds., 1999); Philip Brickman 
& Donald T. Campbell, Hedonic Relativism and Planning the Good Society, in ADAPTATION-
LEVEL THEORY: A SYMPOSIUM 287 (M. H. Appley ed., 1971); Brickman, Coates & Janoff-
Bulman, supra note 42, at 918; Gilbert et al., supra note 36, at 619–20; Myers, supra note 17, 
at 60; Wilson et al., supra note 46, at 822–23. 
 59. See, e.g., Loewenstein & Schkade, supra note 33, at 91 (finding that people “do not 
seem extremely adversely affected when they” learn that they have or are at increased risk of 
having Huntington’s disease, though many resist being tested); Sieff, Dawes & Loewenstein, 
supra note 53, at 307 (finding “anticipated distress” higher than “reported distress” among 
people who test positive for HIV). 
 60. Loewenstein & Schkade, supra note 33, at 91; Sieff, Dawes & Loewenstein, supra 
note 53, at 297. 
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infirm.61 Thus, they may make poor decisions regarding living wills62 
and the value of medical procedures for the terminally ill.63 
Thus, positive and negative welfare states tend to be 
unexpectedly transitory, making it difficult for us to make accurate 
decisions about maintaining or avoiding them. Returning to the 
metaphor, it is as if our cups are actually sieves—or as if no matter 
what or how much we drink today, our stomachs will be empty 
tomorrow. 
C. A Problem with Choice: Water Under the Bridge 
Now we turn to “choices,” which suffer problems of their own. 
Even when we know what we want, and even if we knew how to 
keep it, we have difficulty executing our plans. Examples abound of 
our making decisions contrary to our expressed desires. Classic 
examples include overeating, drug use, and gambling,64 but these are 
only the most obvious situations in which we act against our better 
judgment. 
Many social psychologists place cognitions on a continuum 
between “cold” (relatively uninfluenced by emotion or other non-
conscious processes) and “hot” (characterized by greater emotional 
arousal and influenced more heavily, or even controlled by, emotion 
or other nonconscious processes).65 Economist George Loewenstein, 
who has extensively researched people’s views and actions under hot 
and cold conditions, observed that people in cooler states of mind 
have difficulty predicting how they will act under the influence of 
“visceral factors such as the cravings associated with drug addiction, 
 
 61. Glenn Affleck & Howard Tennen, Construing Benefits from Adversity: Adaptational 
Significance and Dispositional Underpinnings, 64 J. PERSONALITY 899, 901–02 (1996); 
Loewenstein & Schkade, supra note 33, at 92 (citing Gina Kolata, Living Wills Aside Dying 
Cling to Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1997, at C10). 
 62. One study of 4804 terminally ill patients found that 688 had living wills, but those 
patients sometimes changed their minds when near death. One of the researchers, a doctor, 
commented: “Over and over again, they would say, ‘I’ve got a living will, but I’m not sick 
enough yet.’” Gina Kolata, Documents Like Living Wills are Rarely of Aid, Study Says, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 8, 1997, at A12. 
 63. Id. at C10. 
 64. A 2000 survey of 2630 Americans found that 82% percent had participated in some 
form of gambling in the past year. See John W. Welte et al., Gambling Participation in the 
U.S.—Results from a National Survey, 18 J. GAMBLING STUD. 313, 313, 316, 324 (2004). 
Sixty-six percent played the lottery at least once in the past year, 13% played weekly, and 27% 
had gambled in a casino at least once. Id. at 318–19, 324. 
 65. See ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 212–63 (1999). 
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drive states (for example, hunger, thirst, and sexual desire), moods 
and emotions, and physical pain.”66 Likewise, people in warmer 
states of mind tend to overestimate the likelihood that people in 
cooler states of mind will act as they do. Loewenstein calls this 
discrepancy an empathy gap,67 meaning that the “cold” and “hot” 
versions of our selves cannot empathize adequately with one another. 
Loewenstein notes that strong visceral urges such as hunger, thirst, 
sexual arousal, and pain “have the ability to change us so profoundly 
that we’re more different from ourselves in different states than we 
are from another person.”68 
Several kinds of studies provide evidence of empathy gaps. Some 
evidence stems from people’s predictions of their own behavior—in 
particular, comparing the predictions that people in hot or cold 
states make about their behavior in hot situations. These studies 
show that people predict that they will act more emotionally in the 
future if they are currently in a state of emotional arousal.69 Other 
evidence stems from people’s predictions of others’ behavior, in 
 
 66. Loewenstein, Out of Control, supra note 5, at 272; see also George Loewenstein, 
Daniel Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, The Effect of Sexual Arousal on Expectations of Sexual 
Forcefulness, 34 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 443, 445 (1997) (“When not hungry, afraid, angry, 
or sexually aroused, people seem to have trouble imagining how they would feel, or how they 
might act, when they experience these states.”). Loewenstein makes clear that he is speaking 
only of a requisite intensity of emotional “warmth”: “At sufficient levels of intensity, these, and 
most other visceral factors, cause people to behave contrary to their own long-term self-
interest, often with full awareness that they are doing so.” Loewenstein, Out of Control, supra 
note 5, at 272–73 (emphasis added). He later adds, “at even greater levels of intensity, visceral 
factors can be so powerful as to virtually preclude decision making.” Id. at 273. 
 67. Loewenstein, Nagin & Paternoster, supra note 66, at 445. 
 68. Jon Gertner, The Futile Pursuit of Happiness, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 7, 2003, at 
44, 86. 
 69. A study examined the impact of sexual arousal on male college students’ predictions 
of their own sexual aggression. Loewenstein, Nagin & Paternoster, supra note 66. Researchers 
used a pre-textual picture-viewing activity to induce arousal in some subjects, but not others. 
Id. at 448–51. Subjects then read a story written in the second person about meeting a female 
student, “Susan,” who has a reputation for promiscuity, in a bar, returning to her apartment 
with her, and engaging in kissing and heavy petting. Id. at 450. The story stops when “you” 
[the subject] attempt to remove Susan’s clothing and she “tells you that she thinks that she is 
not interested in having sex but does not try to physically stop you.” Id. Subjects were then 
asked to predict the likelihood that they would (1) try to coax Susan to let them remove her 
clothes, and (2) “have sex with her even if she protested.” Id. Students who were sexually 
aroused in advance of reading the story predicted a substantially higher likelihood they would 
try to coax Susan to remove her clothes. Id. at 455–56. 
ARKUSH.FIN 11/24/2008 5:05 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2008 
1292 
which people in emotional states predict that others will act 
emotionally.70 
If predictions of behavior vary with emotional states, it seems 
likely that behavior does as well. However, these studies do not 
examine actual behavior and cannot draw the link completely.71 
Others have. For example, Ron Gold approached roughly 700 gay 
men in bars and inquired whether they had engaged in unprotected 
anal intercourse in the past six months and, in doing so, had broken 
their own safe-sex rules. Between one-quarter and one-third of the 
men answered affirmatively.72 Furthermore, 138 of the men agreed 
to participate in a study on the effectiveness of various forms of safe 
sex educational materials, keeping diaries for sixteen weeks while 
receiving various sex education materials. At the outset of the study, 
34% reported having engaged in unprotected anal sex with one 
partner in the past six months, 33% reported having done so with 
two partners, and 33% reported having done so with more than two 
partners. Remarkably, 64% of the men reported having broken their 
own rules during the study, some more than once, even while 
keeping sexual diaries for researchers.73 
Finally, numerous studies have found evidence of empathy gaps 
through direct comparison of predictions or plans with subsequent 
behavior. For example, a majority of pregnant women who intend to 
decline anesthesia during childbirth change their minds during labor, 
 
 70. For example, in the study of sexual arousal and aggression, participants in the 
arousal group also rated other students as more likely to behave aggressively with Susan. This 
effect was much less dramatic however. Id. at 464–65. Loewenstein and Van Boven examined 
this phenomenon more directly in a study involving the impact of thirst on participants’ 
predictions of others’ behavior. Leaf Van Boven & George Loewenstein, Social Projection of 
Transient Drive States, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1159 (2003). Subjects read 
a narrative in which hikers become hopelessly lost without food or water and were asked to 
predict their own and the hikers’ hunger and thirst in the situation. Half the participants had 
exercised vigorously for twenty minutes before reading the story and answering questions. 
They were warmer and thirstier, but no hungrier, than other participants. Those who had just 
exercised were more likely than others to predict that they and the hikers would be more 
thirsty than hungry, and they more frequently predicted regrets about not having packed extra 
water than extra food. Furthermore, only people who exercised and felt thirsty predicted 
significantly more thirst; those who had exercised but did not report feeling particularly thirsty 
did not predict more thirst. Id. at 1163–65. 
 71. See Loewenstein, Nagin & Paternoster, supra note 66, at 465–67. 
 72. Ron Gold, Why We Need to Rethink AIDS Education for Gay Men, 7 AIDS CARE 
S11 (1995). In another study, 51% of 79 gay men approached in a bar reported having 
engaged in UAI in the past six months. Id. 
 73. Id. Only 109 of the men completed the study. Id. 
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even among women who have previously given birth.74 Military 
trainees overestimate the fear they will feel in parachuting.75 Even 
casual smokers overestimate the likelihood they will quit smoking 
within five years.76 Hungry grocery shoppers make more unplanned 
food purchases than non-hungry shoppers unless they guide their 
decisions with grocery lists.77 People overestimate the pain they will 
feel at the dentist78 and famously underestimate their willingness to 
deliver painful electric shocks to others when pressured by 
researchers—even when they are aware at the time of the prediction 
that most people succumb to such pressure.79 People also 
underestimate the extent to which objects they obtain will suddenly 
become more valuable to them—known as the endowment effect—
even when they know they may soon possess an object.80 They also 
underestimate the influence of curiosity on their choices,81 their 
willingness to accept minor embarrassments in exchange for 
money,82 their ability to maintain zero balances on credit cards,83 and 
their likelihood of mailing in rebate forms.84 
 
 74. Loewenstein & Schkade, supra note 33, at 91. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 93 (citing B.S. LYNCH & R.J. BONNIE, Toward a Youth-Centered Prevention 
Policy, in GROWING UP TOBACCO-FREE: PREVENTING NICOTINE ADDICTION IN CHILDREN 
AND YOUTHS 3–25 (B.S. Lynch & R.J. Bonnie eds., 1994)); see also Loewenstein, Out of 
Control, supra note 5, at 286. 
 77. Daniel T. Gilbert, Michael J. Gill & Timothy D. Wilson, The Future Is Now: 
Temporal Correction in Affective Forecasting, 88 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 
430, 439 (2002). 
 78. Loewenstein & Schkade, supra note 33, at 91 (citing Gerry Kent, Memory of Dental 
Pain, 21 PAIN 187–94 (1985)). Note that people do not always mispredict pain. Studies have 
found that people can fairly accurately predict their “utility” after radiation therapy and that 
people who frequently experience headaches can accurately predict the pain of future 
headaches. See id. 
 79. Id. at 93 (citing STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1965)). 
 80. George Loewenstein & Daniel Adler, A Bias in the Prediction of Tastes, 105 ECON. 
J. 929, 929 (1995) (“The endowment effect refers to the tendency for people to value an 
object more highly if they possess it than they would value the same object if they did not.”); 
Leaf Van Boven, David Dunning & George Loewenstein, Egocentric Empathy Gaps Between 
Owners and Buyers: Misperceptions of the Endowment Effect, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 66–76 (2000) [hereinafter Van Boven et al., Empathy Gaps]; Leaf Van Boven, 
George Loewenstein & David Dunning, Mispredicting the Endowment Effect: Underestimation 
of Owners’ Selling Prices by “Buyer’s Agents,” 51 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 351 (2003). 
 81. Loewenstein & Schkade, supra note 33, at 93–94. 
 82. Leaf Van Boven, George Loewenstein & David Dunning, The Illusion of Courage in 
Social Predictions: Underestimating the Impact of Fear of Embarassment on Other People, 96 
ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 130, 132 (2005) (citing Leaf Van Boven et al., 
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Loewenstein recalls a friend’s story of a flight during which the 
airplane suddenly dived, and only half the oxygen masks dropped 
from the cabin ceiling. In a panic, some people grabbed the masks of 
children next to them.85 Few of us would predict acting so selfishly 
or unfairly. But apparently this is only because we cannot adequately 
empathize with the fear we would feel in a falling airplane and the 
influence of that fear on our behavior.86 In terms of the cup 
metaphor, it is as if even when we know what we should order, we 
sometimes fail to do it. We order soda instead of water, or drink two 
glasses of wine instead of one. 
D. A Problem for the Model: Poor Service 
Most discussions of the above problems treat them implicitly or 
explicitly as informational issues, illustrations of “bounded 
rationality.”87 In this view, “empathy gaps” and “affective 
forecasting” errors are instances of insufficient knowledge about our 
future feelings and behavior. The hope of this approach, albeit 
sometimes implicit, is to provide better information so that we can 
make better decisions or to design policies that will help us do so. If 
we learn what makes us happy and what does not, we can change our 
pursuits.88 And if we ascertain the emotional situations in which we 
fail to behave as planned, we can avoid or remake them.89 
This approach is commendable to a point. It resonates with our 
experience of learning about ourselves and attempting to change our 
behavior, and we certainly need better information to make better 
 
The Illusion of Courage in Self Predictions: Underestimating the Impact of Fear of 
Embarrassment on the Self (unpublished manuscript, University of Colorado, Boulder)). 
 83. See Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81 
AM. ECON. REV. 50, 70–72 (1991) (finding that 75% of consumers carry balances although 
47% report that they “nearly always pay in full”). 
 84. Loewenstein & Adler, supra note 80, at 929 (citing P. Tat, W.A. Cunningham & E. 
Babakus, Consumer Perceptions of Rebates, 28 J. ADVERTISING RES. 45–50 (1988)). 
 85. Loewenstein, Out of Control, supra note 5, at 284. 
 86. Note that Loewenstein also recognizes the much more extensive influence of 
emotion and automatic processes that this Article highlights. See id. 
 87. See GILBERT, supra note 29, at 238 (“Yes, we should make choices by multiplying 
probabilities and utilities, but how can we possibly do this if we can’t estimate those utilities 
beforehand?”); Loewenstein & Adler, supra note 80; Rostain, supra note 7. 
 88. Kaplow and Shavell, for example, deem these problems “mistaken preferences,” 
which result from information problems. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 8, at 984, 1331–32. 
 89. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977, 1978 (2001). 
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decisions. But it is inadequate. First, it diverts our attention from 
important questions. For example, research on “durability bias” 
primarily concerns not the tendency of emotions to fade rapidly, but 
rather whether individuals are aware of this fact and account for it in 
decisions—the implication being that it is just another blind spot or 
bias in decision making.90 But the potential problem of choices 
having little influence on our long-term happiness is at least as 
pressing as the question whether we know about this. Similarly, 
research on empathy gaps focuses on whether we can predict our 
behavior accurately.91 The question is important, but it distracts us 
from more difficult questions such as why we have poor self-control 
and what we can do about it. Moreover, merely knowing about these 
phenomena may not help us much. Researchers in these areas have 
little confidence that more or better information results in better 
decisions.92 
This point brings us to the more fundamental problem with the 
information model. It proposes to remedy poor thinking, planning, 
and self-control with more thinking, planning, and self-control. It 
also requires that we constantly make decisions about how to make 
decisions—when to calculate more elaborately and deliberatively, 
when to use approximations and heuristics, when to settle for 
something less than the best, and so on.93 A problem that has been 
lurking throughout this discussion finally comes to the forefront: 
who has time for even a small fraction of all this reasoning? 
Numerous scholars have noted, particularly when discussing 
heuristics and biases, that people cannot and do not consciously 
 
 90. Gilbert et al., supra note 36, at 617. 
 91. Van Boven et al., Empathy Gaps, supra note 80, at 66. 
 92. Gilbert expresses little hope, stating that “the information we need to make accurate 
predictions of our emotional futures is right under our noses, but we don’t seem to recognize 
its aroma.” GILBERT, supra note 29, at 233. He offers only that we can understand the reasons 
we fail. Id. at 238. 
 93. For example, Sen once proposed adding to ordinary preferences several other sets, 
including “meta-rankings” of preferences. Sen, supra note 12, at 336–39. Meta-rankings could 
be used to “express[] what preferences one would have preferred to have” or “to analyze the 
conflicts involved in addiction.” Id. at 339; see also Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 3, at 1077–
78 (“Even if a choice is not too complex for an actor to process physically, she might choose to 
limit her search for information or consideration of the decision short of reaching a utility-
maximizing decision. The decision to adopt a simplified strategy might be sensible given the 
marginal benefits and costs of making an optimal decision relative to a satisfactory one . . . .”). 
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control everything they do,94 and that people are “cognitive misers” 
who use mental resources sparingly.95 We often fail to consider 
judgments carefully unless alerted to the possibility that our decisions 
may be flawed,96 and even basic acts of self-control occupy such a 
great proportion of cognitive resources that they must occur rarely.97 
Such limitations led economists to propose long ago that people 
engage in “satisficing” rather than “maximizing” behavior, 
intentionally aiming for less than utility maximization because of the 
difficulty in achieving it.98 Yet despite this recognition that people 
cannot consider and make choices about all their actions, few legal 
scholars have grappled seriously with how people get through their 
lives without doing so, and what that means for law and legal 
 
 94. See Loewenstein & Lerner, supra note 4; John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The 
Unbearable Automaticity of Being, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 462, 464 (1999) (“Tice and 
Baumeister concluded after their series of eight such experiments that because even minor acts 
of self-control, such as making a simple choice, use up this limited self-regulatory resource, 
such conscious acts of self-regulation can occur only rarely in the course of one’s day. Even as 
they were defending the importance of the conscious self for guiding behavior, Baumeister et 
al. . . . concluded it plays a causal role only 5% or so of the time.”). One illustration of the 
limits of conscious cognition is the contrast in our nonconscious and conscious processing 
powers. Our senses can process around eleven million bits of information per second, but we 
can process at most fifty bits per second consciously. See Ap Dijksterhuis, Henk Aarts & Pamela 
K. Smith, The Power of the Subliminal: On Subliminal Persuasion and Other Potential 
Applications, in THE NEW UNCONSCIOUS 77, 82 (Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. 
Bargh eds., 2005). 
 95. See John A. Bargh, The Cognitive Monster: The Case Against the Controllability of 
Automatic Stereotype Effects, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 361, 362 
(Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999); Hanson & Yosifon, Situational Character, supra 
note 1, at 23 & n.72. The term “cognitive miser” was coined by social psychologists Shelley 
Taylor and Susan Fiske in 1978. John A. Bargh, Social Psychological Approaches to 
Consciousness, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSCIOUSNESS 556 (P. Zelazo, M. 
Moscovitch & E. Thompson eds., 2007) [hereinafter Bargh, Consciousness] (citing Shelley 
Taylor & Susan Fiske, Salience, Attention, and Attribution: Top of the Head Phenomena, in 
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 249 (L. Berkowitz ed., 1978)). 
 96. Daniel T. Gilbert & Michael J. Gill, The Momentary Realist, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. 394 
(2000). 
 97. For example, the ability to persist in attempting to solve puzzles is seriously 
diminished when people are asked to resist eating cookies placed in front of them, to choose 
between two options, to try not to think about something particular, or to restrain emotional 
responses to movies. See Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 94, at 465; Roy F. Baumeister et al., 
Ego Depletion: Is the Active Self a Limited Resource?, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
1252 (1998). 
 98. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 3, at 1075–76 & n.81 (citing Herbert A. Simon, 
Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, in MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND 
RATIONAL 261, 270–71 (1957)). 
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theory.99 Rational choice theory has no answer,100 and behavioral 
economics provides only a piecemeal, situation-specific approach of 
acknowledging various exceptions to the basic model.101 
Fortunately, psychologists and neurobiologists have begun 
finding an explanation, and it has much to do with emotion. Rather 
than mere objects amenable to evaluation, prediction, and 
stockpiling, emotions are ever-shifting processes that steer our 
interactions with the environment. “Preferences” are a misnomer for 
context-specific affective processes that sometimes have nothing to 
do with long-term (or even short-term) well-being. “Choices” are 
behavioral manifestations of those processes. And emotion’s nature 
as a process explains why “welfare” gains are fleeting. In the 
following section, I review evidence for these points. 
III. A NAVIGATION SYSTEM FOR HOMO ECONOMICUS 
Over the past few decades, the mainstream of social psychology 
has moved away from the assumption that humans are aware of and 
control most of their thought and behavior. Contemporary 
researchers subscribe to various dual-processing models of cognition 
and behavior, which hold that behavior is produced by both 
intentional, conscious, “explicit” thought and unintentional, 
nonconscious, “implicit” thought.102 Emotions are a large part of 
this story because they modulate most cognitive and behavioral 
processes and, indeed, appear to be critical to decisions. 
Mounting evidence shows that emotions can operate 
independently of, and precede, conscious or reasoned thought and 
that nonconscious processing is vital to behavior. Just as we use 
computers and other devices to automate certain tasks—from 
autopilot devices in airplanes to voice mail for telephones—our 
 
 99. The important exception is Jon Hanson, who has followed social psychologists in 
arguing for years that much behavior is produced not by reasoned choice or stable character 
traits but by the circumstances in which people find themselves. See, e.g., Hanson & Yosifon, 
Situation, supra note 1. 
 100. For example, Richard Posner has treated mistaken preferences as merely proof that 
information costs are positive. RICHARD POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 259 (2001). 
He does not answer how rational actors can function if these costs exceed the resources of any 
human being. 
 101. Indeed, behavioral economists have eschewed the search for any general explanation 
of behavior. See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 3, at 1074–75. 
 102. See generally KUNDA, supra note 65, at 265–68. 
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brains work to automate our behavior.103 This means that the roots 
of many of our attitudes and behaviors are beyond our control, and 
even beyond our understanding through introspection.104 Just as we 
cannot understand through introspection, much less control, how 
our brains direct the movements of the muscle fibers in our legs as 
we walk, our higher-order cognitive processes such as exercising 
“will power,” pursuing goals, and reasoning about moral dilemmas 
are often beyond our understanding and control.105 
Although researchers originally thought nonconscious cognition 
was limited to simple mental processes, they now believe that it 
dominates our lives. Nonconscious behavioral processes are so 
ubiquitous, robust, and effective that some are left wondering what 
purpose conscious reasoning serves.106 Automaticity is everywhere, 
and this is something we should celebrate.107 Below, this Article 
 
 103. Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 94, at 464. 
 104. Bargh, Consciousness, supra note 95, at 558 (“[R]ecent experimental evidence across 
several different areas of psychology points to a deep and fundamental dissociation between 
conscious awareness and the mental processes responsible for one’s behavior; many of the 
wellsprings of behavior appear to be opaque to conscious access.”). 
 105. See, e.g., John A. Bargh, Bypassing the Will: Toward Demystifying the Nonconscious 
Control of Social Behavior, in THE NEW UNCONSCIOUS, supra note 94, at 37, 41–42 
[hereinafter Bargh, Bypassing the Will]; DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS 
WILL (2002); John A. Bargh & Melissa J. Ferguson, Beyond Behaviorism: On the Automaticity 
of Higher Mental Processes, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 925 (2000) [hereinafter Bargh & Ferguson, 
Beyond Behaviorism]; John F. Kihlstrom, The Cognitive Unconscious, 237 SCI. 1445, 1447 
(1987). 
 106. Some believe it probably serves nonconsciousness—that the main function of 
consciousness may be “to eliminate the need for itself in the future by making learned skills as 
automatic as possible.” Bargh, Bypassing the Will, supra note 105, at 53; see also id. 
(“[M]etacognitive consciousness is the workplace where one can assemble and combine the 
various components of complex perceptual-motor skills. This ability has given humans a 
tremendous advantage over other animals, because ‘whereas most other species depend on 
their built-in demons to do their mental work for them, we can build our own demons.’” 
(quoting M. Donald, A MIND SO RARE 8 (2001))); Bargh, Consciousness, supra note 95, at 
563 (“In a very real sense, then, the purpose of consciousness—why it evolved—may be for the 
assemblage of complex nonconscious skills.”). Antonio Damasio argues that conscious feelings 
are necessary in addition to nonconscious affective process because there likely is a limit to the 
complexity of problems that nonconscious processes can resolve. ANTONIO DAMASIO, 
LOOKING FOR SPINOZA: JOY, SORROW, AND THE FEELING BRAIN 176–79 (2003) [hereinafter 
DAMASIO, SPINOZA].  
 107. Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 94, at 464; see also id. at 462 (“[M]ost of moment-
to-moment psychological life must occur through nonconscious means if it is to occur at all.”). 
This view is very old in psychology. See WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 
122 (1890) (“The more of the details of our daily life we can hand over to the effortless 
custody of automatism, the more our higher powers of mind will be set free for their own 
proper work.”). 
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reviews evidence of ways in which emotions and related 
nonconscious processes assist us in navigating the world—evidence 
that has broad implications for law, legal theory, and policy. 
A. Evaluating the Environment 
1. Instant evaluation 
The story of nonconscious decision making begins with instant 
evaluations. Nonconscious affective processes constantly judge our 
surroundings, appraising nearly instantaneously what we encounter 
as good or bad, before we have time to make cognitive evaluations 
and often without our ever becoming aware of the affective 
evaluations.108 In other words, we usually have feelings about things 
before we think about them.109 Often, we have feelings about things 
without ever thinking about them. 
The key to studying automatic evaluation is measuring people’s 
reactions in circumstances in which the reactions cannot have been 
produced by deliberation. The classic model for such studies involves 
exposing subjects to a positively or negatively valenced word (for 
example, “cockroach”) so briefly that they cannot evaluate it 
consciously before viewing a second word (such as “disgusting” or 
“appealing”), which they are asked to evaluate as quickly as 
possible.110 Studies consistently find that participants evaluate a 
second stimulus more quickly if it follows a stimulus of the same 
valence.111 This means that the subjects must have evaluated the first 
 
 108. Sheila T. Murphy, Feeling Without Thinking: Affective Primacy and the Nonconscious 
Processing of Emotion, in UNRAVELING THE COMPLEXITIES OF SOCIAL LIFE: A FESTSCHRIFT 
IN HONOR OF ROBERT B. ZAJONC (John A. Bargh & Deborah K. Apsley eds., 2001) (“[T]he 
simple emotional or affective qualities of stimuli, such as good/bad, are processed extremely 
quickly and efficiently without extensive perceptual and cognitive processing.”). 
 109. Robert Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences, 35 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 151 (1980) [hereinafter Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking]. 
 110. Russell H. Fazio, On the Automatic Activation of Associated Evaluations: An 
Overview, 15 COGNITION & EMOTION 115, 116 (2001); see also John A. Bargh et al., The 
Generality of the Automatic Attitude Activation Effect, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
893, 894 (1992) [hereinafter Bargh et al., Generality]; Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 94, at 
474. 
 111. Fazio, supra note 110, at 116; see also Melissa J. Ferguson & John A. Bargh, The 
Constructive Nature of Automatic Evaluation, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVALUATION: 
AFFECTIVE PROCESSES IN COGNITION AND EMOTION 169 (Jocen Musch & Karl Christoph 
Klauer eds., 2003) [hereinafter Ferguson & Bargh, Constructive Nature]; Bargh et al., 
Generality, supra note 110, at 893–94. 
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object, even though they had no time to do so consciously. Indeed, 
people demonstrate instant evaluation even when stimuli are 
presented simultaneously,112 and even when they cannot perceive the 
stimuli consciously at all.113 A variety of studies have confirmed this 
phenomenon.114 
Some researchers initially thought automatic evaluations occur 
only for objects that evoke strongly held attitudes, but later evidence 
suggests the effect is much broader, likely occurring during all 
encounters.115 Likewise, some once thought that automatic 
evaluations occur only when people have been asked to evaluate 
something recently,116 but later studies have shown that people 
automatically evaluate objects without having been primed to do 
so.117 In fact, the more researchers isolate nonconscious processes 
from evaluative goals, the stronger the effect becomes.118 Similarly, 
 
 112. In early studies, the first stimulus was presented for 200 milliseconds, and the 
second followed after an interval of 100 milliseconds. A later study on shorter evaluation 
intervals found evidence of automatic evaluations even when the prime and target stimulus 
were presented simultaneously and found that the effect was stronger for an interval of 150 
milliseconds than the typical interval of 300 milliseconds. See Dirk Hermans, Jan De Houwer 
& Paul Eelen, A Time Course Analysis of the Affective Priming Effect, 15 COGNITION & 
EMOTION 143 (2001). 
 113. See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald, Sean C. Draine & Richard L. Abrams, Three 
Cognitive Markers of Unconscious Semantic Activation, 273 SCI. 1699 (1996). There are two 
thresholds for human perception: a subjective threshold at which a person consciously 
perceives a stimulus and an objective threshold at which a third party can observe a physical 
reaction demonstrating that another person’s body has perceived something, even though the 
person cannot perceive it subjectively. See also Dijksterhuis, Aarts & Smith, supra note 94, at 
79–80. 
 114. See, e.g., Bargh et al., Generality, supra note 110. This research initially provoked 
strong opposition. When Robert Zajonc began studying automatic evaluation, he challenged 
conventional wisdom in social psychology that emotional evaluations must have some cognitive 
component—that people must think before they can prefer—a view that remains dominant in 
law. But evidence for automatic evaluation has grown increasingly robust over time. See Fazio, 
supra note 110, at 117–19. Note, however, that not all priming studies have been successfully 
replicated. See Spruyt et al., On the Replicability of the Affective Priming Effect in the 
Pronunciation Task, 51 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 109 (2004). 
 115. See Bargh et al., Generality, supra note 110, at 89495 (disputing Russell H. Fazio 
et al., On the Automatic Evaluation of Attitudes, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
22938 (1986)). 
 116. See, e.g., John A. Bargh et al., The Automatic Evaluation Effect: Unconditional 
Automatic Attitude Activation with a Pronunciation Task, 32 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 104, 113 (1996) [hereinafter Bargh et al., Automatic Evaluation]. 
 117. John A. Bargh, The Psychology of the Mere, in UNRAVELING THE COMPLEXITIES OF 
SOCIAL LIFE, supra note 108, at 25, 2831 [hereinafter Bargh, Mere] (citing Bargh et al., 
Generality, supra note 110, at 893912). 
 118. Bargh et al., Automatic Evaluation, supra note 116, at 10920. 
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priming done with people’s full awareness is more effective when 
people believe it will not affect them.119 Moreover, strong evidence 
also suggests that automatic evaluation is not simply a matter of 
accessing previously stored judgments.120 People automatically 
evaluate completely novel objects121 and appear to construct 
evaluations in the moment, flexibly, with context-specific 
variation.122 
Studies have shown that people engage in automatic evaluations 
of objects as diverse as words, line drawings, complex photographs of 
real life, auditory stimuli, and pleasant and unpleasant odors.123 And 
researchers have found evidence of automatic evaluations during a 
variety of different tasks, such as evaluative categorization, lexical 
decisions, pronunciation, and arm movements.124 Newer studies 
using different techniques have bolstered earlier findings,125 and 
current dispute concerns not whether automatic nonconscious 
evaluation exists but “just how pervasive the effect is”126 and how it 
operates.127 We appear to evaluate nearly everything we encounter 
 
 119. See, e.g., Bargh, Consciousness, supra note 95, at 559. 
 120. Studies show, however, that some automatic evaluation is based on recall of previous 
judgments. See, e.g., Luigi Castelli et al., On the Automatic Evaluation of Social Exemplars, 86 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 373, 37482 (2004). 
 121. Ferguson & Bargh, Constructive Nature, supra note 111; Kimberly L. Duckworth, 
John A. Bargh, Magda Garcia & Shelly Chaiken, The Automatic Evaluation of Novel Stimuli, 
13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 513, 51418 (2002). 
 122. See Ferguson & Bargh, Constructive Nature, supra note 111, at 16985; Melissa J. 
Ferguson & John A. Bargh, Sensitivity and Flexibility: Exploring the Knowledge Function of 
Automatic Attitudes, in THE WISDOM IN FEELING: PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES IN 
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 383, 389400 (Lisa Feldman Barrett & Peter Salovey eds., 2002) 
[hereinafter Ferguson & Bargh, Sensitivity and Flexibility]. 
 123. Hermans et al., supra note 112, at 144 (collecting studies). 
 124. Ferguson & Bargh, Constructive Nature, supra note 111, at 16985 (collecting 
studies); Hermans et al., supra note 112, at 144. 
 125. Melissa J. Ferguson et al., After-Affects: How Automatic Evaluations Influence the 
Interpretation of Subsequent, Unrelated Stimuli, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 182, 
182 (2005) (citing William A. Cunningham et al., Neural Components of Social Evaluation, 85 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 639, 63948 (2003); Anthony G. Greenwald et al., 
Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 146480 (1998)). 
 126. Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 94, at 474. 
 127. The mechanisms underlying automatic evaluation are still unknown and are the 
subject of extensive theory and discussion. For theories, see Ferguson & Bargh, Constructive 
Nature, supra note 111, at 611; Bargh et al., Automatic Evaluation, supra note 116, at 
12022; Fazio, supra note 110, at 11921; Ferguson et al., supra note 125, at 18283; and 
Mark R. Klinger et al., Mechanisms of Unconscious Priming: I. Response Competition, Not 
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emotionally before we can think about it, and sometimes without 
ever perceiving it consciously.128 In other words, all that our minds 
require to begin working outside our awareness is the mere presence 
of an object. 
2. Thin slices 
It is easy to see the benefit of instant evaluations—after all, we 
cannot mull over everything we encounter. If this is true of simple 
objects, it is even more true regarding complex encounters, and it 
turns out that nonconscious processes aid these decisions as well. We 
often make fairly reliable judgments about complex matters without 
conscious deliberation, or at least based on so little information that 
we have no possibility of conducting a proper analysis.129 Judgments 
regarding relatively complex concepts and characteristics are typically 
just as accurate—and often more accurate—when based on “thin 
slices” of information than when people have more information and 
more time to reflect. 
Researchers have found evidence of good thin-slice judgments in 
a variety of situations. For example, on the basis of extremely little 
information, people can intuit gender,130 “interpersonal and 
relational variables such as status, kinship, and deception”131 and 
possibly sexual orientation,132 and can predict outcomes such as 
“teacher effectiveness, interpersonal expectancies, and mental patient 
pathology.”133 After short interactions, people tend to rate strangers’ 
 
Spreading Activation, 26 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 
441, 44143 (2000). 
 128. Bargh, Mere, supra note 117, at 28–31; Bargh et al., Generality, supra note 110, at 
894–95. 
 129. Journalist Malcolm Gladwell recently popularized many of these findings. See 
MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK 1847 (2005). 
 130. Nalini Ambady et al., Accuracy of Judgments of Sexual Orientation from Thin Slices of 
Behavior, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 538, 53839 (1999) (finding that people can 
determine someone’s gender in the dark merely by watching the individual walk with points of 
light on his or her joints for 200 milliseconds). 
 131. Id. at 538. 
 132. See id. Several studies suggest people may be able to determine others’ sexual 
orientation on the basis of thin-slice judgments, but the results cannot be deemed conclusive. 
Id. at 539, 54346. 
 133. Id. at 538 (citations omitted). 
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traits similarly to other people’s ratings and even similarly to the 
strangers’ self-ratings.134 
Studies of teacher evaluations are particularly persuasive because 
they observe teachers in their actual environments.135 The results are 
remarkable. Nalini Ambady and Robert Rosenthal conducted a study 
in which college undergraduates watched thirty-second silent video 
clips of graduate teaching assistants teaching classes and evaluated 
them on social characteristics such as optimism and confidence and 
non-verbal behaviors such as nodding and gazing downward.136 The 
evaluations were averaged into a composite and compared to end-of-
semester student evaluations of teacher effectiveness. Remarkably, 
evaluations based on thirty seconds of silent video correlated highly 
with student evaluations after semester-long courses.137 The 
researchers repeated the same study with high school teachers and 
found the same correlation between the thin-slice judgments and 
principals’ evaluations of teachers.138 Most astonishing, when the 
researchers repeated the experiments with fifteen-second and six-
second video clips, the results were not significantly different.139 
In 1992, Ambady and Rosenthal conducted a meta-analysis of 
forty-four studies in which people were given between 30 and 300 
seconds to make quick judgments on criteria such as teacher 
effectiveness, teacher bias, existence of deception, patient 
commitment and compliance with therapy, physician proficiency and 
patient satisfaction, comprehension in children, voting behavior, 
levels of anxiety, and depression.140 They found robust confirmation 
 
 134. Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 94, at 475. 
 135. Nalini Ambady & Robert Rosenthal, Half a Minute: Predicting Teacher Evaluations 
from Thin Slices of Nonverbal Behavior & Physical Attractiveness, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 431, 432 (1993). 
 136. Id. at 43235. Ambady and Rosenthal also evaluated several other characteristics, 
including whether the teacher was accepting, active, (not) anxious, attentive, competent, 
dominant, empathetic, enthusiastic, honest, likable, professional, supportive, and warm. Id. at 
433. 
 137. For the end-of-semester evaluations, researchers averaged students’ responses to the 
items “Rate the quality of the section overall” and “Rate the section leader’s performance 
overall.” Id. at 433. The judges’ and students’ evaluations correlated at .76, and at .74 after 
controlling for the teachers’ physical attractiveness. Id. at 43435, 439. 
 138. The judges’ and principals’ evaluations correlated at .80. Id. at 43537. 
 139. Id. at 43738. Across the thirty-, fifteen-, and six-second studies, the judges’ ratings 
generally were reliable also in their consistency with others’ judgments. Id. at 43238. 
 140. Nalani Ambady & Robert Rosenthal, Thin Slices of Expressive Behavior as Predictors 
of Interpersonal Consequences: A Meta-Analysis, 111 PSYCHOL. BULL. 256, 26062 (1992). 
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that thirty-second observations yielded judgments as accurate as 
those derived from extensive testing, performance observations, and 
interviews.141 Other studies have shown that quick evaluations are 
sometimes more reliable than thoughtful evaluations.142 
3. Deciding advantageously without knowing the advantageous 
strategy 
Humans are not just good at quickly sizing up people’s 
characteristics. We also make quick, reliable judgments about 
situations that require substantial thought and calculation to be 
resolved rationally—and we do so even when we lack the 
information necessary for a proper rational calculation. In a classic 
illustration, neurobiologist Antonio Damasio and his colleagues 
developed a game in which people were given $2000 in play money 
and told to gain as much (and lose as little) as possible by picking 
cards from one of four decks lettered A through D. Drawing from 
deck A or B usually awarded $100 but occasionally carried a penalty 
large enough that drawing from those decks would consistently 
cause long-term losses. Decks C and D usually returned $50 and 
occasionally carried penalties small enough that drawing from those 
decks would still result in consistent long-term gains.143 Players had 
no idea what the decks would provide, no means of recording or 
calculating results, and no ability to project averages. They were not 
told how many cards they would be permitted to draw during the 
game. As participants played, researchers observed their behavior, 
emotions, and thoughts. They recorded the number of times 
participants drew from each deck, recorded skin conductance 
responses,144 and asked participants two questions after every twenty 
 
 141. Id. at 263, 26567. 
 142. See Timothy D. Wilson & Jonathan W. Schooler, Thinking Too Much: Introspection 
Can Reduce the Quality of Preferences and Decisions, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
181, 18288, 19192 (1991). 
 143. Antonio R. Damasio et al., Deciding Advantageously Before Knowing the 
Advantageous Strategy, 275 SCI. 1293, 1293–95 (1997) [hereinafter Damasio et al., Deciding 
Advantageously]. 
 144. A skin conductive response (SCR) is a measure of the electrical conductivity of the 
skin. It is calculated by attaching leads to the skin, which measure the skin’s electrical 
resistance. See generally Rui Miguel Costa & Francisco Esteves, Skin Conductance Responses to 
Visual Sexual Stimuli, 67 INT’L J. PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 64 (2008); David L. Neumann & 
Paula L. Longbottom, Extinguishing Conditioned Fear with Fear-relevant and Fear-irrelevant 
Stimuli by a Context Change After Extinction, 46 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 188 (2008); H. 
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draws: (a) “Tell me all you know about what is going on in this 
game,” and (b) “Tell me how you feel about this game.”145 
After drawing just ten cards, which included some losses from 
decks A and B, participants began to generate significant skin 
conductance responses when they considered drawing from those 
decks.146 After twenty draws, however, players still professed to have 
no idea how the game worked. That is, their emotions began 
warning them that decks A and B were risky, but they had no 
conscious awareness of this. After drawing fifty cards, all players 
voiced a “hunch” that decks A and B were riskier, and seven of ten 
ultimately articulated a correct theory of the game. Three never 
deduced how the game worked but still chose correctly.147 
4. Emotion and reason: affect as a decision necessity 
There is more to the gambling study than mentioned above, and 
the remainder has even more important implications for our 
understanding of emotion. In addition to the ten participants, 
Damasio and his colleagues ran the same study with six individuals 
who had damage to a portion of the brain that is heavily involved in 
emotion and, as it turns out, decision making.148 This Article will 
return to that study in a moment, after a brief detour to discuss the 
brain damage involved and its impact on emotion and decisions. 
For years, Damasio has studied and treated patients with damage 
to certain areas of the brain.149 One patient, whom he calls “Elliot,” 
was an intelligent, successful, able-bodied businessman and a good 
husband and father before he developed a brain tumor. After its 
removal, Elliot retained his intelligence, use of language, and 
physical abilities, but his personality changed dramatically. He now 
needed someone to prod him to go to work. Once there, he could 
not manage his time. He could spend an entire afternoon 
contemplating which principle of organization he should use to file a 
 
Rae Westbury & David L. Neumann, Empathy Related Responses to Moving Film Stimuli 
Depicting Human and Non-human Animal Targets in Negative Circumstances, 78 
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 66 (2008). 
 145. Damasio et al., Deciding Advantageously, supra note 143, at 1293. 
 146. Id. at 129394. 
 147. Id. at 1293. 
 148. Id. The subjects had bilateral damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortices. Id. 
 149. See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE 
HUMAN BRAIN 54–74 (Avon Books 1995) [hereinafter DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR]. 
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paper—date, size, relationship to other matters, or any other factor. 
Elliot eventually lost his job, squandered his savings on a series of 
unsuccessful businesses, divorced, remarried, and divorced again.150 
Elliot was brought in to see Damasio after losing his disability 
payments. By this time, “[s]everal professionals had declared that his 
mental faculties were intact—meaning at the very best Elliot was 
lazy, and at the worst a malingerer.”151 Elliot certainly appeared 
mentally fit: 
[C]learly he knew what was occurring in the world around him. 
Dates, names, details in the news were all at his fingertips. He 
discussed political affairs with the humor they often deserve and 
seemed to grasp the situation of the economy. His knowledge of 
the business realm he had worked in remained strong. I had been 
told his skills were unchanged, and that appeared plausible. He had 
a flawless memory for his life story . . . .152 
But Elliot clearly had difficulty making decisions since having his 
brain tumor removed. Naturally, Damasio first tested Elliott’s 
intellect. He measured intelligence, perceptual ability, long-term 
memory, short-term memory, working memory, new learning ability, 
arithmetic, language, sorting ability, and ability to make estimates. 
On each test, Elliot scored between average and superior. Despite all 
his real-life difficulties, he appeared normal or above average on 
every measure of intellect and rationality.153 
Damasio began to wonder whether he was looking in the wrong 
place, and he eventually found that he was. He had always thought 
Elliott was surprisingly reserved and unaffected, but over time he 
realized that Elliot’s lack of emotion was utterly peculiar. Elliott 
appeared not to feel pain or loss over the tragedy in his life. In fact, 
Damasio found himself more disturbed and moved by Elliott’s 
stories than Elliot himself. As a result, Damasio began to examine 
Elliot’s emotions more directly. He showed Elliot pictures of 
earthquakes, burning houses, and people with grotesque injuries, 
finding that Elliot was unmoved by them. Elliot knew that such 
pictures influenced people emotionally—indeed, he said they would 
have evoked emotions in him before his surgery—but he did not feel 
 
 150. Id. at 3451. 
 151. Id. at 34. 
 152. Id. at 35. 
 153. Id. at 4143. 
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anything when viewing them. Since his surgery, Elliot’s emotions 
had gone virtually flat.154 And so Damasio began to suspect a link 
between Elliot’s two major deficiencies—feeling emotions and 
making decisions. 
Damasio decided to subject Elliot to another round of tests, this 
time examining Elliot’s knowledge about social behavior and his 
ability to make moral and ethical judgments. Damasio and a 
colleague tested Elliot’s ability to generate options for action, his 
awareness of consequences, his ability to conceptualize effective 
means of achieving a social goal, and his level of moral reasoning. 
Again, Elliot performed well on every test. What, then, the scientists 
wondered, could account for the differences in Elliot’s performance 
on tests in a lab and his glaring difficulties in everyday life? The key, 
it turns out, was that the tests required Elliot only to generate 
options; they did not ask him to choose. After generating abundant 
options during one test, Elliot remarked, “And after all this, I still 
wouldn’t know what to do!”155 
Finally, the diagnosis became acute. Elliot and similar patients156 
could think rationally—that is, logically—but could not emote as 
ordinary people do and had great difficulty making decisions. 
Emotion and decision making appeared to be linked fundamentally 
in the brain. This suggested that the long-standing conventional 
wisdom that too much emotion impairs decision making is at best 
only half the story. Too little emotion might be equally or even more 
 
 154. Id. at 45. 
 155. Id. at 46–49. 
 156. Famed psychological specimen Phineas Gage is the first known person with 
symptoms such as Elliot’s. At age twenty-five, a railroad spike blasted through Gage’s brain, 
entering his left cheek and exiting the top of his head before landing over a hundred feet away. 
Within minutes, Gage was talking calmly, answering questions, and telling bystanders what had 
happened. He survived an infection, was pronounced healed within two months, and lived 
another thirteen years. But Gage changed drastically after the accident. He no longer observed 
basic social norms and could not hold a job. He spent some time selling himself as a circus 
attraction, then held a series of manual labor jobs before dying at age thirty-eight, apparently 
from epilepsy. Id. at 3–10. Justice William O. Douglas displayed similar symptoms after a 
stroke in 1975. Despite left-side paralysis, it was not immediately apparent that he could not 
continue on the bench; he retained language ability and appeared to have normal brain 
function. Soon, though, his obliviousness to his own condition (he suffered from anosognosia, 
an absence of awareness of an injury), his erratic behavior, his poor judgment in everyday 
matters, and his inability to observe basic social norms led the other members of the Court to 
determine he was unfit. See id. at 68 (citing BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE 
BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1979)). 
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harmful.157 Freedom from emotion does not beget good choices, as 
we typically assume; it begets an inability to choose. 
Damasio began to theorize that, instead of facing the infinite 
array of conceivable, logical thoughts and actions in every situation, 
some nonconscious affective process rejects many potential courses 
of action automatically, dramatically reducing the scope of decision 
alternatives.158 He has been developing and testing this theory for 
nearly fifteen years with impressive results.159 Without this process, or 
something akin to it, decision making would be impossible because 
the sheer number of calculations required in any situation would be 
paralyzing. Even more important, calculations are only that—
predictions of results. Without emotional evaluations of those 
predictions, it is impossible to decide which outcome is preferable.160 
In this sense, logical reasoning is like a street map, and affective 
processes are what tell us which way to go and how quickly. 
When this ability to emotionally experience potential outcomes is 
impaired, we can spend hours on even the simplest decisions.161 
Damasio relates the story of a patient who had immense difficulty 
making the simple choice of when to schedule his next appointment: 
I suggested two alternative dates, both in the coming month and 
just a few days apart from each other. The patient pulled out his 
appointment book and began consulting the calendar . . . . For the 
better part of a half-hour, the patient enumerated reasons for and 
against each of the two dates: previous engagements, proximity to 
 
 157. Id. at 52–53. 
 158. Damasio theorizes that a system of effective guideposts, which he calls “somatic 
markers,” assists the decision process by tagging decision consequences with different valences, 
narrowing decision possibilities nearly instantaneously. They can be likened to “gut feelings,” 
pre-cognitively. Id. at 171–74; see also ERIC R. KANDEL ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF NEURAL 
SCIENCE & BEHAVIOR 596–97 (1995). To explain the simplicity and power of such a process, 
Damasio uses the example of bumblebees. Bumblebees do not stop at flowers randomly; they 
appear to predict and choose the flowers with the most nectar in advance. This behavior could 
be explained by a few basic processes. The bee must be able to detect reward and have an 
automated process that produces certain motor results (landing or not) in the presence or 
absence of cues (such as color of a flower) that have corresponded (or not) with the reward. 
Such a system marks rewarding situations and steers the bee toward them automatically, 
without any thought. Furthermore, because of bees’ small capacities for memory, the system 
must require only a very small sample size. Apparently, as few as three visits will suffice. 
DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 149, at 185–87. 
 159. See Antoine Bechara & Antonio R. Damasio, The Somatic Marker Hypothesis: A 
Neural Theory of Economic Decision, 52 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 336 (2005). 
 160. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 149, at 172. 
 161. See id. at 172–74. 
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other engagements, possible meteorological conditions, virtually 
anything that one could reasonably think about concerning a 
simple date . . . . [H]e was now walking us through a tiresome 
cost-benefit analysis, an endless outlining and fruitless comparison 
of options and possible consequences. It took enormous discipline 
to listen to all of this without pounding on the table and telling 
him to stop, but we finally did tell him, quietly, that he should 
come on the second of the alternative dates. His response was 
equally calm and prompt. He simply said: “That’s fine.”162 
“[T]his behavior,” Damasio continues dryly, “is a good example 
of the limits of pure reason.”163 Thus, we see that the dominant 
model is mistaken in treating emotions as pure objects of decisions 
because they are a fundamental part of the decision-making process. 
Merely knowing the consequences of actions is not enough; 
emotions must tell our bodies which course to pursue, often quickly 
and nonconsciously. 
Now let us return to the card-game experiment. Recall that the 
normal participants began generating anticipatory skin conductance 
responses when contemplating the losing decks after drawing just ten 
cards, even though they professed strategic ignorance and were 
unaware of their emotional apprehensions; and recall that players 
who never understood the game nonetheless made good decisions. 
The six brain-damaged patients were a striking contrast: none of 
them generated a skin conductance response, and none made 
advantageous decisions.164 Most astonishing, three of the brain-
damaged participants eventually deduced as a logical matter which 
decks were good and bad but continued to choose poorly.165 
B. Affect and Nonconscious Processes in Cognition and Behavior 
The research discussed above may be interesting in its own right, 
but it provides only a limited view of the picture of human 
behavior—a glimpse loosely analogous to the “preferences-as-
objects” component in the typical model of decisions. It only begins 
to hint at how those processes interact with the environment to 
produce our attitudes and behavior, a loose analogy to the “choices” 
 
 162. Id. at 193–94. 
 163. Id. at 194. 
 164. Damasio et al., Deciding Advantageously, supra note 143, at 1293–94. 
 165. Id. 
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component. Researchers have catalogued myriad ways in which 
environmental stimuli, through nonconscious affective processes, 
influence our perceptions, attitudes, and, ultimately, behavior. This 
section reviews some of those studies, beginning with the simplest. 
Here, the line between “preferring” and “choosing”—or feeling and 
behaving—begins to blur. 
1. Automatic attitudes 
a. Mere exposure. Simply being exposed to something will cause 
you to like it more, a phenomenon researchers have termed the mere 
exposure effect.166 In a typical study, researchers expose people to 
objects a varying number of times, then ask the participants to 
evaluate several objects, some of which they have previously seen. 
People are more likely to evaluate objects favorably when they have 
already seen them.167 Equally significant, people are unaware of this 
effect. When asked to identify why they prefer certain objects, people 
cite a range of factors but rarely mention having seen an object 
before.168 Moreover, when researchers ask participants about the 
familiarity of objects, subjective judgments of familiarity do not 
correlate with tastes; only the number of exposures does.169 
This lack of awareness led researchers to suspect that the mere 
exposure effect might obtain even when people are wholly unaware 
of an object—and it does. In a typical study, researchers expose 
participants to objects for a period so brief that they cannot perceive 
 
 166. Robert Zajonc, Closing the Debate over the Independence of Affect, in FEELING AND 
THINKING, supra note 15, at 35 [hereinafter Zajonc, Closing the Debate]; Robert Zajonc, Mere 
Exposure: A Gateway to the Subliminal, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 224 (2001). 
 167. In one experiment, subjects were shown Chinese ideographs once, twice, five, ten, 
or twenty-five times. Later, the same objects were presented again, interspersed with others, 
and subjects were asked whether each object represented something “good” or “bad.” 
Subjects responded positively more often to objects they had previously viewed, and more 
exposures yielded higher likelihoods of positive evaluation. Zajonc, Closing the Debate, supra 
note 166, at 36. Another study took photographs of pairs of friends or lovers and made both 
normal and reversed prints of each. People consistently preferred the reversed image of 
themselves over the normal one (the way they see themselves in mirrors) but liked normal 
images of their friends and lovers. Id. at 36–37. 
 168. In the Chinese ideograph study, participants cited factors such as symmetry, 
complexity, or shape, or said the ideograph reminded them of a landscape or sculpture. Id. at 
40 (“Out of the hundreds of participants we have tested, perhaps one or two have ever said 
that the feeling of familiarity was a factor in their preferences.”). 
 169. Id. at 42. 
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the objects consciously,170 then show the participants a pair of 
objects, one previously viewed and one new, and ask which one the 
subjects prefer and which they have seen before. Participants are 
unable to determine which they have seen but select it more 
frequently as the one they prefer.171 This effect has been found for a 
wide range of objects, such as “geometric figures, random polygons, 
Chinese and Japanese ideographs, numbers, letters of the alphabet, 
letters of one’s own name, random sequences of tones, non-sense 
syllables, odors, flavors, colors, foods, faces, actual persons, and 
many others.”172 It has also been found across cultures, various 
personality types, and among different species.173 
b. Automatic attitudes. Similar to the mere exposure effect, 
priming is a phenomenon by which environmental cues can make 
certain feelings more accessible to us, thereby altering downstream 
attitudes outside our conscious awareness. A most basic example of 
priming is a person’s tendency to like something better when primed 
with something pleasant. In a typical study, people subliminally 
exposed to a smiling face evaluate objects more positively than 
people shown nothing, who in turn evaluate objects more positively 
than people shown a frowning face. This manipulation can result 
from priming stimuli that have nothing whatsoever to do with the 
objects being judged and, like the exposure effect, can occur entirely 
outside of conscious awareness.174 
Priming is not limited to subliminal images of smiling faces. 
Automatic attitude formation is ubiquitous, holding for much more 
complex attitudes as well. For example, people primed with the word 
“achieve” view others as more achieving.175 Priming loyalty increases 
in-group favoritism and the identification and expectation of loyal 
 
 170. The time period was one millisecond. Id. at 43. This can be termed subliminal. 
Most researchers avoid that term because of its stigma, instead using implicit or nonconscious. 
 171. Id. at 43–44. 
 172. Id. at 35; see also Robert Bornstein et al., The Generalizability of Subliminal Mere 
Exposure Effects: Influence of Stimuli Perceived Without Awareness on Social Behavior, 53 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1070 (1987). 
 173. Zajonc, Closing the Debate, supra note 166, at 36 (noting effects among “American 
undergraduates, nationals of 12 countries, sons of alcoholics, amnesiacs, dieters, chicks, 
ducklings, and goslings”). 
 174. Id. at 49–50, 52–54. For more evidence of positive primes causing more positive 
evaluations, see Ferguson & Bargh, Sensitivity and Flexibility, supra note 122; and Ferguson et 
al., supra note 125, at 189–90. 
 175. Ferguson & Bargh, Sensitivity and Flexibility, supra note 122. 
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behavior from others.176 Priming cooperation or competition 
moderates whether people name a prisoner’s dilemma game the 
“Community Game” or “Battle of Wits” and whether they express 
the intent to cooperate or defect when playing.177 Exposure to 
business-related objects such as suits, fountain pens, and boardroom 
tables causes people to perceive interactions as more competitive 
than cooperative.178 Showing a fat vase to women who are 
dissatisfied with their bodies can trigger feelings of body 
dissatisfaction.179 Indeed, reading the word “fat” in the preceding 
sentence likely accomplished the same. Nonconscious attitude shifts 
occur “in an uncontrollable manner similar to how written words 
activate their meanings during reading.”180 More broadly, emotions 
themselves are contagious. Listening to happy or sad speakers makes 
listeners happier or sadder, respectively, and even sitting silently in a 
room with someone in another mood can cause others to “catch” a 
mood.181 
2. Automatic behavior 
Given the evidence on automatic attitudes, it should hardly be 
surprising that nonconscious affective processes often mediate 
behavior as well. More remarkable are the breadth, robustness, and 
directness of documented effects, as well as our inability to perceive 
or control them. Researchers have found countless ways in which 
perceptions of the environment directly influence behavior. 
 
 176. Aaron C. Kay & Lee Ross, The Perceptual Push: The Interplay of Implicit Cues and 
Explicit Situational Construals on Behavioral Intentions in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 39 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 634, 635 (2003) (citing Guido Hertel & Norbert L. Kerr, 
Priming In-Group Favoritism: The Impact of Normative Scripts in the Minimal Group 
Paradigm, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 316 (2001)). 
 177. Kay & Ross, supra note 176, at 637–40. 
 178. Aaron C. Kay et al., Material Priming: The Influence of Mundane Physical Objects on 
Situational Construal and Competitive Behavioral Choice, 95 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESS 83, 87–88 (2004). 
 179. See Debra Trampe, Diederik A. Stapel & Frans W. Siero, On Models and Vases: Body 
Dissatisfaction and Proneness to Social Comparison Effects, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 106, 111–14 (2007). 
 180. Bargh, Consciousness, supra note 95, at 558. 
 181. Tanya L. Chartrand et al., Beyond the Perception-Behavior Link: The Ubiquitous 
Utility and Motivational Moderators of Nonconscious Mimicry, in THE NEW UNCONSCIOUS, 
supra note 94, at 343. 
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a. Mimicry. In a “manifestation of the perception-behavior link 
at its most fundamental level,”182 we nonconsciously mimic countless 
behaviors of others. Is it widely understood that yawns and laughter 
are contagious,183 but mimicry extends far beyond these 
circumstances. In verbal interactions, we mimic others’ word choice, 
sentence structure and grammar, accent, tone of voice, speech 
rhythm, duration of speech pauses, and rate of speech.184 We also 
mimic facial expressions and other behaviors such as posture and 
gestures.185 Mimicry is so nonconscious that our mimicking 
movements are sometimes imperceptible to us. A study using 
machines to monitor muscle movements found that people 
imperceptibly move the muscles involved in smiling when they view 
happy facial expressions and the muscles involved in frowning when 
they view angry facial expressions.186 Similar studies found that 
people’s lip muscles move imperceptibly when they watch a 
stuttering person and arm and wrist muscles move when they watch 
others arm-wrestle.187 
b. Automaticity. Mimicry is only the beginning. Researchers have 
found countless ways in which perceptions of the environment 
directly influence behavior. For example, priming people with a trait 
such as rudeness or politeness skews behavior toward the trait.188 The 
 
 182. Id. at 335. 
 183. Id. at 338 (yawning); id. at 336 (laughter). 
 184. Id. at 335–36. 
 185. Id. at 337–39. 
 186. Id. at 339. 
 187. Id. at 341. 
 188. John A. Bargh, Mark Chen & Lara Burrows, The Automaticity of Social Behavior: 
Direct Effects of Trait Construct & Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 230, 233–36 (1996). In one study, researchers instructed subjects to construct 
grammatically correct four-word phrases out of five-word sets, such as “he it hides finds 
instantly,” as quickly as possible. The priming terms were included in the word sets. For 
example, to prime politeness, researchers used the terms “respect, honor, considerate, 
appreciate, patiently, cordially, yield, polite, cautiously, courteous, graciously, sensitively, 
discreetly, behaved, and unobtrusively.” Subjects engaged in the activity one at a time and, 
afterward, each was instructed to seek another task from a researcher down the hallway. When 
the subject approached, the researcher was engaged in conversation with a confederate. The 
confederate timed how long each participant waited before interrupting. Participants primed 
with rudeness interrupted more quickly than those whose word task used neutral terms, who in 
turn interrupted more quickly than subjects primed with politeness. Id. Subjects did not vary 
significantly in their ratings of the experimenter’s politeness; therefore, it is unlikely that the 
variation in interruption time was due to variation in perceptions of the experimenter. Id. at 
235. 
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priming need not be direct. Priming broad schemas that are in turn 
associated with specific traits has the same effect. Thus, people act 
with more hostility not only when primed with words directly related 
to hostility,189 but also when primed with stereotypes associated with 
violence.190 Similarly, exposing people to business-related objects 
causes them to behave more competitively.191 
Our perceptions also automatically influence more complex 
behaviors such as exercises of cognitive ability. Thus, priming people 
with stereotypes of the elderly not only causes them to walk more 
slowly,192 it also diminishes performance on memory tests.193 People 
primed with stereotypes of professors or the trait “intelligent” 
perform better on tests of general knowledge, while people primed 
with the stereotype of hooligans or the trait “stupid” perform more 
poorly.194 And reminding people of a negative stereotype applied to 
their group harms their performance.195 
Given indirect and schema-based activation, these effects can 
operate through exceedingly subtle means. For example, asking 
African American students to list eight friends who would fit well in 
a computer science department—a field in which only four percent 
of the population is African American—lowers the students’ sense 
that they would fit in computer science, lowers their self-perceived 
potential to succeed in computer science, activates thoughts about 
their racial identity, and makes them more likely to discourage same-
 
 189. Id. at 236. 
 190. Id. at 232. 
 191. Kay et al., supra note 178, at 88–91. 
 192. Bargh, Chen & Burrows, supra note 188, at 236–38; Ap Dijksterhuis et al., Seeing 
One Thing and Doing Another: Contrast Effects in Automatic Behavior, 75 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 862, 865–66 (1998). 
 193. Ap Dijksterhuis, John Bargh & J. Miedema, Of Men and Mackerels: Attention and 
Automatic Behavior, in SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE IN SOCIAL COGNITION AND BEHAVIOR 
(Herbert Bless & Joseph Forgas eds., 2000); Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 94, at 466. 
 194. Ap Dijksterhuis & Ad van Knippenberg, The Relation Between Perception and 
Behavior, or How to Win a Game of Trivial Pursuit, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 865, 
870–73 (1998). Note that priming an exemplar of a particular type evokes a different 
behavioral reaction. Whereas priming “professor” improves cognitive performance; the 
opposite occurs for priming with a particular professor against whom people believe they 
compare unfavorably on the trait—say, Albert Einstein. Id. at 864–65. 
 195. See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist 
Revision of Affirmative Action, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1087–88 (2006) (citing several studies, 
mostly in the context of race, where groups performed poorly when primed with negative 
stereotypes concerning their group). 
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race peers from entering computer science—all without activating in 
their minds negative stereotypes about African Americans.196 All that 
is needed is to question whether they belong.197 
These effects have also been found with respect to goals. 
Environmental factors can activate people’s goals and lead them to 
behave as they would if they had consciously chosen to pursue the 
goals.198 For example, people primed with “achievement” perform 
better, persist in tasks longer, and return to tasks better after 
interruptions than people not primed with the goal.199 Activating a 
broad schema such as a social relationship also can activate goals 
relevant to that schema—in this case, relevant to the relationship. 
For example, asking people questions about a good friend rather 
than a co-worker makes them more likely to help strangers,200 and 
priming someone with his or her best friend’s name makes him or 
her more likely to explain a stranger’s undesirable behavior by 
charitable reference to situational factors rather than the stranger’s 
intentions.201 Priming people with thoughts of their mothers causes 
them to perform better on intellectual tasks, and all the more so if 
they identify themselves as desiring to make their mothers proud.202 
And priming people who have long-term goals of fairness and 
 
 196. Gregory M. Walton & Geoffrey L. Cohen, A Question of Belonging: Race, Social Fit, 
and Achievement, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 82, 83–87 (2007). 
 197. Id. 
 198. John Bargh et al., The Automated Will: Nonconscious Activation and Pursuit of 
Behavioral Goals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1024 (2001); Tanya L. Chartrand & 
John A. Bargh, Automatic Activation of Impression Formation and Memorization Goals: 
Nonconscious Goal Priming Reproduces Effects of Explicit Task Instructions, 71 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 464 (1996) [hereinafter Chartrand & Bargh, Automatic Activation]. The 
mental processes appear identical once the goal is activated. Bargh & Ferguson, Beyond 
Behaviorism, supra note 105, at 936. 
 199. Chartrand & Bargh, Automatic Activation, supra note 198, at 1022–24. Subjects 
primed with “achievement” perform better on a word-search task even when all subjects are 
instructed “to find as many words as possible.” Id. at 1016–17. Researchers have observed this 
effect for the goals of impression-formation, id. at 1016, and cooperation, id. at 1017–18. 
Remarkably, although the effect of priming on evaluations fades quickly, goal-priming effects 
grow stronger over at least short time periods. Id. at 1020–21. 
 200. Gráinne M. Fitzsimons & John A. Bargh, Thinking of You: Nonconscious Pursuit of 
Interpersonal Goals Associated with Relationship Partners, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 148, 152–53 (2003). 
 201. Id. at 155–57. 
 202. Id. at 157–58. 
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egalitarianism with the presence of a minority group member causes 
them automatically to reduce the use of stereotypes.203 
Finally, these automatic effects have been found in far more 
abstract behavioral orientations. People primed with words 
associated with intrinsic motivation such as “challenge, spontaneous, 
[or] mastering” are more likely to enjoy a task, to feel they are 
exercising free choice in doing it, and to perform better than people 
primed with words associated with extrinsic motivations such as 
“restricted, forced, [or] expected.”204 Furthermore, people primed 
with the concept of power are more likely to take action in a variety 
of situations205 and more likely to think at higher levels of 
abstraction.206 Indeed, merely watching people behave in a manner 
that suggests they are pursuing a particular goal influences others to 
pursue the same goal.207 
c. Neurological evidence. In addition to evidence from social 
psychology, neuroscience increasingly provides evidence of 
nonconscious processes steering behavior—and of a vast disconnect 
between people’s awareness, intentions, and actions. There are two 
types of evidence in this area: experimental evidence with people 
who have brain lesions, and evidence about brain structure itself. 
In the first category, experimental evidence with people who 
have brain lesions, are individuals who can form accurate impressions 
that certain people are friendlier than others without being able to 
remember a single thing about any of the people in question.208 
Other examples are people who can identify an object such as a book 
but are unable to reach for it when asked to do so, and people who 
cannot identify the object as a book but, if asked casually to pick up 
 
 203. Gordon B. Moskowitz et al., Preconscious Control of Stereotype Activation Through 
Chronic Egalitarian Goals, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 167 (1999). 
 204. Bargh & Ferguson, Beyond Behaviorism, supra note 105, at 934–35. 
 205. Adam D. Galinsky, Deborah H. Gruenfeld & Joe C. Magee, From Power to Action, 
85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 453, 464 (2003). 
 206. Pamela K. Smith & Yaacov Troupe, You Focus on the Forest when You’re in Charge of 
the Trees: Power Priming and Abstract Information Processing, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 578, 594 (2006). 
 207. Henry Aarts et al., Goal Contagion: Perceiving Is for Pursuing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 23, 35 (2004). Unless the observed goal-pursuing behavior is unacceptable, in 
which case the opposite effect occurs. Id. at 23. 
 208. DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS: BODY AND EMOTION IN THE 
MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS 43–45 (1999). 
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the book, will do so.209 These findings suggest that conscious 
reasoning, memory, and intention can be wholly disconnected from 
behavior.  
Regarding evidence in brain structures, neuroscientists have 
found a neurological basis for mimicry and possibly other 
manifestations of perception-behavior automaticity in “‘mirror 
neurons,’” “in which simply watching mouth, hand, and foot 
movements activates the same functionally specific regions of the 
premotor cortex as when performing those same movements 
oneself.”210 
3. Affect and “cold” cognition 
Substantial research has also shown that emotion deeply 
influences (and is influenced by) “cooler” components of cognition. 
Below, this Article sketches emotion’s role in (a) memory; (b) 
knowledge structures; and (c) cognitive processing style. 
a. Attention and memory. Emotion has several important 
influences on memory. First, memories are often biased in a mood-
congruent manner, meaning that happy people are more likely to 
recall happy memories, sad people to recall sad memories, and so 
on.211 Emotions also moderate both attention and long-term 
memory retention, playing a substantial role in both whether we 
perceive and record information in the first instance and how well we 
remember it later.212 This is probably why we are more likely to 
remember highly emotional events.213 
b. Knowledge structures. Knowledge structures are “‘the building 
blocks of cognition’ . . . whose many crucial functions ‘include 
classification, inferring additional attributes, guiding attention and 
 
 209. Bargh, Bypassing the Will, supra note 105, at 44. 
 210. Id. at 45. 
 211. KUNDA, supra note 65, at 187–90. There is also mixed evidence that people may be 
more likely to recall memories that were formed during a mood that matches the current 
mood. Id. at 191–93. Congruence has also expanded to include judgments as well. People in 
positive moods are more likely to make more positive judgments about themselves, other 
people, and inanimate objects, and the opposite applies to those in negative moods. See 
generally id. at 246–49. 
 212. See generally Elizabeth A. Phelps, The Interaction of Emotion and Cognition: Insights 
from Studies of the Human Amygdala, in EMOTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS 51, 58–62 (Lisa 
Feldman Barrett et al. eds., 2005). 
 213. Id. 
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interpretation, communication, and reasoning.’”214 Jon Hanson, 
who has written extensively about knowledge structures and their 
significance to law and legal theory,215 explains with David Yosifon: 
We process stimuli “through preexisting systems of schematized 
and abstracted knowledge—beliefs, theories, propositions, and 
schemas. These knowledge structures label and categorize objects 
and events quickly and, for the most part, accurately. They also 
define a set of expectations about objects and events and suggest 
appropriate responses to them.” Thus, the benefit of such 
knowledge structures is that they provide us, often automatically, 
with a way of understanding our world so that we can operate 
reasonably well within it, at the same time that they free up 
cognitive capacity to cope with other pressing issues.216 
Knowledge structures are involved in the bulk of the instances of 
automaticity discussed earlier in this Article. For example, priming 
someone with a material object related to business, such as a 
briefcase, causes that person to interpret other people’s actions and 
to act herself in a manner more consistent with the knowledge 
structure business—for example, more competitively.217 The 
knowledge structure, once activated, filters subsequent attention, 
memory, cognitive processing, and behavior. 
Predictably, given its influence on attention and memory, 
emotion heavily influences the operation of knowledge structures: 
“When a particular emotion is activated . . . schemas and other 
cognitive materials that are tagged with that emotion will be primed 
for both the identification of mood-congruent stimulus material and 
for the recall of congruent material from memory. In other words, 
affect influences the schemas people apply to interpret events.”218 
 
 214. Hanson & Yosifon, Situational Character, supra note 1, at 50–51 (quoting KUNDA, 
supra note 65, at 16; LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION 
12 (1983)). 
 215. See Jon D. Hanson & Ronald Chen, Categorically Biased: The Influence of 
Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 22 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103 (2004); Hanson & 
Yosifon, Situational Character, supra note 1, at 50–83. 
 216. Hanson & Yosifon, Situational Character, supra note 1, at 51 (quoting LEE ROSS & 
RICHARD E. NISBETT, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL 
JUDGMENT 18 (1980) (citing Hanson & Chen, supra note 215, at 1139–77)). 
 217. See Kay et al., supra note 178, at 87–88. 
 218. Hanson & Chen, supra note 215, at 1182 (citing Walter H. Crockett, Schemas, 
Affect, and Communication, in COMMUNICATION, SOCIAL COGNITION, AND AFFECT 33, 34 
(Lewis Donohew et al. eds., 1988)); see also Ralph Erber, Affective and Semantic Priming: 
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Affect also moderates the formation and reformation of knowledge 
structures. Take, for example, the classic study Hanson and Yosifon 
cite in which researchers running a summer camp divided boys into 
two groups, Eagles and Rattlers, and had the two groups square off 
in various competitions: 
[B]oth out-group animosity and in-group solidarity increased 
dramatically as the competitions continued, and the resultant 
stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination that followed were 
robust: “Mere informational campaigns, even those couched in 
appeals in moral values, were universally unsuccessful in reducing 
enmity. Sunday religious services that interrupted the period of 
competition with especially pointed appeals for brotherly love, 
forgiveness of enemies, and cooperation had no impact. The 
campers solemnly departed from the services and then, within 
minutes, returned to their preoccupation with defeating or 
harassing the detested out-group.”219 
The perception of a threat from another group quickly fostered 
the formation of strong negative schemas about the out-group. The 
schemas were highly resistant to reasoned discourse and also could 
not be undermined merely by “placing the groups in various 
noncompetitive settings together—taking meals, filling out surveys, 
shooting off fireworks, and so on . . . as subsequent food fights 
demonstrated.”220 
The enmity diminished only when the researchers began placing 
the campers in “situations of mutual dependence and 
cooperation.”221 
For example, a bus transporting both groups to dinner “broke 
down,” forcing the hungry campers to cooperate. With a rope that 
had once been used in the tug-of-war competition, the groups 
worked to jointly push and pull the bus to restart it. Operating 
under such cooperative (“common enemy”) conditions over time, 
the campers changed their group-based views of one another and 
 
Effects of Mood on Category Accessibility and Inference, 27 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 
480, 480 (1991). 
 219. Hanson & Yosifon, Situational Character, supra note 1, at 55–56 (quoting ROSS & 
NISBETT, supra note 214, at 40); see also MUZAFER SHERIF ET AL., INTERGROUP CONFLICT 
AND COOPERATION: THE ROBBERS CAVE EXPERIMENT 117–49 (1961). 
 220. Hanson & Yosifon, Situational Character, supra note 1, at 56 (citing SHERIF ET 
AL., supra note 219, at 151–58). 
 221. Id. 
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intergroup friendships emerged “between erstwhile rivals and even 
former enemies.” By the end of the summer, “the twenty boys 
themselves proposed that they return to Oklahoma City in a single 
bus, and the self-chosen seating did not reflect the Eagles’ and the 
Rattlers’” group identities.222 
In other words, the perception of a threat from others fostered 
the construction and application of strong negative schemas. These 
schemas could not be undone easily through rational appeals or 
neutral encounters between the groups. Instead, they were undone 
by altering the affective valence of the out-group, by turning enemies 
into collaborators. 
c. Processing style. Emotion also influences cognitive processing. 
Not only are people in positive moods inclined “to like just about 
everything better”;223 mood also influences the very processing style 
that people use. Researchers discovered long ago that people in 
negative moods focus more on details and appear to think more 
carefully about judgments. This led some to believe that happy 
people’s brains are less active than sad people’s brains, perhaps 
because people in good moods are simply less motivated to think 
hard.224 This theory accords with the common sense assumption that 
negative moods signal to people that something is wrong and they 
should remedy the circumstances, whereas positive moods signal that 
all is well. 
More recent evidence suggests happy brains are no less active 
than sad brains. Instead, people in positive moods think just as 
actively, but are more likely to employ “top down” processing, 
relying more on established knowledge structures. In contrast, 
people in negative moods examine contextual details more closely.225 
Researchers have found, for example, that people rely on more 
scripts—a knowledge structure consisting of a set of expectations for 
 
 222. Id. (citing SHERIF ET AL., supra note 219, at 170–71, 182; quoting ROSS & 
NISBETT, supra note 214, at 39; quoting ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 611 (2d ed. 
1986)) (brackets omitted). 
 223. SUSAN FISKE & SHELLEY TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 446–47 (1991). 
 224. Herbert Bless, The Interplay of Affect and Cognition: The Mediating Role of General 
Knowledge Structures, in FEELING AND THINKING, supra note 15, at 207–08. 
 225. Id. at 203. 
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the appropriate sequence of events in well-known situations226—
when in positive moods than in neutral or negative moods.227 
For example, people in positive moods are more likely than those 
in negative moods to recall events that did not actually happen but 
that they could expect to have occurred in a given context.228 In a 
typical study, researchers described to subjects a narrative about a 
common occurrence, such as a dinner outing. In the description, 
they included statements typical of the experience (“the hostess 
placed the menus on the table”) and information anomalous to the 
experience (“he put away his tennis racket”).229 After a short time, 
participants were tested on their memory of the narrative by being 
asked whether bits of typical and atypical information were part of 
the original narrative. Half of this information had been included in 
the original accounts, while the other half was new to the 
participants. Happy subjects were far more likely than neutral or sad 
subjects to “remember” script-typical information, whether they had 
heard it or not. Meanwhile, people in all moods remembered script-
atypical information at the same levels.230 
Similar results have been found with respect to stereotypes,231 
heuristics,232 prior judgments,233 and the fundamental attribution 
error234—the failure to account for numerous situational factors that 
contribute to observed behavior.235 In each case, happy people rely 
more on general knowledge structures or mental shortcuts, while sad 
people display a stronger tendency to process the details of a given 
situation. 
 
 226. Scripts are also termed “event schemas.” FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 223, at 119. 
 227. Bless, supra note 224, at 205–06. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 205. 
 230. Id. at 205–06. 
 231. Id. at 204. 
 232. Id. at 206. 
 233. Id. at 206–07. 
 234. Joseph P. Forgas, Affect and Information Processing Strategies: An Interactive 
Relationship, in FEELING AND THINKING, supra note 15, at 270–71 [hereinafter Forgas, Affect 
and Information Processing]. 
 235. See Hanson & Yosifon, Situation, supra note 1, at 285. 
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4. Out of control 
It is important to emphasize that there is no easy way for us to 
counteract or avoid many of these phenomena.236 As a general 
matter, we cannot control all of them because we cannot perceive all 
of them.237 But even when we perceive the impact of emotion on our 
behavior, we may be unable to control it because emotion has such a 
heavy influence on what we think of as “colder” cognition, including 
our thoughts about our automatic behavior. Indeed, our very 
attempts to evade the influence of affective processes are influenced 
by them—even caused by them in the sense that, when we try to 
control these processes, it is because we are motivated, emotionally, 
to do so.238 
 a. Affect infusion and over-correction. One example of our 
difficulty in counteracting emotion with “reason” is psychologist 
Joseph Forgas’s counterintuitive finding that mood states influence 
complex decisions more than simple decisions. Forgas categorizes 
cognitive processing into four types, in order of complexity: direct 
access, motivated, heuristic, and substantive processing,239 and has 
 
 236. Bargh, Chen & Burrows, supra note 188, at 241. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Forgas, Affect and Information Processing, supra note 234, at 255; Joseph P. Forgas, 
Mood and Judgment: The Affect Infusion Model, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 39, 46–47 (1995). 
Direct access processing requires merely accessing a decision made earlier. People employ direct 
access processing when a task is “well known or familiar, and when no strong cognitive, 
affective, situational, or motivational cues call for more elaborate processing.” Forgas, Affect 
and Information Processing, supra note 234, at 255. Motivated processing occurs when people 
are driven to reach a particular conclusion and therefore involves “highly selective and targeted 
information search strategies, directed by a specific motivational objective.” Id. at 255–66. 
Examples of motivations are self-affirmation, desire to meet expectations, desire for closure, 
and the desire for coherence. For more comprehensive overviews of motivated processing see 
FISKE & TALYOR, supra note 223, at 211–25; KUNDA, supra note 65, at 212–46; and Hanson 
& Yosifon, Situational Character, supra note 1, at 90–115. In heuristic processing, people 
cannot rely on stored responses and are not motivated toward a particular conclusion, and they 
rely on heuristics to “compute a constructive response with minimal effort.” Forgas, Affect and 
Information Processing, supra note 234, at 256. For more comprehensive overviews on the use 
of heuristics, see FISKE & TALYOR, supra note 223; and KUNDA, supra note 65, at 53–110. 
Finally, people engage in substantive processing when they face “complex, novel or atypical” 
tasks, when “there is no motivational goal to dominate processing,” and when heuristics are 
unavailable, unhelpful, or unneeded. Forgas, Affect and Information Processing, supra note 
234, at 256. People employ substantive processing most often when “the situation calls for 
constructive, elaborate processing” or when they “need to actually select, learn, and interpret 
novel information and relate this information to their preexisting knowledge structures in 
order to construct a response.” Id. 
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found that contemporaneous mood influences decisions more at 
each level of complexity in a process he terms “affect infusion.”240 In 
a typical study, subjects are primed with positive or negative affect 
(leaving, of course, an unprimed control group). Subjects are then 
asked to evaluate various persons or objects such as a series of well-
matched or poorly matched romantic couples,241 a task that requires 
different levels of processing.242 People take more time to evaluate 
mismatched couples, and emotion influences these judgments 
more.243 Other studies asking people to evaluate the causes of 
problems in their own relationships (evaluations that require 
complex analysis) show high degrees of affect infusion: people 
primed with positive affect explain relationship difficulties more 
optimistically, blaming problems on external and temporary causes, 
while those primed with negative affect are more critical and likely to 
blame themselves for problems.244 
Forgas’s findings destabilize some of our bedrock assumptions 
about decision making—that we can reason away the influence of 
emotion, and that quicker, more impulsive decisions are somehow 
more “emotional.” His evidence suggests that the more people must 
think about a decision, the more influence contemporaneous 
emotion has.245 Affect infusion is “most likely when people engage in 
genuinely open, constructive processing strategies that require the 
 
 240. Forgas, Affect and Information Processing, supra note 234, at 255–59. 
 241. Couples were well-matched or poorly matched along the lines of race and 
attractiveness, features regarding which people expect homogeneity in couples. See Joseph P. 
Forgas, Strange Couples: Mood Effects on Judgments and Memory about Prototypical and 
Atypical Targets, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 747 (1995). 
 242. Forgas, Affect and Information Processing, supra note 234, at 259–260 (citing 
Joseph P. Forgas, On Bad Mood and Peculiar People: Affect and Person Typicality in Impression 
Formation, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 863–75 (1992)). 
 243. Id. at 260–61. 
 244. Forgas, Affect and Information Processing, supra note 234, at 261. 
 245. Id. This is not to say that affect does not play a great role in other decisions as 
well—only that current mood is less influential. In less complex forms of processing, affect 
influences the decision at a different moment in time. See id. at 258. For example, in direct-
access processing, the stored response that a person accesses may be a memory, schema, or 
script that was influenced by affect at the time of recording. Motivated processing is inherently 
affective; contemporaneously induced mood states have less influence on these decisions 
because an overriding affective goal is steering the decision. Moreover, many motivations are 
emotion-centered, such as the motive to maintain and repair one’s mood. See id. In heuristic 
processing, affect serves as one important heuristic itself, in which people rely on their “gut 
feelings.” See generally Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13 
J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1 (2000). 
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use of memory-based information to construct a judgment.”246 
These tasks “involve the active elaboration and transformation of the 
available stimulus information, require the activation and use of 
previous knowledge structures, and result in the creation of new 
knowledge from the combination of stored information and new 
stimulus details.”247 Therefore, the more a person thinks about a 
decision, the less able he is to control his emotions by keeping his 
emotions out of it. 
Another example of people’s inability to control the impact of 
emotion on their behavior is when people try to counteract the 
effects of their moods. Other studies have shown that people who 
are motivated to counteract the effects of their moods often over-
correct and act in a manner skewed toward the opposite emotion.248 
This is hardly an absence of emotional influence. 
b. The illusion of conscious will. A final reason for skepticism 
regarding our ability to counteract the effects of emotion in decisions 
is that evidence increasingly suggests that we have little control of 
most of our actions—and, indeed, that conscious control may be an 
illusion.249 Neuroscientists have found for example that 
representations of conscious intentions and representations that 
control actions are located in distinct areas of the brain250 and that 
the portion of the brain that guides action appears to fire before the 
portion of the brain that registers conscious intention.251 This raises 
the important point that consciousness and deliberation should not 
be confused with control. We do not necessarily control our 
 
 246. Joseph P. Forgas & Rebekah East, Affective Influences on Social Judgments and 
Decisions, in SOCIAL JUDGMENTS: IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT PROCESSES 198, 203–04 (Joseph 
P. Forgas et al. eds., 2003). 
 247. Id. at 204. It is unclear how far the affect infusion model extends. Even the most 
complex processing decisions in Forgas’s experiments could be made relatively quickly and 
with little conscious processing. It remains to be seen whether the affect infusion model holds 
when people ponder decisions at much greater length. For that reason, the affect infusion 
model has greater application at this time to legal situations in which people make relatively 
quicker decisions (for example, many consumer contexts) rather than extensively deliberated 
and rationalized decisions (such as judicial opinion-writing). The affect infusion model may 
hold even farther up the range of decision-making complexity, but the jury is still out right 
now. 
 248. See Leonard Berkowitz et al., On the Correction of Feeling-Induced Judgmental 
Biases, in FEELING AND THINKING, supra note 15, at 131, 135. 
 249. See generally WEGNER, supra note 105, at 29–49. 
 250. Bargh, Bypassing the Will, supra note 105, at 47. 
 251. WEGNER, supra note 105, at 49–61. 
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thoughts and actions even when we perceive ourselves as acting 
deliberately. 
5. Context-dependent interaction with the environment 
The point here is not to suggest that people can be manipulated 
predictably and easily. There is no simple relationship between 
environmental cues and our attitudes and behavior.252 Countless 
studies have shown that the effect of mood on memory, judgments, 
and cognitive processing varies across different circumstances253 and 
personality types.254 Likewise, the effects of the environment on 
attitudes and behavior are complex, often conflicting, and deeply 
context-dependent.255 This is only proper. Automatic attitudes and 
behavior would have limited value if they remained constant across 
varying situations. An efficient system of nonconscious appraisal 
must evaluate a bottle of soda differently depending on whether you 
 
 252. See, e.g., Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Contemporary Psychology’s Challenges to 
Legal Theory and Practice, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1081, 1088 (2003) (“An important truism of 
social psychology is that people respond not to some objective reality but to their own 
subjective interpretations or definitions of that reality. Thus, to understand, predict and 
influence a given individual’s behavior, it is necessary to understand, predict, and control the 
processes by which that individual ‘construes’ the events to which he or she responds. 
Furthermore, variability and unpredictability in such subjective construals can give rise to 
variability and unpredictability in behavior . . . .”). 
 253. See, e.g., Leonard L. Martin, Moods Do Not Convey Information: Moods in Context 
Do, in FEELING AND THINKING, supra note 15, at 153, 155. It is worth noting that the affect 
infusion model, see supra text accompanying notes 239–48, holds that situational factors exert 
a strong influence on the extent to which contemporaneous emotion will influence decisions. 
This is because emotion’s influence is contingent on the cognitive processing strategy that an 
individual uses, and processing strategy is, itself, dictated by situational factors—the type of 
decision, the characteristics of the person deciding, and the circumstances in which that person 
operates. See Forgas, Affect and Information Processing, supra note 234, at 260. 
 254. See, e.g., Joseph Ciarrochi & Joseph P. Forgas, The Pleasure of Possessions: Affective 
Influences and Personality in the Evaluation of Consumer Items, 30 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 
631, 634–35 (2000) (brief review); Cheryl L. Rusting, Personality, Mood, and Cognitive 
Processing of Emotional Information: Three Conceptual Frameworks, 124 PSYCHOL. BULL. 165, 
165–68 (1998). 
 255. Bargh, Bypassing the Will, supra note 105, at 39; Bargh & Ferguson, Beyond 
Behaviorism, supra note 105, at 931; see also Joseph P. Forgas & Simon M. Laham, The 
Interaction Between Affect and Motivation in Social Judgments and Behavior, in SOCIAL 
MOTIVATION: CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSES 168, 170 (Joseph P. Forgas et al. 
eds., 2005) (“[T]he same affective state can have a congruent, incongruent, or no effect on 
subsequent motivated action, depending on subtle shifts in people’s preferred information 
processing strategies.”). 
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will drink its contents or be struck by it, whether you are thirsty, and 
whether you desire to lose weight.256 
Countless studies document the context-specificity of automatic 
attitudes and behavior. A college woman’s level of excitement from 
reading a sexually provocative magazine article varies depending on 
whether she has been thinking about campus friends or her parents 
beforehand.257 Catholic women rate themselves more negatively on 
characteristics such as morality, self-esteem, and anxiety after reading 
a sexually provocative passage if primed subliminally with a scowling 
picture of the Pope.258 A graduate student is more likely to rate her 
ideas negatively after subliminal exposure to a scowling picture of her 
advisor.259 People are more likely to feel badly about failing at a 
task—and to blame themselves rather than the task—if primed with a 
relationship contingent on successful performance rather than an 
unconditionally accepting relationship260 or primed with the name of 
someone significant to them who they feel disapproves of them.261 
Automatic effects are also mediated by current motivations,262 and 
emotional attempts at persuasion are more likely to succeed if they 
 
 256. Ferguson & Bargh, Sensitivity and Flexibility, supra note 122, at 389 (citing Arthur 
M. Glenberg, What Memory Is For, 20 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1 (1997)); cf. Berridge, supra 
note 35, at 15 (“The sight of food has no intrinsic motivational value. It is merely an 
aggregation of visual shapes and colors, like the sight of any object. It is not an incentive until 
value becomes attached to it by experience.”). 
 257. See Mark W. Baldwin, Relational Schema Activation: Does Bob Zajonc Ever Scowl at 
You From the Back of Your Mind?, in UNRAVELING THE COMPLEXITIES OF SOCIAL LIFE, supra 
note 108, at 55, 56–57. 
 258. Id. at 59–60 (citing Mark W. Baldwin, Suzanne E. Carrell & David F. Lopez, 
Priming Relationship Schemas: My Advisor and the Pope Are Watching Me from the Back of My 
Mind, 26 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 435 (1990)). Priming the women with the scowling 
face of another individual had no effect. Id. at 60. 
 259. Id. at 58. 
 260. Id. at 57. 
 261. Mark W. Baldwin & Jennifer Meunier, The Cued Activation of Attachment 
Relational Schemas, 17 SOC. COGNITION 209 (1999). 
 262. Melissa J. Ferguson & John A. Bargh, Liking Is for Doing: The Effects of Goal Pursuit 
on Automatic Evaluation, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 557, 557 (2004). 
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match the emotional states of audience members.263 Reactions to 
environmental cues also vary with individual characteristics.264 
In short, people do not react to stimuli in a simple, predictable 
manner; reactions vary across personalities, motivations, needs, 
moods, rules, and norms—in short, across all types of situations. 
Thus, there is no reason to think we can predict or steer human 
behavior with any precision. To say that we often do not control our 
own actions is not to say that others control them. At the same time, 
we should not underestimate manipulation. There is strong evidence 
that our attitudes and behavior can be manipulated outside our 
awareness265 and that such influences can be very difficult to 
counteract.266 Just as meteorologists can predict probabilities of 
precipitation given a set of environmental variables, we can predict 
probabilities of human action given a set of human circumstances. 
And the more variables we can control, the better the predictions. 
Likewise, in human behavior, the more aspects of the situation we 
can control, the more behavior can be predicted and controlled. This 
is why, as Hanson and Yosifon have written, controlling people’s 
situations means controlling their actions, and firms will compete 
fiercely to control people’s situations, even without understanding 
what they are doing. Hanson and Yosifon have termed this process 
“power economics.”267 
 
 263. David DeSteno et al., Discrete Emotions and Persuasion: The Role of Emotion-
Induced Expectancies, 86 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 43, 43 (2004). Also, implicit 
stimuli often influence us more than do explicit stimuli. See Laura J. Kray, Leigh Thompson & 
Adam Galinsky, Battle of the Sexes: Gender Stereotype Confirmation and Reactance in 
Negotiations, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 942, 943 (2001). 
 264. For example, priming “power” has differential effects on male sexual arousal 
depending on how much men find sexual aggression attractive. John A. Bargh et al., 
Attractiveness of the Underling: An Automatic Power  Sex Association and Its Consequences for 
Sexual Harassment and Aggression, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 768, 777–79 
(1995). And exposure to images of attractive women harms a woman’s evaluation of her body 
image more if she is already dissatisfied with her body. See Trampe, Stapel & Siero, supra note 
179, at 106–07. 
 265. See generally Dijksterhuis, Aarts & Smith, supra note 94, at 82. 
 266. See, e.g., Aiden P. Gregg, Beate Seibt & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Easier Done Than 
Undone: Asymmetry in the Malleability of Implicit Preferences, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1, 3 (2006). 
 267. Hanson & Yosifon, Situation, supra note 1, at 197; see also Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, 
supra note 13, at 635. 
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C. The Pursuit of Being, Not Well-Being 
Rather than suggest that people can be controlled by others as 
puppets, the goal of this Article is to outline a more realistic account 
of widely ignored or misunderstood forces in decision making, 
answer the question of how we navigate the world in light of our 
inability to reason through most of the decisions that our 
environments demand of us, and determine the proper place of 
emotion in theories of decision making. The answer appears to be 
that nonconscious, affective processes interact constantly with the 
environment and other biological processes (including more 
“cognitive” phenomena such as knowledge structures) to direct our 
attitudes and behavior.268 The evidence is beginning to suggest that 
automatic processes are capable of controlling most aspects of our 
behavior—that they even regulate our emotions269 and exercise self-
control for us.270 Nonconscious affective processes are likely 
homeostatic, designed to promote self-preservation.271 And higher-
order emotions may be a complex, highly evolved version of the 
basic affective mechanism common to all life: approach and 
avoidance.272 
This suggests that “preferences” and “welfare” are mistaken 
concepts, at least as they are commonly understood. “Preferences” 
are the name we give to most salient and acceptable reasons we can 
identify for our behavior in various situations, which we believe we 
have chosen. This is backward. Rather than mere objects of decision 
about which we reason and strategize, the emotional forces that we 
 
 268. This research is just getting started. See Bargh, Mere, supra note 117, at 25, 30–31 
(“Moods are affected by the general tone of the automatic evaluations made in one’s current 
environment, social judgments are influenced by them, and behavioral dispositions at the level 
of muscular readiness to approach or to avoid the object are also automatically put into motion 
by the evaluative reaction. The power of the affective system to guide subsequent cognition 
and behavior is perhaps just beginning to be revealed.”) (citations omitted). 
 269. See John A. Bargh & Lawrence E. Williams, The Nonconscious Regulation of 
Emotion, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTION REGULATION 429 (James J. Gross ed., 2006). 
 270. See Ayelet Fishbach & James Y. Shah, Self-Control in Action: Implicit Dispositions 
Toward Goals and Away from Temptations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 820 (2006). 
This has left some experts wondering what purpose conscious thought serves, the best conjecture 
being that it serves nonconsciousness by helping us automate increasing amounts of behavior. 
See, e.g., Bargh, Bypassing the Will, supra note 105, at 53; Bargh, Consciousness, supra note 95, 
at 563. 
 271. DAMASIO, SPINOZA, supra note 106, at 30–40. 
 272. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 149; DAMASIO, SPINOZA, supra note 
106, at 40–54. 
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call “preferences” are some of the very processes that enable our 
bodies to interact with the environment, making decisions for us, in 
the absence of conscious monitoring and control. The environment 
constantly demands responses from us at a rate and level of 
complexity far greater than our conscious reasoning skills can 
accommodate, but our nonconscious processes rise to meet this 
challenge. Thus, in contrast to the economic assumption that choices 
are “preference-satisfying,”273 it would be better to view 
“preferences” as “choice-satisfying”: when the situation demands a 
behavioral response, the emotional processes that we call 
“preferences” provide it. As for “welfare,” unfortunately, there is 
little reason to assume that these processes maximize our happiness. 
The most we can say without entering a spiritual or religious 
discussion is that they help us survive in the evolutionary sense. 
Thus, we come to an important distinction between “approach 
and avoidance” and “good and bad.” It is analogous to the 
difference Dan Gilbert and Kent Berridge have observed between 
“wanting” and “liking.”274 Not everything toward which our 
affective processes steer us is good, and not everything from which 
they steer us is bad. This is why affective processes should be 
thought of as approach-and-avoidance or go/no-go processes275 
instead of authentic judgments about, or windows into, 
“preferences” and “welfare.” 
“Good” and “approach” can be misaligned for many reasons. 
One important reason is that approach-and-avoidance processes did 
not evolve to make us happy, at least insomuch as happiness is 
unnecessary to evolutionary fitness. Rather, they evolved to help us 
navigate the world.276 Flashing lights automatically engage our 
attention but are not necessarily good for us. Their extensive use in 
environments carefully structured to extract money from people 
(casinos) is probably not welfare-enhancing. And just as insects fly 
into bug zappers, human children must be taught not to stare into 
 
 273. See supra text accompanying notes 8–12. 
 274. See supra text accompanying notes 15–36. 
 275. Robert B. Zajonc, Emotions, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 591, 
596 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998). 
 276. Because these processes are products of evolution, they can be expected to have 
numerous arbitrary, and even mildly harmful, effects so long as they are not evolutionarily 
lethal. Some may be epiphenomena. Others may be poor but adequate. Still others may have 
served a purpose only long ago, under different circumstances. 
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the sun. (How are they taught? With warnings about a highly salient 
adverse consequence: the possibility of blindness.) Indeed, most 
traps that we set for other animals, from bug zappers to duck calls, 
employ approach responses harmfully. Our challenge is to recognize 
that we have more in common with other species than we think. 
To be sure, affective processes mostly serve us well. After all, we 
are not dead, and most of us are happy most of the time.277 
However, all other things being equal, there is no reason to believe 
that emotions exist to make us happy. In turn, there is little reason 
to believe that any given behavior reflects a “preference” or anything 
other than the context-dependent interaction of our biological 
processes with the environment, and equally little reason to believe 
that any given behavior increases “welfare.” 
IV. THEORIES OF EMOTION IN LAW 
Now that we have reviewed empirical evidence on emotion, we 
can review legal theories of emotion to see how they fit the evidence 
and to determine whether they should be modified. We will examine 
rational choice theory, behavioral economics, and cultural cognition 
theory, focusing on three questions. First, what does the theory say 
about emotion’s role in decision making? (How much role does 
emotion play, and is it good or bad? Do authentic preferences exist?) 
Second, what does each theory say about the rationality of decisions? 
(I consider two kinds of “rationality”—consistency, meaning the 
logical consistency of choices, and propriety, meaning the questions 
whether choices are in some sense good or correct.) Third, how does 
the theory perform in terms of empiricism, parsimony, coherence, 
and its normative contribution?278 
A. (Unemotional) Rational Choice Theory 
Emotion and Rationality. Pure rational choice theory does not 
account for emotion as a part of the decision-making process. 
 
 277. See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, ARE WE HAPPY YET? 1 (2006); Diener & Diener, 
supra note 56, at 181. 
 278. Authors associated with each theory likely will dispute some of my characterizations, 
and some objections will be well-founded. Authors have not been perfectly consistent or clear 
regarding some of the factors on which I evaluate their work. Additionally, summarizing any 
broad body of work inevitably requires line-drawing that will result in occasional unfairness. I 
apologize in advance for any major errors. 
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Instead, it holds that emotion called preferences, welfare, and utility 
is exclusively an object of non-emotional decisions. Under this view, 
people have authentic, stable preferences, which are revealed by their 
decisions. Decisions themselves are rational in that they are 
consistent and proper—consistent because they follow logical rules 
and proper because they reflect authentic preferences.279 For 
purposes of comparison to other legal views on emotion, rational 
choice theory may be thought of as unemotional rational choice 
theory. 
Normative Implications. Part of rational choice theory’s allure is 
the clarity and simplicity of its normative implications. The theory 
holds that because people generally make good decisions when left 
to their own devices—decisions that maximize well-being—policy 
makers should let them do so, interfering with free choice only in 
instances of market failure. Furthermore, policy makers can ascertain 
“value” merely by looking at people’s behavior—for example, by 
looking at the price of a good in a well-working market. Although 
rational choice theory eschews emotion as part of the decision-
making process, emotion (as revealed by behavior) is the theory’s 
source of authority for policy makers.280 
Empiricism, Internal Consistency, and Parsimony. Rational choice 
theory, as widely understood, sacrifices empiricism for simplicity, 
consistency, and parsimony, and the pure form of the theory’s view 
of emotion has limited value in light of widespread evidence that 
decisions are irrational and, to a lesser extent, that emotions play a 
large role in decisions. These problems have received ample attention 
in the legal literature and should not require elaboration here.281 
Integrating Emotion into Rational Choice. One rational choice 
theorist, Eric Posner, has attempted to integrate emotion into the 
theory.282 His goal is to challenge the view of emotions as “‘outside’ 
forces that compel one to act inconsistently with the interests of the 
 
 279. See MARY ZEY, RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS: A 
CRITIQUE 1–3 (1998). 
 280. See supra Part I. 
 281. See, e.g., William M. Landes, The Empirical Side of Law & Economics, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 167, 180 (2003) (“In the legal academic pecking order, empirical research does not rank 
as high as theory. This translates into a downward shift in the demand for empirical relative to 
theoretical scholarship in law and economics.”); Chris William Sanchirico, Finding Error, 2003 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (“[I]t is often fair to criticize rational choice theory for being 
insufficiently grounded in empirical reality.”). 
 282. See Posner, supra note 89, at 1978. 
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self”283—for example, irrationally—while “hew[ing] as closely as 
possible” to the model of rational choices against a backdrop of 
stable preferences.284 I believe his attempt is unsuccessful because, in 
accommodating emotion into rational choice theory, he loses much 
of the theory’s core content. 
Posner’s main contention is that people remain fully rational 
when in “emotion states” or in “the grip of an emotion.”285 All that 
occurs is a temporary change in preferences, abilities and beliefs.286 In 
other words, an emotion causes the individual’s utility function to 
shift but not to break down.287 Moreover, Posner assumes that 
people can anticipate and control their future emotion states and 
therefore counteract future shifts.288 
This account is flawed first in its assumption that we ordinarily 
make decisions in an emotionless state, a view that is inconsistent 
with the body of evidence reviewed above suggesting that emotion is 
ubiquitous in decision making.289 In short, Posner recognizes 
emotion where it is most obvious and salient—for example, in 
instances of rage or fear—but misses its presence in other decisions. 
Second, while there is some merit to Posner’s view that people can 
control their emotions by cultivating them and planning for them, I 
believe he overestimates this ability in light of evidence that we are 
worse at anticipating our emotions and controlling them than we 
believe.290 
The account also suffers from another problem. Posner arrives at 
a view that looks little like rational choice theory—indeed, one that is 
basically situationist. He argues that a model of utility curves that 
shift with varying emotional states retains a “rational choice 
element” because emotional behavior will “bear some resemblance 
to calm-state behavior” and because people in emotion states 
 
 283. Id. at 1980. 
 284. Id. at 1984. 
 285. Id. at 1982. 
 286. Id. at 1984. 
 287. Id. at 1987–88. 
 288. Id. at 1985. 
 289. See supra Part III. 
 290. Blumenthal has already made this criticism. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra 
note 4, at 231–32. 
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“remain responsive to incentives.”291 But if utility curves shift with 
emotional states, and if we modify Posner’s approach to account for 
emotion’s presence in a far greater range of decisions, then the 
account suggests little more than that individuals respond to their 
circumstances at any particular moment. The only claim to 
rationality here is that, if put in identical circumstances, a person 
would act identically. This bears little resemblance to a model in 
which people pursue stable preferences in a rational manner across 
time and space. Posner’s view thus loses much of rational choice 
theory’s predictive value. 
The account also loses rational choice theory’s normative thrust. 
Posner believes that either an emotion-state or a calm-state curve 
may reflect authentic value for the individual in any given 
situation,292 and it is left to policy makers to ascertain which to 
value.293 I think Posner is right that either hotter or cooler decisions 
may be better for welfare in any given situation. But this approach, 
especially when we accommodate a much broader role for emotion 
and nonconscious processes in decision making, sacrifices rational 
choice theorists’ principle normative claim that utility curves reveal 
value. 
B. Behavioral Economics, or Emotional Irrational Choice Theory 
The term “behavioral economics” has been applied to a large 
volume of work that is difficult to characterize succinctly. It can be 
said fairly, however, that behavioral economics aspires only to make 
piecemeal modifications to rational choice theory in order to make it 
more realistic,294 and we can discern a general behavioral-economic 
view of emotion. Behavioral economics thus maintains rational 
choice theory’s assumption that emotion is mostly an irrational force 
that interferes with sound decision making, but it accepts that this 
happens in a much broader range of circumstances. 
 
 291. Posner, supra note 89, at 1990 (“[W]here the rational choice element remains is in 
(1) the insistence that people remain rational during the emotion state, so that their behavior 
will bear some resemblance to calm-state behavior, and remain responsive to incentives . . . .”). 
 292. Id. at 2012. 
 293. Id. (“Both kinds of preferences must be evaluated, and included in or excluded from 
the social welfare function, in accordance with the degree to which satisfaction of them 
contributes to the individual’s well-being.”). 
 294. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 3, at 1051, 1074–75; Rostain, supra note 7, at 974–
75. 
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For purposes of comparison to other views of emotion, we can 
think of behavioral economics as “emotional irrational choice 
theory” or “emotional irrationalism.” This view holds that emotion 
plays a role in many decisions but that emotion is irrational and 
distorting in the decision-making process.295 Therefore, decisions are 
often inconsistent and improper. Authentic preferences still exist—
they remain the objects of decisions in the form of “welfare”—but 
people often act as their irrational selves rather than their rational 
selves and fail to pursue their true preferences. 
1. Emotional irrationalism’s empiricism 
In light of the empirical evidence reviewed above, it is clear that 
emotional irrationalism is right about much regarding emotion, and 
it is an improvement over rational choice theory. Perhaps it is 
surprising, then, that emotional irrationalism still fares poorly on 
empirical standards such as coherence and parsimony. Foremost, 
emotional irrationalism ignores extensive evidence that emotion 
performs a useful function in many circumstances and is probably 
essential to decision making. 
Additionally, emotional irrationalism continues to assume that 
authentic preferences and welfare exist but provides no means of 
identifying them and often ignores strong evidence that they do not 
exist. Although some emotional irrationalists have noted that the 
evidence appears to suggest that preferences are so context-
dependent and contingent that “true” preferences may not exist,296 
or at least that we cannot discern them,297 the same individuals stake 
out positions on paternalism as a general matter and on specific 
 
 295. Cass Sunstein has objected to the claim that he views emotional or heuristic decision 
making as “irrational,” arguing instead that he would call it “boundedly rational.” Cass R. 
Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1110, 1112–13 (2006). I believe the label 
“irrational” is fair, at least for purposes of this discussion. Sunstein affirms that his work on risk 
regulation addresses the problem of emotionally based “blunders.” Id. at 1121. By my 
definition, emotional blunders represent “emotional irrationality” because they result in 
inconsistent and non-welfare-enhancing decisions. 
 296. See, e.g., Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 39, at 1545–46. 
 297. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 231–32. Although Blumenthal’s 
work on emotion is very strong, and more realistic than that of most other irrationalists, see id.; 
Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2–6 (2007) 
[hereinafter Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism], I place him here because he appears 
concerned primarily with identifying bad decisions and fashioning paternalist responses to 
them. See infra text accompanying notes 333–38. 
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paternalist policies as well. It is difficult to promote welfare when we 
do not know what it is, and difficult to help people make good 
decisions when we cannot easily tell the good from the bad. I will 
discuss this problem in greater depth below, regarding the normative 
work of behavioral economics. 
Emotional irrationalists themselves have recognized that their 
view is not parsimonious, primarily because they do not attempt a 
consistent account of decision making, instead addressing problems 
for rational choice theory piecemeal.298 This is problematic because it 
creates the risk that policy makers will reach inconsistent conclusions 
and promote inconsistent policies. A more fundamental problem is 
the division of decision making into several types—such as cognitive 
versus emotional and rational versus irrational—without a clear 
means of distinguishing the two and without an empirical basis for 
the rational, non-emotional decision making that emotional 
irrationalism prioritizes. As this Article has detailed, mounting 
evidence suggests that affective processes are critical to all decisions; 
however, emotional irrationalism holds not only that some decisions 
are unemotional, but also that unemotional decisions are generally 
better than emotional decisions.299 While psychologists are finding 
nonconscious affective processes so robust and effective as to call 
into question the necessity of conscious thought,300 and while 
neurobiologist Antonio Damasio writes that “[f]eelings of pain or 
pleasure or some quality in between are the bedrock of our 
minds,”301 a behavioralist ponders whether “some kind of ‘affect’” is 
“a necessary or sufficient condition for fear.”302 
 
 298. See, e.g., Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 39, at 1545. 
 299. My point here should not be taken as an argument against all dual-process theories, 
which are common in psychology. Behavior relies on numerous processes that can be grouped 
into a number of binary categories, such as conscious and nonconscious or automatic and 
controlled. The point is that it is mistaken to claim that any particular decision is, or should be, 
unemotional. It is probably accurate, however, to speak of two types of emotional decisions: 
(1) those that flow more directly from environmental stimuli and (2) those that are mediated 
more by knowledge structures and other sources of affect such as other long-term goals and 
motivations. See, e.g., Bechara & Damasio, supra note 159, at 340 (distinguishing “primary” 
and “secondary” causes of the affective building blocks of decisions). The latter kind of 
emotional reasoning corresponds more with our intuitive notion of “reasoned” thought. 
 300. See supra text accompanying notes 102–69. 
 301. DAMASIO, SPINOZA, supra note 106, at 3. 
 302. SUNSTEIN, FEAR, supra note 7, at 3. Sunstein states on the same page, “I 
understand fear to depend on some kind of judgment that we are in danger.” Id. (citing 
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS 48 
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2. Emotional irrationalism and risk regulation 
As a normative matter, emotional irrationalism maintains rational 
choice theory’s goal of maximizing welfare. However, because 
people often cannot be trusted to attain welfare themselves, policy 
makers must find a way to ascertain authentic preferences and help 
people make good decisions. As a result, irrationalists are 
preoccupied with paternalism, debating how, when, and how much 
policy makers should interfere with individual decisions.303 The 
principal problem for emotional irrationalism is that it lacks a 
coherent definition of welfare on which to base policy and lacks a 
reliable means of distinguishing good decisions from bad. In this 
section, I explore Cass Sunstein’s work on risk regulation in the 
book Laws of Fear as an example of emotional irrationalism, using it 
to argue that the approach is normatively incoherent and risky for 
public welfare. 
Sunstein argues that the public is emotionally irrational in 
assessing risk; therefore, risk regulation policy should be set, for the 
most part, by insulated experts who adhere to more “rational” 
analyses.304 We should be wary of this approach not because it would 
place decisions in the hands of experts who purport to know better 
than the public, which is inevitable unless we regulate through direct 
democracy, but rather because it is mistaken about the role of 
emotion in policy judgment. If all decision making is emotional at its 
core, as the evidence suggests, then Sunstein is mistaken to think 
that experts make objective judgments whereas others make 
“emotional” judgments. Sunstein also seems not to notice that he 
has no definition of welfare on which experts can base their analyses. 
In effect, he inadvertently promotes policy making by experts who 
make decisions based on their own values rather than the public’s. 
 
(2002)). This view actually has much more in common with emotional rationalism, discussed 
below, than emotion irrationalism.  
 303. See, e.g., Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, supra note 297; Colin F. Camerer et 
al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric 
Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1211 (2003); Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and 
Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 136 (2006); Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 39, at 
1541 (styling their approach as “a sort of anti-antipaternalism”); Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175, 175 (2003). 
 304. SUNSTEIN, FEAR, supra note 7, at 68. Sunstein’s perspective is similar to Justice 
Breyer’s. See STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE 
RISK REGULATION 33–39, 59–61 (1993). 
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As an initial matter, Sunstein makes numerous questionable 
distinctions between “rational” and “emotional” judgments. For 
example, he sees an emotional mistake in people’s greater aversion to 
a risk of cancer death “described in vivid terms[] as ‘very gruesome 
and intensely painful’”305 than to the same risk of cancer death not so 
described.306 But this is irrational only if we assume that people 
should care about absolute numbers of deaths without any concern 
for whether the deaths are particularly painful,307 an assumption on 
which Sunstein himself casts doubt elsewhere.308 Sunstein also 
adjudges that people ought to be willing to pay more per life saved 
from catastrophic risks than from risks that implicate fewer deaths.309 
It is not obvious that this approach is any more “rational” than 
paying an equal amount to prevent all deaths. 
These examples highlight our tendency to deem other people’s 
judgments emotionally flawed while viewing our own equally 
emotional judgments as “rational”—in short, to slip into using the 
word “rational” to mean something with which we agree—a 
phenomenon I term the emotional attribution error. This type of 
error provides a window into a core problem for “libertarian 
paternalism”310 and “asymmetric paternalism,”311 which are 
emotional-irrationalist approaches meant to answer libertarian or 
anti-paternalist concerns by promoting paternalism only where it 
interferes with “irrational” and not “rational” decisions.312 
Emotional irrationalists often cannot tell the two apart, often for the 
simple reason that the distinction is false.313 Although particular 
attempts to achieve policy goals can be irrational, for example 
 
 305. SUNSTEIN, FEAR, supra note 7, at 77. 
 306. Id. at 77–79. 
 307. Or if we assume that all cancer deaths are “very gruesome and intensely painful” and 
that all people know this. 
 308. Id. at 149 (“Of course different valuations would be justified if they stemmed from 
the nature of the risk . . . .”). 
 309. Id. at 161. 
 310. See id. at 175; Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 303, at 175. 
 311. See Camerer et al., supra note 303, at 1212. 
 312. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, FEAR, supra note 7, at 200 (“The justification . . . will depend 
on whether there are serious problems of bounded rationality and bounded self-control.”). 
 313. Again, this is not to suggest that there are no useful distinctions among decisions or 
that we will never find cause to prioritize some over others. See supra text accompanying notes 
285–86. It is only to say that emotional irrationalism takes an undertheorized approach to this 
question. 
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because they are inconsistent or contradict the evidence on how to 
achieve them, judgments of what goals to pursue are not rational to 
begin with. If all decisions, and therefore all policy judgments, have 
an irreducibly emotional component, then all contain some a-
rationality. If this is the case, then what rational or objective basis can 
experts use in policy making? 
Sunstein proposes a cost-benefit analysis in which policy makers 
attempt to save the greatest number of lives per dollar.314 But this is 
not obviously more rational than a policy that recognizes other 
concerns. Imagine a choice between a policy that saves more lives per 
dollar but renders most people miserable and one that results in 
more deaths but far greater joy among the living. Opinions would 
vary widely on which policy is preferable,315 and expert scientists 
would not be able to resolve the question objectively.316 Sunstein 
barely discusses this type of problem and does not attempt a 
solution, even though such tradeoffs are the core value judgments 
involved in risk regulation.317 To be sure, Sunstein states that cost-
benefit analysis is just a tool to promote clear thinking, and that 
“[p]articipants in a democratic society may choose to proceed even 
when the costs exceed the benefits.”318 But by focusing primarily on 
rationalizing risk regulation with cost-benefit analysis, he often 
misses the most difficult questions: what counts as a cost or a benefit, 
and how do we value these things?319 
Sunstein’s answer is to rely on revealed preferences,320 an odd 
approach given how much he has destabilized the concept of 
preferences. Although Sunstein recognizes that preferences are so 
 
 314. SUNSTEIN, FEAR, supra note 7, at 129–48. 
 315. And they vary for emotional reasons worth respecting, not reasons we can dismiss 
easily as “irrational.” See Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of 
Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1072 (2006) (reviewing SUNSTEIN, FEAR, supra 
note 7). 
 316. See generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING 
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004). 
 317. See SUNSTEIN, FEAR, supra note 7, at 149 (noting in passing that “different 
valuations [for statistical lives] would be justified if they stemmed from the nature of the risk or 
the affected population—and of course we need an account that justifies one assignment of 
monetary equivalents rather than another.”) (emphasis added). 
 318. Id. at 130. 
 319. For an excellent challenge to cost-benefit valuations in health and environmental 
regulation, see ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 316, at 41–60. 
 320. See SUNSTEIN, FEAR, supra note 7, at 131 (“The idea is that governments assign 
monetary values to risks by asking what monetary values ordinary people assign to risks.”). 
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contextual and often mistaken that the very meaning of the term is 
“unclear,”321 and although he argues that mistaken decisions are not 
worthy of respect,322 he grounds much cost-benefit analysis in 
revealed preferences in the form of people’s stated willingness to pay 
to avoid risks of death.323 
This paradox is striking. In the same book, Sunstein is dismissive 
of preferences on matters such as savings rates, stating, “The false 
assumption is that almost all people, almost all of the time, make 
choices that are in their best interest or at the very least are better, by 
their own lights, than the choices that would be made by third 
parties.”324 When it comes to valuing human life, however, he 
ignores this problem. After a short discussion of miswanting and 
adaptive preferences, he quickly dismisses them, stating, “[m]uch of 
the time, there is no reason to believe that the use of informed WTP 
[willingness to pay] (say, $100) is a product of adaptive preferences. 
When there is such a reason, the judgment about the Easy Case must 
be revised.”325 Sunstein does not provide evidence for the claim that 
we rarely need to be concerned with these problems and does not 
explain how to revise the analysis when miswanting and preferences 
are present. The inconsistency on this matter becomes more explicit 
many pages later, in a separate chapter. There, Sunstein identifies 
willingness to pay as a model circumstance in which “it is extremely 
difficult for contingent valuation studies to avoid constructing the 
very values that they are supposed to discover”326 and notes, “[i]t is 
 
 321. Id. at 176, 203 (“In such domains, it is unhelpful to say that regulators should 
simply ‘respect preferences.’ What people prefer, or at least choose, is a product of starting 
points and default rules.”). 
 322. Id. at 137 (“Even more fundamentally, the relevant numbers [on value of statistical 
lives] deserve respect only if they are not a product of an absence of information and bounded 
rationality on the part of the people whose choices generate them.”). 
 323. Id. at 129–74. Kaplow and Shavell display a similar problem. They oppose according 
weight to social norms independent of whether people desire them emotionally. See Kaplow & 
Shavell, supra note 8, at 988. They also believe social norms are rooted in some form of 
emotional appeal. Id. at 1021–27. Thus, they argue on the one hand that people’s liking of 
social norms does not mean we should codify them into law and, on the other, that we should 
codify into law whatever people like. 
 324. SUNSTEIN, FEAR, supra note 7, at 178. 
 325. Id. at 155. His dismissal of inadequate information and bounded rationality is nearly 
identical. Id. at 156 (“In many cases, however, WTP is not a result of inadequate information 
and bounded rationality is not leading people to err. If it is, appropriate adjustments should be 
made.”). 
 326. Id. at 190. 
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not clear how those interested in eliciting (rather than affecting) 
values might respond to this problem.”327 
Are people’s judgments to be trusted or not? Are revealed 
preferences reliable or not? Because emotional irrationalism stands 
with one foot in rational choice theory and the other in a more 
situational perspective on emotion, Sunstein has it each way at 
various times. First, he argues that people’s emotions cause them to 
make bad choices in many instances; and thus, emotionless experts 
should make most decisions for them. Then, he abandons these 
claims in some contexts and seeks to base policy in part on revealed 
preferences, a self-defeating approach if one takes his criticism of 
decision making seriously—as we should. 
Moreover, a critical realist perspective of the evidence shows that 
the problem with preferences is probably much worse than Sunstein 
suggests. Preferences are not merely susceptible to a few biases, 
however troubling; they appear to be so deeply contextual that they 
cannot be taken as authentic expressions of value. This can be 
illustrated in one of Sunstein’s principal applications of revealed 
preferences—using people’s stated willingness to pay to prevent risks 
to their own lives to guide government spending on risk precautions. 
Sunstein’s analysis leads him to conclude that experts should spend 
less to save poor people’s lives than rich people’s.328 If the poor are 
willing to pay twenty dollars to save their lives and the rich are 
willing to pay sixty dollars, as the argument goes, then regulators 
should value their lives accordingly.329 But a situationist perspective 
on emotion recognizes that currency, like everything else, has only a 
relative, contextual value. A poor person will spend fewer dollars to 
save her life because a dollar means more to her than to a rich 
person—not because she values her life less. Given the unlikelihood 
that poor people place a lower value on their own lives, the example 
says more about the comparative value of money than the 
comparative value of life.330 
 
 327. Id. at 192. 
 328. Id. at 162–63. 
 329. Id. (“[G]overnment should not force poor people to buy more than their WTP to 
eliminate statistical risks.”). 
 330. The relative values of actual currencies provide a useful analogy. Imagine a sweater 
that costs $60 and £30. These prices tell us about the relative value of American and British 
currency, not the relative value of sweaters to Americans and Brits. From a situationist 
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The emotional attribution error and the absence of a welfare 
theory in emotional irrationalism explain why emotional irrationalists 
offer paternalist responses to decision-making problems primarily 
where intuitively appealing policy metrics and responses come readily 
to mind. For example, a principal area in which irrationalists have 
promoted libertarian paternalism is in retirement savings, where 
there is widespread belief that American workers save too little and 
that increased savings would benefit them.331 Likewise, in risk 
regulation, many of us intuitively agree that we should maximize the 
number of lives saved per dollar—that is, until we think about hard 
cases. In another example, Samuel Issacharoff and his colleagues 
describe their skepticism of paternalism as deriving in part from the 
“common intuition that people may have an intrinsic taste for free 
choice”332 without responding to the wealth of evidence that this 
“taste” may be an example of miswanting. In these instances, we fail 
to notice that there are policy judgments to be made and that we 
often lack a basis for assuming that intuitive solutions are best. 
Conversely, irrationalists shy away from the implications of their 
work on emotion where no appealing paternalist approach comes to 
mind or where consequences of paternalism seem jarring and 
frightening.333 For example, after an excellent survey of empirical 
evidence on people’s remarkably quick recoveries from emotional 
losses, Jeremy Blumenthal ponders whether our tort system over-
compensates victims and over-deters conduct based in mistaken 
 
perspective, even a single currency—or any other object, for that matter—has multiple values 
when it is held by different hands in different circumstances. 
  It is revealing that Sunstein agrees with this situational analysis on the scale of rich 
and poor nations. There, he states that it would be “ludicrous as well as offensive” to assume 
that differences in willingness to pay reflect differences in the value of lives. Id. at 164. In 
wealthy countries, however, he maintains that regulators’ use of willingness to pay “respect[s] 
people’s autonomy.” Id. at 165. If inequality that results in varying willingness to pay bothers 
us—and it bothers Sunstein, id. at 166—then the solution is wealth redistribution, something 
exogenous to risk regulation. Id. at 169. But surely Sunstein does not believe that we can or 
should redistribute wealth to the point of creating anything close to actual equality. So the 
problem remains: if differences in wealth (not to mention other situational factors) persist, then 
willingness to pay is not a reliable basis for policy. 
 331. See, e.g., id. at 175–76. Sunstein and Thaler advocate opting workers into retirement 
savings plans automatically because this change in the default position increases savings rates 
dramatically. See id. 
 332. Camerer et al., supra note 303, at 1214 n.11. 
 333. Sunstein’s willingness-to-pay analysis is exceptional in this regard and much more 
akin to a typical rational choice analysis. 
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predictions of future suffering.334 However, he quickly distances 
himself from that conclusion335 because he “share[s] the entirely 
plausible and legitimate intuition, reified by the legal system, that 
when an individual is injured, and is reasonably certain to experience 
harm from that injury in the future, that individual deserves 
recompense.”336 Blumenthal also displays the emotional-
irrationalists’ problematic treatment of welfarism by noting that “we 
can never be sure how to maximize happiness or minimize 
unhappiness”337 but nonetheless endorsing paternalism with little 
attention to this problem, recommending that paternalists add 
“emotional ‘errors’” to the list of “cognitive errors” that they try to 
cure.338 
In sum, emotional irrationalism is correct on some important 
points—namely that decision making is often emotional and that 
emotions may lead to irrational decisions, at least in terms of 
consistency and propriety. However, emotional irrationalists fail to 
see that emotion is critical to all decisions. Thus, they miss many 
instances of emotion in decision making, fail to see that we must take 
care not to dismiss all emotional judgments too quickly, and fail also 
to see that even expert decisions rely on emotional judgments. 
Emotional-irrationalist debates over paternalism are misguided, 
focusing on the choice between people’s “rational” and 
“irrational/emotional” selves without seeing that the putatively 
 
 334. See Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 182–86. 
 335. See id. at 187 (“I should make one point explicit. I do not intend by any of this 
discussion to imply that tort victims do not deserve compensation for their injuries, even 
intangible ones, or should not be awarded damages for future pain and suffering or emotional 
distress.”). 
 336. Id. Blumenthal provides three other reasons for declining to reduce victim 
compensation, but in my view they do not add much to the discussion. First, he notes that 
victims will experience some future emotional harm, and the question is really how much. This 
fails to support his proposition because it counsels only against eliminating compensation 
altogether, not against reducing it even drastically. Second, Blumenthal states that the affective 
forecasting literature is too young to be applied without reservation. But his whole discussion 
is about the implications for law if that evidence is trustworthy. Finally, he states that our legal 
system is committed to “values other than the application of data” such as “finality, fairness, 
process, or constitutional principles.” Id. at 187–88. But he immediately folds this point back 
into his original intuition that tort victims should be compensated: “Here, we value the 
compensation of tort victims, and may continue to do so even in the face of contradictory 
evidence.” Id. at 188. 
 337. Id. at 231. 
 338. Id. at 237. 
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“rational” selves are always emotional to some degree.339 Emotional 
irrationalism retains emotion as the object of decision making and 
policy but has destabilized the definitions of “preferences” and 
“welfare” so much that it is flying blind. Without a coherent 
definition of welfare, emotional irrationalists address decision-making 
problems mostly where intuitively appealing, non-frightening 
solutions happen to present themselves. 
C. Cultural Cognition or Emotional Rational Choice Theory 
In light of the empirical evidence on emotion in decisions, surely 
not all legal theorists view emotions as bad in all instances, right? 
Right. Proponents of a more recent view called “cultural evaluator 
theory” argue that emotion is critical to rational decisions.340 We can 
call this view emotional rational choice theory or emotional 
rationalism. In its most important claims, emotional rationalism is 
accurate and useful. However, its account of emotion is unempirical 
and confused, namely in its suggestions that decisions are generally 
rational and that emotions are products of reason.341 Moreover, its 
proponents appear ambivalent about the theory’s legal implications. 
1. Emotion and rationality 
Cultural cognition theory views emotion as integral to most, if 
not all, decisions and views this as good. Its core claim is that 
people’s attitudes and behavior are predicted by their cultural 
 
 339. Kahan and his colleagues advance a similar criticism but believe that emotions are 
rational, see infra text accompanying notes 340–88, and do not necessarily recommend a 
solution different from Sunstein’s. Kahan et al., supra note 315, at 1105–07. 
 340. See, e.g., Dan Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Perception, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 741 (2008). 
 341. I have had difficulty providing a coherent account of cultural cognition theory. The 
theory is relatively new, with too little writing about it and too little response from other 
scholars. Additionally, its proponents have made inconsistent statements on issues that this 
Article addresses. It is my hope that this Article will spur useful discussion and clarification. 
Where there is an inconsistency, I emphasize in the text of this Article the statements by 
cultural cognition theorists that correspond to what I call emotional rationalism because these 
statements provide something unique in the legal literature on emotion. Other statements look 
basically like emotional irrationalism, treating “culture” as another bias that impedes rational 
thought. I note examples of these statements in footnotes. One cannot help guessing an 
explanation for the discrepancy. It appears to me that Dan Kahan, the leading cultural 
cognition theorist, leans more toward rationalism than his coauthors, who lean more toward 
irrationalism. This is because the strongest statement of emotional rationalism is in an article 
Kahan authored alone. See id. 
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worldviews342—which means their emotions and emotion-laden 
knowledge structures. According to emotional rationalism, emotion 
is involved in all decisions because it informs people of the value 
judgments which they use to make decisions. Apparently, people 
make value judgments at some prior time; then, emotions reveal 
those judgments to them in moments of decision.343 Emotions are 
“expressively rational”344 in that they reflect, and allow people to 
perceive, what coheres with their core values.345 
Emotional rationalism thus takes a strong position on rationality, 
holding that emotions generally reflect consistent, authentic 
preferences.346 This is not to say that decisions are always correct but 
rather that they are never hopelessly irrational. When emotions are 
wrong, it is not because they clash with an individual’s authentic 
values. That is the emotional-irrationalist definition of irrationality, 
not the emotional-rationalist definition. It is because the underlying 
values themselves are wrong. Because “emotions express cognitive 
evaluations . . . [they] can and should be evaluated as true or false, 
right or wrong, reasonable or unreasonable, in light of the moral 
correctness of the values those emotions express.”347 In sum, 
emotional rationalism views emotions as windows into underlying 
rational judgments. 
 
 342. See, e.g., Kahan et al., supra note 315, at 1083–84. 
 343. See Kahan, supra note 343, at 752 (“[E]motions perform a unique role in enabling 
her to identify the stance that is expressively rational for someone with her commitments. 
Without the contribution that emotion makes to her powers of expressive perception, she 
would be lacking this vital incident of rational agency, no matter how much information, no 
matter how much time, and no matter how much computational acumen she possessed.”). 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. at 750–51. 
 346. This is one area where cultural cognition theorists have been inconsistent. 
Elsewhere, Don Braman and Dan Kahan have written that cultural cognition is a “bias” that 
inhibits proper thinking. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and 
Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 164–68 (2006) [hereinafter Kahan & Braman, 
Public Policy]. 
 347. Kahan, supra note 340, at 762–63; see also id. at 764 (“[T]he view that emotions are 
‘judgments of value’ has also been affiliated with the position that emotions can be educated. 
The type of instruction this approach contemplates, however, consists not in a stoic program of 
disciplining the mind and strengthening the will to resist the supposedly corrupting influence 
of emotion on judgment. Instead, it has involved a species of moral instruction that reforms a 
person’s emotional apprehension of the social meanings that unjust or destructive states of 
affairs and courses of action express.”). 
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2. Emotional rationalism’s empiricism 
Cultural cognition theorists are right about a lot—particularly 
that all decisions likely have an emotional component and that we 
should take care not to dismiss too many emotional decisions as 
undeserving of respect. Cultural cognition theory is realist and 
situationist in its core claim that emotion and emotionally mediated 
knowledge structures (“cultural worldviews” in the language of 
cultural cognition theory) deeply influence cognitive processing, 
attitudes, and behavior.348 This means that people pay attention to, 
believe, and remember, information that coheres with and reinforces 
their worldviews; they trust information from others who they 
believe share their values and distrust information from those who 
they believe have opposing values.349 In short, “[c]ulture is prior to 
facts.”350 This generally accords with my review of the psychology 
literature.351 
Cultural cognition is also critically realist in its recognition that 
(1) everyone—including experts, policymakers, and the researchers 
identifying emotion’s role in decision making—is subject to the 
phenomena being documented, which makes it difficult to find 
neutral, accurate answers; and that (2) even when we succeed in 
finding true answers to some questions, culturally constrained (or 
“biased,” in their words) thinking may prevent the dissemination of 
and convergence around this information.352 Cultural cognition 
theorists are also right to point out the necessity and value of 
emotion in decision making and to suggest that we should not be so 
quick to dismiss emotional attitudes and behavior as irrational rather 
than as expressions of something worthy of respect in a democratic 
society.353 
An exemplary application of the theory is a recent piece in which 
Don Braman and Dan Kahan argue that much of the debate over 
gun control is misguided in its focus on consequentialist arguments 
 
 348. See Kahan & Braman, Public Policy, supra note 346, at 157–60. 
 349. Id. at 155–56. 
 350. Id. at 150. 
 351. See supra Part III. 
 352. See, e.g., Kahan et al., supra note 315, at 1105–07; Kahan & Braman, Public Policy, 
supra note 346, at 166–68. 
 353. See Kahan et al., supra note 315, at 1105–06. 
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about public safety.354 Braman and Kahan provide evidence that, for 
most members of the public with strong feelings about gun control, 
the debate is not about public safety; it is about conflicting visions of 
human social and political organization.355 People oriented toward 
hierarchy and individualism are more likely to oppose gun control, 
while people oriented toward egalitarianism and solidarity are more 
likely to support it.356 These cultural orientations filter the 
information to which people pay attention, moderate which 
information they credit and discredit, and, ultimately, exert strong 
influence over their policy views.357 Indeed, cultural orientations 
predict people’s views better than any other factor, including 
measures of race and geography.358 In Braman and Kahan’s words, 
“These dynamics help to explain the persistent ineffectiveness of 
empirical data in the American gun debate.”359 
Despite making these valuable observations, emotional 
rationalism is oddly mistaken about the precise role of emotion in 
decision making. In particular, the claim that emotions reflect 
reasoned judgments no doubt captures an important aspect of 
emotion—that emotions are sometimes products of thought and 
even effort—but it is incomplete. To the extent that emotional 
rationalism holds that one cannot have emotions without cognitive 
judgments, or that emotions are always products of reasoned choice, 
these views are out of step with mainstream social psychology.360 
 
 354. See Don Braman & Dan Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the Fear of Gun 
Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun Debate, 55 EMORY L.J. 
569, 571–80 (2006). 
 355. Id. at 571, 582–86. 
 356. Id. at 578–79. 
 357. Id. 
 358. Id. at 579. 
 359. Id. at 580. 
 360. Not to mention mainstream legal scholarship. Emotional irrationalism and rational 
choice theory, for example, recognize that emotion makes at least some decisions and dispute 
only how common the phenomenon is. The mainstream view in social psychology is that 
emotion can be wholly distinct from, and precede, reason, see, e.g., Zajonc, Closing the Debate, 
supra note 166, at 31–33, and that emotion appears to influence and shape many, if not most, 
cognitive or “reasoning” processes, see generally FEELING AND THINKING, supra note 15. 
  Kahan’s cognitivist approach appears to derive not from psychology or neuroscience 
but rather from the philosophy of Martha Nussbaum. Kahan wrote an article with Nussbaum 
in 1996 propounding the view, see Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of 
Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996), and continues to rely heavily on 
her work. See Kahan, Two Conceptions, supra note 340, at 742, 749–50. The 1996 article 
pitted an emotional-rationalist-like view of emotion against what strikes me as nearly a 
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In holding that emotion does not make (or help make) decisions 
but rather enables people to perceive previously made value 
judgments,361 emotional rationalism scrubs away emotion’s 
evaluative function and molds it back into an object of rational, 
emotionless judgments. In this manner, the account looks like a 
restatement of rational choice theory with “emotion” more explicitly 
playing the role of “preferences” and “welfare.” Emotion is critical 
to decisions under emotional rationalism in the manner that 
preferences are critical to decisions under rational choice theory: 
there can be no decisions without decision inputs. This structural 
similarity renders emotional rationalism’s theoretical account subject 
to many of the criticisms of rational choice theory—that decisions are 
often not rational or welfare enhancing and that emotion has a 
substantial, perhaps indispensable, role in the process of decision 
making. 
Yet emotional rationalism has deeper problems. Foremost, the 
theory does not explain the roots of the pre-emotional value 
judgments on which it depends. If emotions reveal previously made, 
reasoned value judgments,362 then we need an explanation of who or 
what makes these judgments. Rational choice theory and behavioral 
economics do not have this problem because they assume 
 
caricature of automatic, nonconscious emotion, see Kahan & Nussbaum, supra, at 273–75, 
claiming victory for emotional rationalism just as it was becoming untenable in the psychology 
literature, compare Zajonc, Closing the Debate, supra note 166 and FEELING AND THINKING, 
supra note 15. Philosophers, too, have found Nussbaum’s account flawed. See, e.g., Simon 
Blackburn, To Feel and Feel Not, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 24, 2001, at 36 (“Nussbaum writes as 
if there were only one kind of rival to the cognitive account: a view that simply adds sensations 
or bodily feelings onto the cognitive appraisal. . . . [Her theory] makes emotions intelligent, 
susceptible of justification, and even . . . true or false. . . . This is a disappointingly cavalier way 
of drawing up the options, especially from someone who has studied eighteenth-century moral 
philosophy.”). 
Kahan’s attempts to marshal empirical support from psychology and neuroscience 
demonstrate only that the evidence is not inconsistent with his theory, not that the evidence 
supports his theory. For example, regarding Damasio’s evidence that emotion is crucial to 
decision making, see Kahan, Two Conceptions, supra note 340, at 750 (citing DAMASIO, 
DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 149, at 173–83), and supra notes 337–39 and accompanying 
text. Kahan notes, “If being rational consists, at least in part, of ‘see[ing] which values [we] 
hold’ and knowing how to ‘deploy these values in [our] judgments,’ then ‘those who are 
unaware of their emotions or of their emotional lacks’ will necessarily be deficient in a capacity 
essential to be being ‘a rational person.’” Kahan, Two Conceptions, supra note 340, at 750 
(quoting MICHAEL STOCKER & ELIZABETH HEGEMAN, VALUING EMOTIONS 105 (1996)). 
 361. Kahan, Two Conceptions, supra note 340, at 752. 
 362. Id. at 752, 764. 
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preferences are given rather than chosen, regardless of their 
propriety. Kahan’s claim that decision inputs are products of reason 
is difficult to conceptualize without assuming that people are spirited 
by immaterial agents who exercise choice for them—a discredited 
and unempirical notion.363 
Emotional rationalism is also non-parsimonious in that it fails to 
account for attitudes and behavior outside the realm of risk 
perception. For example, emotional rationalism apparently would 
hold that racial prejudice is either an authentic expression of core 
values entitled to respect or evidence of an incorrect reasoned 
judgment that can be righted through rational discourse. Although 
viewing racial prejudice as an incorrect value judgment has some 
intuitive appeal, it is doubtful that this represents a complete picture 
of the phenomenon or that reasoned discourse alone would remedy 
it.364 Similarly, emotional rationalism has nothing to say about 
miswanting problems and empathy gaps—widespread evidence that 
our thoughts about our emotions are often mistaken.365 
It should be apparent that emotional rationalism’s cognitivist 
account of emotion also creates an internal inconsistency: on the one 
hand, emotional value judgments are products of reason; on the 
other, cultural worldviews (which are essentially emotional) have an 
overwhelming influence on the reasoning process. Likewise, in 
public policy, Kahan maintains that value judgments can be righted 
when wrong because they are reasoned, but that value conflicts are 
intractable because they are based on cultural worldviews that exert a 
high degree of control over reasoning. 
 
 363. See, e.g., STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN 
NATURE (2003). Emotional rationalism, like rational choice theory, also fails to explain the 
assumption that decisions are generally correct. This is in contrast to emotional irrationalism, 
which holds that decisions are often incorrect but fails to provide a basis for its paternalistic 
interventions. 
 364. To the contrary, a large volume of evidence suggests that racial prejudice is both 
generated and expressed beyond our perception, automatically and nonconsciously, and is 
difficult to perceive, much less to reason with. See supra notes 102–06 and accompanying text. 
 365. Emotional rationalism’s model also engages without sufficient explanation in a 
peculiar human exceptionalism. We expect other animals to lack the self-consciousness and 
reasoning ability upon which decision making depends in the emotional rationalist account. 
But if this is the case, then how do they make decisions? In fact, some proponents of emotional 
rationalism have doubled down on the theory on this point, making dubious claims about 
animal cognition, such as arguing that animals have schemes of goals and projects derived from 
reasoning about their own flourishing. See Blackburn, supra note 360, at 38 (criticizing 
Nussbaum’s humanization of emotions). 
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The solution to these problems is to drop the unempirical dead 
weight in cultural cognition theory—emotional rationalism, which 
holds that people’s value judgments are somehow “rational,” 
reasoned, or chosen. With a more realistic vision of emotion, cultural 
cognition theory would be more realistic, parsimonious, robust, and 
useful. Indeed, notwithstanding its shortcomings on the relationship 
between emotion and rationality, cultural cognition theory is correct 
in its core contentions. Ample evidence supports the claim that 
decisions are constituted from emotional motivations and status 
concerns and that information is processed through emotionally 
mediated knowledge structures366—a highly realist and situationist 
account of attitudes and behavior similar to the one I promote. 
3. Cultural cognition and risk regulation 
Cultural cognition theorists are ambivalent about the normative 
implications of their work, perhaps as a result of under-developed 
and sometimes mistaken views on emotion, rationality, and welfare. 
Although they apparently take some form of welfarism as their 
goal,367 they are unclear on whether they believe cultural cognition 
theory will provide answers to policy disputes, will improve political 
debate so that the democratic process can yield answers itself, or will 
merely assist experts and politicians in selling policies.368 They seem 
to waiver between suggesting that policy problems have correct 
answers on which people will converge, once the debate is improved, 
and saying that policy conflict is intractable. In parallel, they waiver 
between populism and paternalism. 
Cultural cognition’s emotional rationalist element makes it 
appear strongly populist at times. For example, it holds that experts 
have little or no special competence to resolve policy disputes 
because they demonstrate many of the systematic cultural biases 
found in non-experts369 and that everyone’s emotions are entitled to 
respect because they are generally rational and, when incorrect, may 
 
 366. See Kahan et al., supra note 315, at 1089–96; see also supra notes 342–47 and 
accompanying text. 
 367. See, e.g., Kahan & Braman, Public Policy, supra note 346, at 149. 
 368. See, e.g., Kahan et al., supra note 315, at 1107; Kahan, Two Conceptions, supra note 
340, at 765 (“[I]nformation about risks must be framed in a way that affirms rather than 
denigrates recipients’ cultural identities; to make it possible for persons of diverse cultural 
persuasions to experience that affirmation simultaneously . . . .”). 
 369. See Kahan et al., supra note 315, at 1105–06. 
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be righted through reasoned discourse.370 This stance on the 
rationality of emotions seems to suggest that people eventually will 
converge on “true” answers to policy questions. However, Kahan 
disclaims allegiance to “pro-market or populist programs of risk 
regulation,”371 and he and his colleagues are ambivalent about the 
possibility of political consensus.372 They view political debates as 
“status conflicts” between competing cultural groups373 and fear that 
deliberative democracy could harm individuals by subjecting them to 
open “cultural imperialism.”374 
Cultural cognition theorists have three answers to this problem, 
which, loosely speaking, can be labeled an emotional-rationalist 
answer, an emotional-irrationalist answer, and a situationist answer, 
respectively. First, if culture-based policy conflicts are intractable, 
then Sunstein’s insulated-experts model might be a better means of 
regulating risk because its superficially neutral analysis masks and 
mutes potentially harmful cultural conflict.375 This position is more 
surprising than Sunstein’s. Cultural cognition theorists’ emotional-
rationalist tendencies lead them to believe that ordinary people’s 
emotional value judgments are rational and worthy of respect in a 
democracy.376 They also recognize that experts cannot make policy 
without making value judgments and that they will do so in the same 
culturally determined manner as non-experts.377 Yet cultural 
cognition theorists will consider demurring to what they view to be 
 
 370. See id. at 1105 (“When expert regulators reject as irrational public assessments of 
the risks associated with putatively dangerous activities . . . they are in fact overriding public 
values. For just as citizens’ perceptions of the benefits of these activities express their 
worldviews, so too do their perceptions of the risks they pose.”); Kahan, Two Conceptions, 
supra note 340, at 760–63. 
 371. Kahan, Two Conceptions, supra note 340, at 762. 
 372. Kahan et al., supra note 315, at 1100–01. 
 373. Id. at 1095. 
 374. Id. at 1107 (“At the same time that [cultural cognition theory] extinguishes one 
ground for interfering with market and political evaluations of risk—that lay sensibilities are 
irrational—[it] arguably creates another: that those sensibilities sometimes reflect an unjust 
desire to use the expressive capital of the law to advance culturally imperialist ends.”). Note 
that this is a confession either that emotions are not always capable of being reasoned with and 
corrected, or that even if they are, there are multiple “correct” emotions. 
 375. Id. at 1108 (“[Emotional irrationalism’s] analytic deficiencies can be seen as 
conflict-abating discourse virtues: precisely because it ignores the decisive role that cultural 
values play in shaping competing perceptions of risk, that theory mutes the function that risk 
regulation plays in adjudicating between competing worldviews.”). 
 376. Id. at 1104–05. 
 377. Id. at 1092–94, 1105–08. 
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phony expert paternalism. It is one thing to adopt the emotional-
irrationalist approach of labeling certain values bad for welfare and 
attempting to substitute better ones; it is quite another to hold that 
all public values are entitled to respect but sometimes should be 
ignored and muted. Kahan and his colleagues accuse Sunstein in no 
uncertain terms of being afraid of democracy, but they may be 
equally if not more afraid,378 and they contemplate settling for a role 
as communications specialists for paternalists.379 
Second, Braman and Kahan suggest “debiasing” public policy 
debates by reducing the harmful effects of cultural cognition on 
rationality.380 In this respect, their writings are more emotional-
irrationalist than emotional-rationalist. Although they argue 
elsewhere that policy problems irreducibly turn on value judgments 
about which people will never agree,381 here Braman and Kahan 
seem to suggest that policy questions may have “true” answers, or at 
least answers on which people will converge if their thinking can be 
rationalized.382 This answer suffers from a problem discussed 
regarding emotional irrationalism: a conflation of what we might call 
questions of policy fact with questions of policy judgment. Although 
it is correct that emotion and knowledge structures moderate our 
processing of empirical knowledge, it is also true that, even when we 
have good knowledge, we still must make value judgments about 
policy.383 Kahan and Braman no doubt understand this, but much of 
their work curiously focuses on “debiasing” the debate on policy 
facts with too little acknowledgement that this answers only one part 
 
 378. See id. at 1106. Emotional irrationalists fear democracy only insomuch as people 
make bad choices; emotional rationalists apparently fear democracy even when people’s choices 
are good. 
 379. See id. at 1107–09. 
 380. See Kahan & Braman, Public Policy, supra note 346, at 164–66. 
 381. See Braman & Kahan, Fear of Guns, supra note 354, at 575 (“No amount of 
expected utility analysis can tell us whose vision of the good society—the egalitarian’s, the 
hierarchist’s, or the individualist’s—to prefer.”). 
 382. Kahan & Braman, Public Policy, supra note 346, at 166–68 (arguing that cultural 
cognition biases people’s receptivity to scientific answers on “policy issues”). 
 383. See infra Part V. For example, regarding gun control, the question which gun policy 
results in the fewest deaths is factual, and the question how we act on the answer requires a 
value judgment. 
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of the cultural-conflict puzzle.384 Even assuming we can settle factual 
disputes, policy choices remain.385 
Finally, Kahan and Braman advocate searching for policies that 
affirm multiple cultural identities at once, thereby breaking political 
gridlock.386 This approach is far more situationist in that it surrenders 
more to the notions that a-rational value judgments are inherent in 
all policy decisions and that successful policies often must mean 
different things to different people. This approach also has been 
effective and no doubt will continue to be.387 However, it still suffers 
from at least two problems. First, it cannot be expected to end policy 
conflict because every problem will continue to have numerous 
potential responses, even when we restrict ourselves to those with 
broad cross-cultural appeal. (Moreover, a good rhetorician can argue 
for any policy conclusion from any set of values. Therefore, the 
approach may narrow the scope of policy options much less than 
Kahan and Braman believe.) Second, something important has been 
lost along the way: Kahan and Braman propose only to lessen 
political conflict, not to yield good policy—a striking omission for 
welfarists. At times Kahan and Braman seem to suggest that experts 
need better messaging as much if not more than better policy.388 
Moreover, they do not address how we can tell whether one policy is 
qualitatively better than another or simply has been sold more 
effectively. Some very bad policies may be highly saleable. It seems 
intuitive that lessening cultural conflict in society will enhance 
welfare, but not if it comes at the cost of enacting harmful policies. 
My reading of Kahan and Braman suggests that they sense the 
problems I have identified, which is why they vacillate between 
suggesting that cultural cognition will help find good policy 
solutions, will help improve political debate, or merely help 
paternalists sell their policies. Much of this variation results from 
 
 384. See, e.g., Kahan & Braman, Public Policy, supra note 346, at 168–69 (suggesting 
that people will converge on policies when they are made receptive to empirical evidence). 
 385. This parallels the criticism of Sunstein’s cost-benefit analysis. Cost-benefit analysis 
helps only in ensuring consistent pursuit of policy goals; it does not diminish the need for 
judgments on what those goals should be. 
 386. Kahan & Braman, Public Policy, supra note 346, at 168–70. 
 387. Id. at 167–70. 
 388. See, e.g., Kahan, Two Conceptions, supra note 340, at 765 (“[I]nformation about 
risks must be framed in a way that affirms rather than denigrates recipients’ cultural identities; 
to make it possible for persons of diverse cultural persuasions to experience that affirmation 
simultaneously.”). 
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inconsistent views of emotion and rationality. For example, if 
emotions drive politics, emotions are generally rational, and people’s 
emotions differ intractably, then political disputes may be intractable 
as well. This view leads to the pessimistic demurral to expert 
paternalism. On the other hand, if emotional judgments are 
somewhat rational but not intractably different—if they can be 
reasoned with or “debiased”—then all we need is better political 
dialogue, through which people will converge on policy solutions. 
The third way that Braman and Kahan suggest is to find policies that 
are saleable to multiple cultural groups, but this approach drops the 
search for welfare-enhancing policy entirely. In short, cultural 
cognition may suggest several means of muting political conflict, but 
it does not help us answer questions about what is good for 
individuals and society. 
V. REAL EMOTION IN LAW 
Finally, we can outline the view emerging from the empirical 
evidence, name it, and compare it to theories of emotion in law. This 
view holds that emotion is critical to all decisions—not because it is a 
decision input, but because affective processes are the very approach-
and-avoidance or go/no-go processes that moderate other 
cognitions and drive most, if not all, behavior.389 Because these 
processes are interactions between our bodies and the environment, 
they are inherently context-dependent. They generally serve us well, 
but did not arise to make us happy.390 Thus, there is no reason to 
assume that any particular decision is rational in the sense of 
consistency or propriety. This is a critical realist and situationist 
account of emotion—critical realist because, following Jon Hanson 
 
 389. See Bechara & Damasio, supra note 159, at 360 (“[N]umerous and often conflicting 
somatic states may be triggered at the same time, but stronger ones gain selective advantage 
over weaker ones. . . . Thus over the course of pondering a decision, positive and negative 
somatic markers that are strong are reinforced, while weak ones are eliminated. This process of 
elimination can be very fast. Ultimately, an overall, more dominant, somatic state emerges (a 
“gut feeling” or a “hunch,” so to speak), which then provides signals to the telencephalon that 
modulate activity in neural structures involved in biasing decisions.”); id. at 363 (“The somatic 
marker hypothesis posits that when pondering a decision, separate thoughts . . . trigger a 
positive or negative somatic state. Depending on the relative strengths . . . of negative versus 
positive states, an overall somatic state will emerge that is either positive or negative.”); Zajonc, 
Feeling and Thinking, supra note 109, at 167–72. 
 390. See, e.g., Bechara & Damasio, supra note 159, at 353 (arguing that these processes 
evolved from a “fight of flight” response). 
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and David Yosifon’s definition of that term, it attempts to derive for 
law and legal theory a view of emotion that reflects the best available 
evidence about actual human thought and behavior, with the 
understanding that we should be skeptical about the possibility of 
neutral, apolitical knowledge on the matter.391 It is situationist 
because it views emotion not as a mere object of people’s choices, 
but instead as one of a myriad of often unseen situational factors that 
generate human behavior. We can think of this view as emotional 
situationism or emotional realism. 
A. Emotional Realism’s Empiricism 
Emotional realism squares with all the empirical evidence 
presented above and, in accordance with its realist goal, does not 
appear to be contradicted by any evidence in the literature. Also, 
emotional realism is the only view that explicitly takes a fully 
materialist, empirical approach to human behavior, assuming that the 
mind is composed of scientifically observable biological processes 
that interact with our environments and other aspects of our 
biology.392 
Emotional realism also requires fewer (if any) dubious 
assumptions. Foremost, it eschews the assumption common to other 
theories that at least some decision making is emotionless and 
“rational.” To illustrate the flaw in that approach, engage in the 
following thought experiment: imagine yourself without emotion if 
you can. Never mind that your life would be devoid of love, 
friendship, and art; imagine the effect on your decisions. Perhaps, 
like rational choice theory and emotional irrationalism predict, you 
would make better, even perfect, decisions to maximize your . . . 
your what? What would be your goals? Why would anything be good 
or bad? How would you decide anything? Why would you do 
anything? You wouldn’t. Even the simplest decisions require an 
affective judgment, and even the simplest behaviors require an 
 
 391. See Hanson & Yosifon, Situation, supra note 1, at 181. 
 392. See DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 149, at 252 (“[T]he comprehensive 
understanding of the human mind requires an organismic perspective; that not only must the 
mind move from a nonphysical cogitum to the realm of biological tissue, but it must also be 
related to a whole organism possessed of integrated body proper and brain and fully interactive 
with a physical and social environment.”). See generally Bechara & Damasio, supra note 159 
(discussing the influence of emotions in economic decision making and proposing a neural 
model for these decisions). 
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affective motivation.393 Pure logic cannot make judgments or 
animate behavior; it can only predict consequences. 
Emotional realism is also parsimonious in that it accommodates 
both human and other animal behavior394 and accords with 
evolutionary theory.395 It also could perhaps form the basis of a 
behavioral model. Because it describes behavior as the result of 
various go/no-go forces (mediated through knowledge structures 
and other aspects of cognition), it might even be amenable to 
modeling. Of course, such a model would be more complicated than 
a rational choice model and should be treated as purely descriptive, 
not as defining value. 
B. Emotional Realism in the Law 
Finally, we can discuss briefly what a realist view of emotion 
means for the law. Below, this Article outlines a few general 
principles, and then it sketches some potential applications. 
1. General framework 
a. Eschewing “emotion versus reason.” At the most general level, 
we should change the manner in which we conceive and discuss 
“emotion,” eschewing the simplistic and mistaken “emotion versus 
reason” dichotomy and recognizing that emotion is crucial to 
 
 393. The same is true for more complex decisions. Imagine a case so squarely controlled 
by legal authority that a result is dictated. Emotion is still required to decide the case. The 
judge adopts the result dictated by the law only because doing so is more attractive than 
aversive in that particular context—for example because the judge fears that the rule of law will 
break down if judges do not follow authority or is motivated to affirm a self-image as an 
impartial arbiter of law. 
 394. In fact, emotional realism treats human attitudes and behavior as constructed of the 
same building blocks that animate cellular behavior. See, e.g., DAMASIO, SPINOZA, supra note 
106, at 37–54, 144–52 (describing a unified theoretical model consisting of affective processes 
nested within affective processes that encompasses phenomena from basic metabolic regulation 
in unicellular organisms to complex decision making). 
 395. Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking, supra note 109, at 156 (“Affect is the first link in the 
evolution of complex adaptive functions that eventually differentiated animals from plants. And 
unlike language or cognition, affective responsiveness is universal among the animal species.”); 
id. at 169–70 (“Affect was there before we evolved language and our present form of thinking. 
The limbic system that controls emotional reactions was there before we evolved language and 
our present form of thinking. It was there before the neocortex, and it occupies a large 
proportion of the brain mass in lower animals. Before we evolved language and our cognitive 
capacities, which are so deeply dependent on language, it was the affective system alone upon 
which the organism relied for its adaptation.”). 
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decision making. To be sure, various forms of emotionality are more 
and less desirable, and the “emotion versus reason” frame captures 
the important point that decision making appears to occur through 
varying levels of interaction between primary emotions (quicker and 
more immediate, usually provoked more directly by environmental 
stimuli) and secondary emotions (from memory, schemas, and 
deliberation).396 But this only underscores that it is a mistake to label 
“emotion” the culprit. Rather than denigrate emotion outright, 
attempts to prescribe behavior should study the role that various 
types of emotion play in different situations and inquire how to 
promote some influences and mute others.397 Of course, we need a 
theory of welfare before we can do this. We should cease insisting 
that people think and act “reasonably” or “rationally” rather than 
“emotionally.” Or perhaps the word “reason” will come to signify 
something more clearly emotional. 
b. Process: the primacy of emotion and automaticity. The law also 
should take emotion’s role in behavior much more seriously, which 
means treating it as primary rather than secondary (or, worse, as a 
source of interference) in decisions. Emotion in the form of what is 
appealing and aversive is at the core of incentives and behavior. This 
means that regulators seeking to influence behavior and to prevent 
undesirable influences on people’s behavior should pay far more 
attention to non-linguistic forms of information, communication, 
and influence. This includes subtle, situational manipulations of 
affective cues and emotional communication through direct appeals, 
images, and even smells and tastes. 
Emotional realism requires us to recognize “reason” or 
“rationality” for what it is—an evolutionary late-comer, flawed, 
limited, and incapable of directing most day-to-day thought and 
action. As a result, we should be less sanguine about remedying 
behavioral problems with information or reasoned persuasion. 
Additionally, because so much human behavior is nonconscious, 
automatic, and not readily amenable to inspection, we should 
reevaluate areas of the law that depend on proving states of mind. 
 
 396. See Bechara & Damasio, supra note 159, at 340; cf. George Loewenstein & Ted 
O’Donoghue, Animal Spirits: Affective and Deliberative Processes in Economic Behavior 13–
21 (May 2005) (unpublished manuscript). 
 397. For some work in this area, see Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, supra note 297. 
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c. Ends: welfarism and revealed preferences. Emotional realism 
recognizes that people’s actions do not necessarily demonstrate what 
increases their well-being, or even what they think will do so. The 
more useful assumption is that actions reveal little more than 
people’s interactions with the environment—responses to current 
affective incentives, which include both immediate environmental 
influences and mental representations of past and future events. 
Welfarists should move away from the circular definitions of welfare 
and preferences employed by rational choice theory and emotional 
irrationalism and instead examine the real causes of human 
happiness. At a minimum, strong evidence suggests that material 
wealth provides little if any welfare gains to people who already live 
above some floor of material comfort,398 suggesting that economic 
efficiency should not be a dominant goal of welfarists and that legal 
doctrines attuned to efficiency should be reevaluated. 
2. Specific applications 
a. Employment discrimination. The law of race discrimination has 
already benefitted from an application of affective theory. For 
example, Linda Hamilton Krieger and Susan Fiske have argued that 
Title VII analysis should account for nonconscious affective 
influences.399 They argue that an employment decision is motivated 
by a protected characteristic merely when “the characteristic served 
as a stimulus which, interacting with the decision maker’s internal 
biased mental state, led the decision maker to behave toward the 
person differently than he otherwise would.”400 Krieger and Fiske 
affirm that this process is often nonconscious and automatic, in 
contrast to the prevailing legal assumption that it must be conscious 
and deliberate,401 and they recognize that the operation of such 
biases is inherently context dependent.402 They argue that jurors 
should determine whether this sort of influence took place and even 
 
 398. See supra text accompanying notes 16–26. 
 399. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 1, at 1056. 
 400. Id. 
 401. Id. at 1057. 
 402. Id. 
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argue that such a regime will not alter the types of evidence used in 
Title VII litigation.403 
This work is important, and a very good start, but Krieger and 
Fiske may be mistaken to conclude that recognizing Title VII 
violations for instances of nonconscious prejudice will change little 
about Title VII litigation. To the contrary, the approach might alter 
Title VII litigation dramatically or even destabilize the regime 
irreparably. The evidence on nonconscious prejudice suggests that, 
under a regime that recognizes a violation of Title VII where a 
decision has been motivated in any part by nonconscious racial 
discrimination, liability will be found in a far higher percentage of 
cases, and increasingly so as plaintiffs develop better means of 
proof.404 In short, if nonconscious prejudice is as common as 
researchers believe, and if plaintiffs learn how to prove its presence in 
individual cases, then defendants might lose the majority of Title VII 
cases. It is doubtful that this result will be politically or legally 
palatable. 
There are two potential responses to the Krieger and Fiske 
research. First, create some doctrinal limit on Title VII liability for 
nonconscious prejudice in employment. For example, rather than 
finding liability whenever nonconscious prejudice plays any role in an 
adverse employment action, one could establish a minimum 
threshold of required influence. A second and more drastic response 
would be to conclude that private litigation—or at least the current 
private litigation regime—is not a good solution to workplace 
discrimination. A full discussion of these issues is well beyond the 
scope of this Article. For present purposes, the point is that, as 
 
 403. Id. at 1059 (“Under the framework we propose, the evidence would remain much 
the same, but the inferences reasonably drawn from that evidence, and the nature of the 
ultimate fact the evidence would be offered to prove, would expand to accommodate the 
insight that disparate treatment can result from the uncorrected influence of implicit 
stereotypes as well as from their deliberate, fully conscious use.”). Jerry Kang and Mahzarin 
Banaji have taken a situationist perspective in discussing the question when affirmative action 
programs should end. Because there is strong evidence that racial bias operates nonconsciously 
and that people are not aware of its influence and do not report it accurately, they argue that 
appeals to “colorblindness” are deeply misguided and fixed dates for ending affirmative action, 
such as Justice O’Connor’s suggestion of twenty-five years, are arbitrary. See Kang & Banaji, 
supra note 195, at 1115–17. Instead, “[f]air measures that are race- or gender-conscious will 
become presumptively unnecessary when the nation’s implicit bias against those social 
categories goes to zero or its negligible behavioral equivalent.” Id. at 1116. 
 404. Not to mention that a wealth of currently discounted circumstantial evidence will 
have much greater impact on outcomes.  
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evidence mounts that most people are unwittingly prejudiced most 
of the time, a regime that finds liability for such prejudice may be 
strained deeply, then broken, by intractable problems of evidence 
and line-drawing. 
b. Advertising and consumer protection. Emotional realism also 
has substantial implications for consumer law. Foremost, it suggests 
that advertisers will strive to influence people nonconsciously and 
affectively, seizing upon the mechanisms outlined in Part III above, 
in what I would term affectising. A mere glance at television 
commercials confirms this.405 Policymakers should undertake a 
serious analysis of the benefits and harms of attempts to influence 
people emotionally and nonconsciously, for “feelings are the sensors 
for the match or lack thereof between nature and circumstance.”406 
Emotional realism also predicts that consumers will be influenced by 
other forms of persuasion such as statements deemed so outlandish 
that no “rational” person would believe them, statements made only 
for entertainment value, and statements of opinion. Contemporary 
consumer law, with its rationalized focus on false factual claims 
(“deception”) and unavoidable harm to consumers (“unfairness”), 
has virtually nothing to say about these forms of communication, 
even though they are the principal means by which firms attempt to 
influence consumers. 
If one maintains the goal of rationalizing or debiasing consumer 
decisions, then a potential response to affectising is an effects test 
under which a statement is unfair or deceptive if it makes an effective 
claim that is not a true statement of fact. By definition, these 
communications succeed by influencing people in a manner other 
than by engaging their rational faculties. However, such an approach 
may be overbroad. Given limited human capacities for information 
processing and reasoning, it seems likely that non-linguistic and 
emotional forms of communication may be desirable in some 
instances. The difficulty, then, will be discerning the valuable from 
the wasteful and harmful. 
 
 405. For excellent work on this point, see Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note 13; 
Hanson & Kysar, TBS II, supra note 13. 
 406. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 149, at xv (“And by nature I mean both 
the nature we inherited as a pack of genetically engineered adaptations, and the nature we have 
acquired in individual development, through interactions with our social environment, 
mindfully and willfully as well as not.”). 
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Other aspects of consumer law require reexamination as well—
for example, laws regarding causation and states of mind. The 
evidence reviewed in this Article suggests that the causes of 
consumer choices are often unknown and unknowable, even to 
consumers themselves.407 This suggests that requiring consumers to 
show reliance on particular representations might be nonsensical and 
harsh in some instances. 
Similarly, regarding sellers’ states of mind, firms should be 
expected to attempt to influence consumers in numerous ways that 
the firms themselves do not understand, and to succeed in many 
instances.408 This means that many unfair and deceptive practices will 
not necessarily be intended. Moreover, the question whether a 
deceptive act is committed intentionally should have little bearing on 
its legality. For these reasons, common-law seller scienter 
requirements, still present in some consumer protection statutes, also 
may present a senseless and often insurmountable hurdle for 
consumers. For these reasons, recent attacks on modern consumer 
protection statutes that urge stricter common-law standards of 
reliance and seller intent409 may be deeply flawed. 
Finally, advertising is becoming increasingly narrowly targeted at 
particular individuals and situations—acutely tuned to reach just the 
right person, in just the right way, in just the right context—to 
maximize a-rational influence on people.410 These efforts may cross a 
 
 407. See supra Part III.B. This is a core feature of automaticity research. For a superb 
overview on how nonconscious processes guide behavior outside our awareness, see TIMOTHY 
WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE ADAPTIVE UNCONSCIOUS (2002). 
 408. As Hanson has explained in several different articles, firms are in stiff competition to 
influence consumers, experimenting constantly with different approaches, and can be expected 
to succeed in many instances even without understanding what they are doing. See Hanson & 
Kysar, TBS I, supra note 13; Hanson & Kysar, TBS II, supra note 13; Hanson & Yosifon, 
Situation, supra note 1. 
 409. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. GRIEVE, HARM-LESS LAWSUITS? 4–9 (2006); Victor E. 
Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1 (2006). 
 410. See, e.g., Michele Gershberg, Yahoo Beefs Up Target Advertising Tools, REUTERS, 
July 2, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/industryNews/idUSSP25867220070702 (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2008) (describing Yahoo’s plans to use behavioral targeting to fine-tune 
advertisements to particular users); Alana Semuels, Yahoo Lets Consumers Opt Out of Targeted 
Advertising. Everyone Rejoice?, BLOG OF THE L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8 2008, 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2008/08/yahoo-lets-cons.html (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2008) (describing Yahoo’s decision to let users opt out of targeted advertising, a 
response to scrutiny of targeted advertising by the House Energy and Commerce Committee 
of the United States House of Representatives). 
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threshold that regulators and judges should recognize as “unfair.” A 
difficult inquiry, ripe for examination, is how the concept of 
“unfairness” might extend, in a principled manner, to embrace some 
forms of intense targeting of individual consumers and consumer 
subpopulations. 
In sum, emotional realism counsels a broad reexamination of 
advertising law, including legal treatment of marketing content, 
delivery methods, and burdens of proof and defenses in litigation.411 
c. Other substantive applications. A realistic view of emotion 
should have numerous other applications, particularly for areas of law 
concerned with intent, decision making, or non-linguistic 
communication. For example, contract law perhaps should 
acknowledge more instances of emotional weakness sufficient to 
undo contracts, and perhaps judges should be especially sensitive to 
the potential for harm and manipulation by false friends and 
romantic partners.412 More generally, tort and contract law perhaps 
should acknowledge that different emotional relationships between 
people might give rise to different legal rights and obligations.413 In 
the First Amendment context, evidence of the importance of non-
linguistic communication may counsel for better protection of 
expressive conduct. 
In criminal law, emotional realism’s insight into incentives might 
alter the punishments we enact. For example, we punish “heat of 
passion” crimes less because we find them less morally repugnant. 
Emotional realism suggests that this retributive approach may defeat 
our deterrence objectives. If the key to deterring a crime is to create 
negative consequences so emotionally salient that they outweigh the 
affirmative motivation to commit an unlawful act, then perhaps heat 
of passion crimes require stiffer consequences (or just very different 
ones). The stronger one’s emotional motivation to commit a crime, 
 
 411. Little work has been done in this area. In the products liability context, Hanson and 
Kysar have argued that problems of market manipulation bolster the case for enterprise 
liability. See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note 13; Hanson & Kysar, TBS II, supra note 13. 
David Hoffman has argued for a rebuttable presumption that puffery is unlawful. See David A. 
Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever (June 1, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author). 
 412. See Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, supra note 297, at 66; Ethan J. Leib, 
Friendship & the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 631, 685–94 (2007). 
 413. See, e.g., Leib, supra note 412, at 685–94 (analyzing potential unique rights and 
obligations in the context of friendship). Another area ripe for inquiry is the law of transactions 
between emotional humans and organizations that do not experience emotion. 
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however momentary, the stronger the emotional deterrent needed to 
stop it. 
d. Something missing in law school admissions. Finally, setting 
aside substantive law, emotional realism also suggests that there may 
be something important missing in law school admissions. If 
emotion is critical to reason—if all judgments are based upon 
emotions and emotional values—then law schools may be remiss to 
rely heavily on the Law School Admission Test, which evaluates 
reading comprehension and logical reasoning, and to ignore 
measures of emotional or social intelligence.414 This proposition may 
sound radical. But given the importance of emotion in decisions—
particularly in social decisions, the core province of law—we may be 
deeply mistaken to train new lawyers, judges, and policymakers who 
excel in traditional measures of intellect without ensuring that they 
also have good emotional faculties. 
3. Emotional realism in risk regulation 
Finally, having discussed the shortcomings of emotional 
irrationalism and emotional rationalism in the risk regulation 
context, it is necessary to explain why emotional realism might 
provide a better approach. The starting point is that we have no 
coherent, settled definition of welfare on which to base policy. 
Notions of the good appear to be irreducibly a-rational and 
impervious to scientific resolution; therefore, normative economics is 
pseudoscience, and policy making tailored to its vision of welfare is 
the pursuit of particular values behind a mask of neutrality.415 
Neither emotional irrationalism nor emotional rationalism answers 
this problem. 
Emotional realism suggests a potentially fruitful line of inquiry by 
refocusing, as this Article has focused, on processes rather than 
objects. I mean this in two ways. First welfare, like the emotions that 
it represents, is probably better viewed as a process than an object. 
We should conceptualize well-being as the process of being well, not 
as a set of objects amenable to enumeration and accumulation. To be 
sure, empirical evidence provides a basis for object-like components 
 
 414. See generally DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE: WHY IT CAN 
MATTER MORE THAN IQ (1997); GOLEMAN, SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE, supra note 56. 
 415. For similar views, see ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 316, at 8–12; Kahan 
et al., supra note 315. 
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of welfare, such as minimum standards of material comfort and 
equality, below which people are demonstrably unhappy.416 But aside 
from baselines of wealth, equality, and autonomy, the evidence 
suggests that we experience well-being for the most part through 
processes such as close relationships and activities that engage our 
skills and interests constructively, not through the acquisition and 
retention of objects and statuses.417 This may mean that some 
processes (such as close relationships and engaging activities) are so 
generally good for well-being that regulators should promote them 
as policy objects. Or it may mean simply that policy makers should 
foster circumstances under which people can engage in flourishing 
behavior on their own. Even more simply, policy makers might start 
by reducing impediments to such activity.418 
Second, if we cannot agree on the objects of policy—for 
example, the amount we are willing to pay to save a life—then we 
should work to find good processes for resolving them. Regarding 
the process of fashioning risk regulation policy, emotional realism 
suggests that the insulated-experts model is deeply mistaken. 
Regulators should attempt to incorporate public emotion (albeit 
with moderation) rather than insulate policy from it. Because we 
cannot define welfare without resorting to emotional value 
judgments, policy makers have no purely rational metrics to follow, 
and they need emotional guidance, whether their own or the 
 
 416. See supra text accompanying notes 16–26. This suggests that a policy of maximizing 
the size of the economy and the efficiency of legal rules at the expense of ensuring minimum 
living standards and better distribution of benefits is wasteful and misguided from a welfarist 
perspective. 
 417. See supra text accompanying note 27 (discussing close well-being and relationships); 
MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, FLOW: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF OPTIMAL EXPERIENCE (1990); 
DAMASIO, SPINOZA, supra note 106, at 137 (“Joyous states signify optimal physiological 
coordination and smooth running of the operations of life.”).  
 418. For example, policy makers could work to reduce economic stress and lack of 
autonomy in people’s lives even if those changes appear to come at the expense of economic 
models of efficiency. And we should reexamine government interference with welfare-
enhancing processes—for example, marriage. Given strong evidence that marriage is one of the 
clearest sources of positive well-being, laws banning marriage between consenting adults, such 
as homosexual marriage bans, may be exceedingly cruel and costly in terms of well-being, 
preventing people from engaging in an activity more likely than any other to contribute to 
their happiness. (There is still a lurking empirical question whether close relationships between 
unmarried people yield similar happiness.) If the Constitution provides any substantive due 
process protection, it should provide a right to engage in the personal relationship more likely 
than any other to yield well-being, and states ought to meet an extremely high burden to 
interfere with it. 
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public’s. Insulated experts may pursue policies that do not reflect 
public values, or even policies that harm people, and their sterile, 
technical analyses may miss problems that the public’s affective 
processes can perceive. Moreover, as cultural cognition theorists 
point out, it is difficult to argue in a liberal state that the public’s 
value judgments are not entitled to respect.419 At the same time, it is 
not clear that the cultural-cognition approach of finding policies that 
appeal to people of differing cultural worldviews will yield good 
policy, rather than merely muting political conflict. Also, the 
approach retains a highly paternalist element because someone still 
must choose policies and devise the means of selling them to the 
public. Finally, the greatest risk in paternalist approaches is their 
potential to undermine even the baselines of well-being—minimum 
standards of material wealth, equality, and autonomy under which 
people can flourish. History instructs us amply on the dangers of 
paternalism, particularly when it is not grounded in coherent theory 
and policy makers lack clear boundaries. 
For all of these reasons, risk regulation should reflect public 
emotion at least as much as it should be protected from it. At the 
same time, risk regulation should not be derived directly from public 
input (for example through direct democracy). This is for two 
reasons. First, although emotions underlie all policy judgments, 
emotional realism recognizes that people’s emotions are not always 
good for them and may be spectacularly wrong in some instances, 
particularly, as Sunstein argues, when they are products of high-
profile scares.420 Therefore, we would be mistaken to plug public 
emotions directly into policy without some kind of moderator or 
gatekeeper.421 Second, individuals can make only a limited number of 
reasoned decisions, and many decisions, or merely having too many 
decisions, can burden us and diminish our well-being. We lack the 
time or resources to reason carefully about many aspects of our lives 
and therefore properly rely on others to help us. 
 
 419. See Kahan et al., supra note 315, at 1105. Also, the failure to address certain types of 
emotionality in policy can cause unhappiness. That is, even if the public’s concern for 
something appears misguided, the public cares nonetheless and might be harmed by regulatory 
inattention to the perceived problem. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 316, at 
130–36. Sunstein appears to agree with this point. See SUNSTEIN, FEAR, supra note 7, at 127. 
 420. SUNSTEIN, FEAR, supra note 7, at 89–106. 
 421. Of course, as discussed earlier in this section, we should seek a means of 
distinguishing the good from the bad better than the emotional-irrationalist approach of 
guesswork and intuition. 
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Our best hope in risk regulation, then, is to place policy in the 
hands of experts, but also to ensure that they share public values. In 
short, we need well-functioning republicanism. This proposition is 
strikingly absent from the risk regulation debate, given its prospects 
for moderating between expertise and public values. Republicanism 
is also sorely lacking in the contemporary administrative state, which 
is composed of officials appointed by the President (who is never 
elected or defeated on the basis of an administrative appointment) 
and characterized by regulations and procedures that are opaque and 
inaccessible to the general public. 
A discussion of how best to foster republicanism in risk 
regulation is obviously beyond the scope of this Article, but several 
possibilities are worth exploring. One approach would be to employ 
periodic citizen panels with diverse memberships to develop expertise 
and recommend policies. Another would be to rely as we currently 
do on professional experts, but also to make them more accountable 
to the public, perhaps through direct elections. Others possibilities 
are to enhance citizen participation in special commission 
recommendations or in the agency rulemaking process. Whatever the 
means, the goal is simple: we want other people to make important 
decisions for us, and we want those people to share our values. It is 
unlikely that regulators will share our values at all times, given the 
differences among us. That is why they must be accountable to us, 
ensuring that policy judgments are accessible and susceptible to 
modification. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has attempted to say much, but it can be reduced to 
a single point—law and legal theory treat emotion primarily as an 
object of reasoned decisions and policy making and as a source of 
interference in decisions, but empirical evidence suggests that 
emotion is a behavioral process that is critical to decisions. This shift 
in viewpoint has widespread implications for law, legal theory, and 
policy. As a descriptive matter, it suggests that we should reevaluate 
legal doctrines that rely on the assumption that humans are mostly 
emotionless actors and reexamine areas of law that concern consent, 
states of mind, and the causes of behavior. As a normative matter, 
emotional realism suggests that we have no empirical or even 
internally consistent definition of welfare on which to base policy. 
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Welfarists should seek a new definition, and they are more likely to 
find it in processes than in objects. There is much work to be done. 
 
